




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# JOURNAL *of* LIBERTY *and* INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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Vol. 5, No. 1 | 2019





*Journal of Liberty and International Affairs is published by  
The Institute for Research and European Studies – Bitola*

For further information, please visit: [www.e-jlia.com](http://www.e-jlia.com)

eISSN 1857-9760

*First published in April 2015*

Please send all articles, essays, reviews, documents and enquiries to:

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Peer review method: Double-Blind

Date of acceptance: March 25, 2019

Date of publication: May 25, 2019

Original scientific article

UDC 81'272:340.132(497.7)

342.725:340.132(497.7)

Scan the QR code:



## EXPLAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE LAW ON THE USE OF LANGUAGES IN MACEDONIA<sup>1</sup>

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**Abstract:** *This article aims to explain citizens' support for the Law on the Use of Languages (LUL) through their demographic characteristics, political participation, party affiliation and ethnic belonging. We base this article on an empirical ordered logistic regression models using an original database of 669 Macedonian respondents. We compare the support of Macedonian public for the LUL with the support for the general idea of promotion of the use of the languages of the non-majority ethnic communities in Macedonia. We argue that both the support for promotion of minority languages in Macedonia, as well as the support for this concrete Law depends mainly on citizens' ethnicity and party affiliation. We find statistically significant opposition for the LUL among the ethnic Macedonians, the (Macedonian / mainstream) opposition parties, the participants in the so called 'For a Shared Macedonia' initiative, and those whose mother tongue is a minority language other than the Albanian.*

**Keywords:** *Language Policies; Minority Languages; Ethnicity; Ethnic-Parties; Macedonia*

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<sup>1</sup> In this article the name Macedonia or Republic of Macedonia for the country whose current name is the Republic of North Macedonia is used due to the fact that the actions described in the text took place before the country's name change.

## INTRODUCTION

The linguistic diversity in Macedonia, reflecting its ethnic structure, has always been considered a cultural treasure of the Macedonian society.<sup>2</sup> Be that as it may, the language policy has been among the most politicized issues in the country, always in the focal point of parties' electoral campaigns.

The Law on the Use of Languages (LUL) of 2018, stipulating the Albanian language as a second official language on the whole territory of Macedonia, provoked once again a fierce public debate. While the government promoted the law as a policy adopted for promotion of the use of all non-majority ethnic communities' languages in Macedonia (Government of RNM 2018), the opposition accused the government of adopting a law which lacks larger public support, it is not evidence-based, it is unconstitutional, and it harms the status of the Macedonian language and identity. (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 6 - 11). The opposition parties assessed the LUL as unnecessary because the 2008 Law had already assured the official use of the Albanian language at local level, along with the use of the smaller national minorities, in those local units where national minorities make more than 20% of the population.

Even though the rhetoric within the political scene, academia and public opinion was largely contrasting, a generally positive attitude towards the idea for a further promotion of the use of the languages of national minorities prevailed in the public discourse. The main critique was directed toward the procedure of adoption of the law, the constitutionality of its contents and the exclusion of the stakeholders from the consultation processes. (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 20) The lack of public debate suggests that the stakeholders were not consulted before the law adoption, which we can also see in the lack of publicly available analyses on the issue.

Thus, in this article we address the issue of public support for the LUL and we aim to explain it through voters' political participation, party affiliation, ethnic belonging and socio-demographic characteristics. We compare the support of the Macedonian public for the LUL with the support for the general idea of promotion of the use of the languages spoken by the non-majority ethnic communities in Macedonia.

We base this article on a quantitative analysis. We run logistic regression models using an original data-base of 669 Macedonian voters. We argue that the general support for the promotion of minority languages in Macedonia, as well as the support for this concrete LUL, depends mainly on ethnicity, party affiliation and political participation of the voters. We shall prove that the significant opposition comes from the ethnic Macedonians, the (ethnic Macedonian/mainstream) opposition parties, the participants in the so called 'For a Shared Macedonia' movement, and those whose

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<sup>2</sup> The Macedonian language is the mother tongue to 66.49% of the population, the Albanian language to 25.12%, the Turkish language to 3.55% and the rest goes for Roma, Serbian, Vlach and some other languages.

mother tongue is minority language other than the Albanian. On the other hand we expect to find higher chances for support for the LUL among the supporters of the governmental parties and the participants in the 'Colorful Revolution'.

Through the next five subsections we shall introduce the reader with the contextual background, the hypotheses, the methodological approach and data, the results and our final conclusions.

## CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

The 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia allowed the use of minority languages in local self-government units if the language community was majority,<sup>3</sup> (Bliznakovski 2011), while the 2001 constitutional (amendments) introduced major changes in the official use of the languages of minority communities, which according to Treneska-Deskoska (2017, 64) influenced the quality and clarity of the new provisions and caused different interpretations during their statutory regulation and everyday application. The 2008 Law on the Use of Languages spoken by at least 20% of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia and the units of the local self-government (Official Gazette 2008/2011) expressively improved the use of languages of no majority ethnic communities. Official languages within the local self-government according to this law could be languages used by 20% of citizens living in the relevant local government, and languages that make up less than 20% could also use their language as official if the municipal council adopts such decision. In 30 out of 81 municipalities, together with the City of Skopje, the Albanian language was official at the level of those municipalities (Bliznakovski 2014), while Turkish, Serbian, Vlach, Romani and Bosniak were used according to the same rules in a smaller number of municipalities (Bliznakovski 2011). Yet, numerous remarks (from different nature) appeared on the implementation of the 2008 Law (Bliznakovski 2014, Treneska-Deskoska 2017, 65-6).

Because the legal provisions regulating the official use of languages in Macedonia were always a result of difficult negotiations between the parties speaking for the ethnic-Albanian community and the leading mainstream/ethnic-Macedonian parties, Treneska-Deskoska (2017) argues that some of the provisions remained unclear and open to different interpretations. She (Treneska-Deskoska 2017, 67) will further claim that, in order to manipulate their electorate, immature politicians, "locked in ethnic suites", obstruct building inter-ethnic peace and intentionally fuel mistrust among ethnic groups by keeping them in fear of the 'enemies' (from other ethnic groups). The 2016 pre-elections in Macedonia were expected to put an end to the political crisis that endured for several years before. The contentious politics (Tilly and Tarrow 2015) seen in

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<sup>3</sup> Additionally, the municipal council could decide on the official use of the languages spoken by at least 50% of the population in that municipality.

the anti-governmental protests and the counter protests was 'silenced' by an 'aggressive' party campaign coming from both the incumbent parties and the then opposition. The always dominating inter-ethnic issues in Macedonia, which according to Engström (2002) happen when the state and civil society in a country are weak, have once more found their space in party programmes, with the language policy being in the spotlight.

Marác (2014, 46) argues that language groups that do not control the state language are excluded from power and therefore struggle for recognition in order to get access to the power structure of the state in their first language. The issue of the recognition of the Albanian language as a second official language on the whole territory was vigorously campaigned by the Albanian parties and, albeit ambiguously, by the mainstream Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (the Macedonian acronym SDSM) before the 2016 elections. Yet, the very narrow electoral difference between the two biggest parties from the so called 'Macedonian block' empowered the parties from the 'Albanian Block' in the coalition bargaining process. Therefore, the post-electoral joint 'Albanian Platform' (Mejdini 2017) emphasized the issue of the Albanian language recognition as one of the imperatives for the ethnic-Albanian parties. The "Albanian" mandates were crucial for forming a government which eventually resulted in a change of power.

The new government led by SDSM in its 2017-2020 program (Government of the RNM 2017a), committed itself to support a proposal for a legal solution for the use of languages that will extend the use of the official language spoken by more than 20% of the citizens. In the National Program for the Adoption of the Law of the European Union 2017-2019 the Government stated that the activities to promote the policy of the use of the official languages of communities could continue, and that the Secretariat for the Implementation of the Framework Agreement would prepare action plan(s) on how to achieve the set of goals in the Review of the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement for Social Cohesion. The Government's 'Plan 3-6-9' (Government of the RNM 2017b) envisaged the adoption of a Draft Law on the Use of Languages, but the Draft LUL was not among the initiatives with high priority within the program of the Government for the period June-December 2017. The Draft LUL was ready in August 2017, but a strategic planning for the law is missing from the strategic plan 2017-2019 of the Ministry of Justice (the proposer of the LUL) (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 9).

In the period between September and November 2017, after the first reading in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, the Committee on European Affairs (CEA), the Committee on the Political System and Inter-Ethnic Relations (CPSIER) and the Legislative Committee (LC) each recommended that the draft law goes for a second reading. Thus, in November the draft law was considered and it was concluded that it was acceptable for a second reading. At the second readings by CEA and LC, 90 amendments submitted by the Members of Parliament were not open to hearing,



because pursuant to Article 171c8 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (2013), the deadline of at least three working days for hearing the amendments (stipulated for laws having the European Flag) had expired. At the LC session the draft law was implemented in a further procedure, and on 11 January, 2018, in the absence of the opposition, the LUL was passed at the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia. The President of the Republic of Macedonia did not sign the decree on the LUL. On 14 March, 2018, the LUL was voted for the second time in the Assembly, with none of the 35,569 previously submitted amendments from the opposition being accepted. The President of the Republic of Macedonia for the second time did not sign the decree on the LUL (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 20).

Finally, on 14 January, 2019, LUL was published in the Official Gazette, signed only by the President of the Assembly of Republic of Macedonia, without signature of the President of Republic of Macedonia.

## HYPOTHESES

The issues with the short procedure of the Law adoption (deriving from the 'European Flag') that partially resulted in lack of consultations with the stakeholders, and the avoidance of the parliamentary majority to discuss the opposition's amendments, ignited severe debate in the public. This consultation void was also seen in the scarce public opinion inquires. Very few national public opinion surveys are available on the language policy in Macedonia and the very LUL. The first offered national survey was conducted immediately after the announcement of the LUL draft proposal by the 'Pavel Shatev' Institute, on a sample of 1000 respondents. The survey reveals very low support for the LUL. 88% from the respondents did not support the law, and 80% believed that the law leads to federalization of Macedonia (Kanal 5 2017).

In February 2018, the Institute for Democracy 'Societas Civilis' - Skopje (IDSCS 2018) conducted a national survey on a representative sample of 1000 respondent. However the available results explain citizens' perceptions of the practice of use of the languages in Macedonia after the adoption of LUL. According to this survey 57% of the respondents believe that the Macedonian language will be used as a common language in Macedonia, and 34% believed that each ethnic community will use its own language. The perceptions in this survey differed according to the party affiliation of the respondents and their level of trust in the institutions. 51% from the respondents believe that the LUL will not improve the inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia, while 44% do not. The opinions in this case depend on respondents' party affiliation and ethnicity. The voters for the opposition party Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (the Macedonian acronym VMRO-DPMNE) were less optimistic than the voters for the governing SDSM. The voters for the ethnic-Albanian parties were very optimistic, but those voting for smaller ethnic-

Albanian party were less optimistic than those voting for the leading ethnic-Albanian party in government that proposed the law. A survey on a sample of 669 respondents, conducted by the Center for Deliberative Democracy- Dialogue (CDDD) in April-May 2018, managed to cover a spectrum of questions addressing the LUL, which provided a more thorough analysis on the motives for citizens' perceptions on LUL. 64.1% of the citizens do not support the law at all, while only 18.7% extremely support it. As regarding the idea that the use of languages of non-majority communities in Macedonia should be promoted, 45% do not support it at all, while 22% consider it as very necessary (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 27). The trend of support between these two issues is largely analogous. Yet, the question remains: what explains the public opinion on the LUL?

Although many factors could be part of the explanation of the citizens' level of support for LUL and for the very idea of promotion of the use of non-majority languages some are stronger than others. This has been thoroughly elaborated in Rizankoska and Trajkoska's (2018) work where we can see that among the most influential factors that created the public opinion on the LUL were: the content of the very law, the constitutional and the legal aspects of the adoption of the law, and their opinion on the concept of multiculturalism in Macedonia. On the other hand, we can see how voters themselves stated that their ethnicity and their opinion on the political parties that adopted the law were the least important reasons for their own positive or negative perceptions of the LUL (2018, 29).

We, therefore, test whether indeed ethnic belonging of the citizens, including their mother tongue, their party affiliation and political participation stand aside in the process of public opinion formation. We shall argue, nonetheless, that it is mostly ethnicity and political beliefs (typically party attachment) that create the public opinion in this case, and that socio-demographic characteristic has almost no explanatory power. We will cluster the variables in three main sets of hypotheses.

To start with the first cluster, we believe political participation has the highest explanatory power. Thus, we hypothesize that those respondents that in 2016 national elections voted for the SDSM Coalition (then the leading opposition party, and after 2017 the leading governmental party) should support the LUL. The reasoning behind this is because SDSM, along with the ethnic Albanian party – Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), was the party that proposed the Law and campaigned the very issue of bilingualism (albeit ambiguously) before the 2016 elections (H1). We also expect to find positive perceptions on the LUL among those citizens who voted for the parties representing the ethnic-Albanian community because the Law promotes the use of this very ethnic group's language (H3). Negative opinion on the LUL is expected to come from those citizens voting for the opposition parties in the moment of drafting and adopting of the law (mostly VMRO-DPMNE and Levica), which openly opposed LUL, and strongly advocated for its withdrawal (H2).

VMRO-DPMNE has opposed the idea of the bilingualism on the whole territory even during the pre-electoral campaign, but have reacted more strongly on the lack of public debate (VMRO-DPMNE 2017) and asked for the withdrawal of the European flag from the law because the party considered it unconstitutional. (VMRO DPMNE 2018a, VMRO-DPMNE 2018b) Therefore, the party proposed almost 36000 amendments to the law and warned on the procedural mistakes in the Macedonian Assembly (VMRO-DPMNE 2018c). Levica, as a party, which declares itself a class oriented, above-ethnic and internationalist, opposes the LUL because it perceives it as a populist attempt by both governing parties SDSM and DUI to 'deal' with poverty. Levica opposes the 'percentage-basing' of the law (like the very Ohrid Framework Agreement) because the '20% criteria' (reflecting the percentage of the ethnic-Albanian population in Macedonia) excludes the smaller ethnic minorities in the country such as Turks, Vlachos, Serbs, Roma etc. Thus, according to Levica, the political opportunism that had driven the government to adopt this law will cause deeper segregation within the Macedonian society on ethnic basis and will increase the nationalism once more (Levica 2018). Levica asked the Constitutional Court for LUL's invalidation due to its unlawful adoption and the lack of the Presidents' decree which is necessary for its ratification (Levica 2019).

Two additional political explanations are feasible. Namely, we expect that given the recent turbulent period of social movements, political protests and counter protests, citizens will have different opinions depending on their participation in some of those events of contentious politics. Due to the campaign and the repertoire of the Macedonian ethno-nationalist movement 'For a Shared Macedonia' (FSM), which directly opposed the 'Albanian Platform', we expect that the participants in this movement will have negative opinion on LUL (H5) (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2017).

On the other side, we shall expect positive opinion on LUL coming from the participants in the 2016 'Colorful Revolution' (CR) (H4). This is due to two possible reasons. Firstly, the CR's campaign against corruption was openly unifying and welcoming for different individual participants regardless of their ethnicity, socio-demographic status and political affiliation. Secondly, SDSM (the party that proposed the law) was a substantial contributor to the movement (especially in the advanced stages of it) (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2019).

Although in the above presented hypotheses ethnicity is inevitably intertwined with political participation, we shall address this aspect more directly through few more variables (the second cluster). We expect that ethnic Macedonians are likely to oppose LUL due to the fears for the status of the Macedonian language, the Macedonian ethnic identity, and the unitary status of the country (H6). This, as it has been mentioned before, was campaigned by the opposition parties (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 33; 2019). Additionally, we should look at the response from the smaller ethnic groups (respondents with mother tongue other than Macedonian and Albanian). They might support the Law because it is a promotion of the use of the languages of the non-

majority communities in Macedonia, or oppose it because their language is not addressed within the Law as it was done with the Law of 2008 (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 52). Thus, we can expect two possible directions of this hypothesis (H7).

Finally, the place of living is indirectly related to the ethnic structure of the country. We can expect that permanent residents in the Southeastern region of Macedonia (where the Albanian community does not make a local majority) are likely to oppose bilingualism on the whole territory of Macedonia (H8). The rest of the regions where Albanian community either makes majority in most of the municipalities, either municipalities are more ethnically mixed, should be more prone to accept the idea of bilingualism.

In the final cluster, we shall control for socio demographic characteristics of the respondents: age, gender, level of education, monthly family income and profession/status of a civil servant. We might expect that younger people are more prone to change, thus they shall support LUL (H9). Gender could go both in positive or negative direction. (H10). Better educated people are likely to be more open minded and liberal while at the same time they are likely to be better informed and oppose the Law due to the failures in its adoption procedure (H11). The more economically vital families are better informed and therefore oppose the law due to the procedure controversies associated with LUL (H12). Due to the Civil Servant status the respondents will likely support the government's policies, therefore LUL. This can be related to the patronage and/or partization of state institutions. (H13).

The same clusters of hypotheses/variables shall constitute the three models testing for both dependent variables. The same logic elaborated above is applied for the 'PML' variable as well.

## METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DATA

The unit of analysis in this work is the Macedonian voter (citizen) regardless of their current residency (in the country or abroad). We rely on an original data gathered in the period from 7 April to 10 May, 2018 that has thoroughly considered voters' positions on the issue. The survey covered 669 respondents, which according to their place of residence, 91% lived in the country and 9% abroad. The marginal error is +/- 5% because the sample is lower than a standard representative sample at national level. Of those who live in Macedonia, the majority of the respondents, 61%, are from the Center, and 39% from the outskirts of Macedonia, i.e., 61% are from the Skopje region, 26% from the Southeast, and 13% from the Northwest. The questionnaires were filled in electronically<sup>4</sup>, in Macedonian or in Albanian language, and an accent was put on the

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<sup>4</sup> We have distributed the google docs questionnaire on line via social media and via banner-adds in six internet portals that appeal to different groups of readers in terms of age, ethnicity and political affiliation.

balance of all ethnic groups. Namely, 71% of the respondents are declared ethnic Macedonians, and 19.6% are ethnic Albanians. For 81% of the respondents the Macedonian is the mother tongue, and for 14% is the Albanian language. We acknowledge that on-line surveys can have shortcomings in terms of balancing age, sex, educational categories etc., compared to face-to-face or telephone surveys. In addition, given their voluntary participation, we know that the respondents in this sample will most likely be more interested in the research question than an average voter. Nevertheless, additional four focus groups conducted within the same project, stressed the underrepresented socio-demographic groups from this survey (such as women, older and lower educated people) and confirmed the same trend in the citizens' opinions as in this empirical database (Rizankoska and Trajkoska, 2018, 11). This gives us a reassurance in the validity of the sample.

In order to address both the issue of support for the LUL and for the general idea of promoting the use of languages of non-majority communities in Macedonia, we will use two different dependent variables. The first one (labeled as LUL) shall measure the public support for the LUL. The variable is operationalized as dichotomous variable i.e., 'zero' means that the respondent does not support the adoption of the law, and 'one' means that the respondent supports the adoption of the law. For this purpose we use the original data-set ordinal categorical variable that measures the level of support in a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest). Due to the alarm originating from the unbalanced frequency distribution across the 5 ordinal categories<sup>5</sup>, we have decided to use a simpler operationalization of the dependent variable. So, we have gathered the scores for 1 and 2 in the category 'no support' vs. the scores of 3, 4 and 5 in the category 'support' for the LUL.

The second dependent variable (labeled as PML) measures the support of the public for general promotion of the use of the non-majority communities' languages in the country. This variable as well is operationalized as a dichotomous variable with 'zero' meaning that the respondent does not support the idea of promotion of minority groups' languages and 'one' meaning that the respondent supports that idea. This variable is also recoded from the original 5 category ordinal variable, and the same statistical details apply here as in the case of the variable 'LUL'. As it has been discussed before, the level of support for both issues is low. Table 1 contains the mean scores for both dependent variables (LUL and PML), operationalized as dummy variables, and we

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<sup>5</sup> The *ologit* models for the 5 ordinal categories dependent variable did not permit for a *brant test* (that shall check for parallel line assumption) (Williams 2006) which happened due to a very few cases within some of the categories. That impedes a reliable statistical analysis involving 13 independent variables. In order to keep the explanatory variables unchanged we have decided to simplify the dependent variable. Namely, from the 5 category variables (from 1 to 5) we find average score of 2.15 for the first issue, and 2.43 average score for the second one, thus we decided to recode the variables as 'no support' = 1 and 2 category, and 'support' = 3, 4 and 5 category together. The statistical significance and the direction of the hypothesis, nevertheless, remained the same in both *ologit* and *logit* models.

see that 33% of the respondents have positive attitude towards LUL, while 40% have positive attitude towards the idea of minority languages' promotion in Macedonia. Thus, we see a slightly higher support for the idea of promoting the use of non-majority communities' languages than for the proposed solution for the language policy i.e., the LUL.

**Table 1. Summary statistics for all the variables**

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
LUL	669	.327	.467	0	1
PML	669	.395	.489	0	1
SDSM	669	.111	.314	0	1
Mac_opposition	669	.230	.421	0	1
Alb_parties	669	.114	.318	0	1
CR	669	.289	.453	0	1
FSM	669	.109	.312	0	1
EthnicMac	669	.715	.452	0	1
SmallMinLang	669	.052	.223	0	1
Southeast	669	.277	.448	0	1
Age	669	2.063	1.088	1	5
Gender	669	.395	.489	0	1
Education	669	3.755	1.139	1	5
Income	669	3.396	1.141	1	5
CivilServant	669	.150	.357	0	1

Although the very data-base we use is rich in information regarding the motives for the level of support for both questions and it goes deeper into inquiring the perceptions on many different aspects of the law (such as the procedure of adoption, the content, the impact of the law on the inter-ethnic relations in the country etc.), this analysis focuses primarily on the political participation and party affiliation, ethnicity and socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. Thus among the independent variables we have 13 explanatory variables. From Table 1 we see the summary statistics for each variable, i.e., how each variable is operationalized, their mean and standard deviation.

Table 2 contains the expected direction of the hypotheses/variables for both dependent variables. To start with the first cluster, the dummy variable 'SDSM' counts (with a one) those that voted for SDSM in the December 2016 elections. The next dummy variable 'Mac\_opposition' measures (with a one) those that in the 2016 election voted for two parties that have remained in opposition (VMRO-DPMNE and LEVICA).

The dichotomous variable 'Alb\_parties' measures (with a one) the vote for a party representing the ethnic-Albanian community. Additionally, the dummy variable 'CR' stands for 'The Colorful Revolution' and measures (with a one) the participation of the respondent in the 'I Protest' movement in 2016. The final variable of this cluster 'FSM' measures (with a one) the respondents who participated in the 2017 'For a Shared Macedonia' movement.

Then, we add the 'ethnicity' cluster and we start by the dummy variable 'EthnicMac' that (with a one) depicts those respondents that feel like ethnic Macedonians. The variable 'SmallMinLang' indicates that the respondent's mother tongue is a language spoken by an ethnic group that is a non-majority but at the same time not ethnic-Albanian. This variable is also a dichotomous one and it indicates (with a one) the respondent that does speak such 'small minority' language. The third variable 'Southeast' (also a dummy) measures (with a one) the respondents who live in the southeast of the country as opposed to those who live in the Skopje region or the northwestern regions (zero).

We finally add the third cluster of control variables that depict the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. We measure variable 'Age' as an ordinal categorical variable where '1' is the age group below 30 years old, '2' is 31 to 40, '3' is 41 to 50, '4' is 51 to 60, and '5' is above 61 years old. The 'Gender' variable is measured as a dichotomous variable where 'zero' is male and 'one' is female. The 'Education' variable is measured as a five ordinal category variable where '1' is primary school or less, '2' is secondary/high school, '3' is higher vocational education, '4' is university education, and '5' is MA or PhD level of education.

**Table 2. Hypotheses direction and independent variables operationalization**

Hypo-thesis	Variable	Variable Label	Variable type	Expected direction
H1	SDSM	Respondents voted for SDSM.	Dichotomous 0= did not vote 1= voted	+
H2	Mac_opposition	Respondents voted for either VMRO-DPMNE or Levica.	Dichotomous 0= did not vote 1= voted	-
H3	Alb_parties	Respondents voted for an ethnic Albanian party.	Dichotomous 0= did not vote 1= voted	+
H4	CR	Respondents participated in the 2016 Colorful Revolution.	Dichotomous 0= did not participate 1= participated	+
H5	FSM	Respondents participated in the 2017 movement For a Shared Macedonia.	Dichotomous 0= did not participate 1= participated	-
H7	EthnicMac	Respondent determines him/herself as an ethnic Macedonian.	Dichotomous 0= not an ethnic Macedonian 1= ethnic Macedonian	-



H6	SmallMinLang	Respondents' mother tongue is a language from a non-majority minority group (small ethnic group such as Turks, Roma, Serbs etc).	Dichotomous 0= respondents' mother tongue is either Macedonian or Albanian 1= respondents' mother tongue is a language spoken by a small minority group.	-/+
H8	Southeast	Respondent's permanent residence is in the Southeastern region of Macedonia.	Dichotomous 0= respondents do not reside in the Southeast region 1= respondents' reside in the Southeastern region.	-
H9	Age	Respondents' age.	Categorical (ordinal) 1= below 30, 2 = 31 to 40, 3= 41 to 50, 4=51 to 60, 5= above 61 years old.	-
H10	Gender	Respondents' gender.	Dichotomous 0=male 1=female	-/+
H11	Education	Respondents' level of education.	Categorical (ordinal) 1= primary school or less, 2 = secondary/high school, 3=higher vocational education, 4= university education, 5= MA or PhD	-/+
H12	Income	Respondents' monthly family income.	Categorical (ordinal) 1=below 9000 denars, 2= 9001 to 18000 denars, 3= 18001 to 36000 denars, 4 = 36001 to 60000 denars, 5= above 60001 denars.	-
H13	CivilServant	Respondents work in the public administration/are civil servants.	Dichotomous 0= not a civil servant 1= civil servant	+

The 'Income' variable measures the monthly family income of the respondent and it is also a five ordinal category variable where '1' is below 9000 denars, '2' is from 9001 to 18000 denars, '3' is from 18001 to 36000 denars, '4' is from 36001 to 60000 denars, and '5' is above 60001 denars. The variable 'CivilServant' is measured as a dichotomous variable where 'one' is the status of a civil servant for the respondent and 'zero' is the joint number of the rest of the professional categories. From the Table I (in Appendix), which presents the correlation coefficients of all independent variables, we see that there is no danger for multicollinearity. The highest correlation coefficient -0.56 is found between variables 'EthnicMac' and 'Alb\_parties'. Given the reasoning behind H4 we check whether there is possibility for collinearity between 'SDSM' and 'CR' variables, but we see that the coefficient is 0.37 which is not so high.



## RESULTS

We run logistical regressions for both dependent variables (LUL and PML) based on the three clusters of variables. That is to say, for each dependent variable three models are tested. Each of the three models per dependent variable adds one set of variables to the previous one. Model 1 contains only the variables on political participation and party affiliation, Model 2 adds the variables on ethnicity, and Model 3 adds the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Table 3 contains the estimated logistical odds for all six models. The left part of the table shows the models on the LUL dependent variable, thus explaining the support for the law, while the right side contains the results from the estimated odds for the models predicting the support for promotion of the use of minority languages in Macedonia.

Beginning from the left part of Table 3, we see that Model 1 only contains the variables on political participation and party affiliation, and all five variables are found to be statistically significant predictor of the public support for LUL. Model 2 contains the variables on ethnicity and improves the predicting power of the first model with two out of three variables being significant predictor. Finally, Model 3 has no better predicting power than the first two models, which means that voters' socio-demographic characteristics cannot explain the public support for LUL.

**Table 3. Estimates of the logistical odds for support for the LUL (left) and for support for the idea of promotion of minority languages in Macedonia (right)**

VARIABLES	Law on the use of languages LUL			Promotion of minority languages PML		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
SDSM	1.560*** (0.292)	1.392*** (0.337)	1.344*** (0.352)	0.928*** (0.282)	0.668** (0.315)	0.624* (0.328)
Mac_opposition	-1.308*** (0.357)	-1.233*** (0.409)	-1.236*** (0.409)	-0.867*** (0.262)	-0.740*** (0.286)	-0.753*** (0.288)
Alb_parties	4.599*** (0.654)	2.584*** (0.676)	2.566*** (0.685)	3.947*** (0.602)	2.217*** (0.639)	2.195*** (0.643)
CR	0.434* (0.225)	0.739*** (0.265)	0.769*** (0.273)	0.591*** (0.205)	0.803*** (0.226)	0.837*** (0.232)
FSM	-2.529*** (0.870)	-2.267** (0.958)	-2.144** (0.928)	-0.722* (0.396)	-0.436 (0.413)	-0.432 (0.415)
EthnicMac		-2.942*** (0.304)	-3.116*** (0.334)		-2.350*** (0.280)	-2.436*** (0.301)
SmallMinLang		-1.487*** (0.493)	-1.559*** (0.506)		-1.521*** (0.458)	-1.601*** (0.467)
Southeast		0.215 (0.275)	0.253 (0.294)		0.0107 (0.227)	-0.00416 (0.242)

Age			0.142 (0.115)			0.218** (0.0982)
Gender			0.223 (0.247)			0.0109 (0.207)
Education			0.00531 (0.126)			0.0810 (0.107)
Income			0.161 (0.118)			0.0588 (0.0992)
CivilServant			0.106 (0.359)			-0.168 (0.307)
Constant	-1.189*** (0.144)	0.874*** (0.272)	0.0194 (0.611)	-0.821*** (0.131)	1.007*** (0.265)	0.142 (0.535)
Observations	669	669	669	669	669	669

Standard errors in parentheses/ \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

So, we can conclude that in the models testing the public opinion on the LUL, we have proven (found statistical significance for) hypotheses 1 to 7, and failed to prove hypotheses 8 to 13. As expected, we find voters who voted for SDSM or an ethnic-Albanian party (i.e., parties that proposed the law), and those who participated in the 'Colorful Revolution' to be more supportive to the LUL. On the contrary, we see that those voting for the opposition parties (VMRO-DPMNE and Levica) and those participating in the 'For a Shared Macedonia' movement to be against it. Additionally, we prove that respondents declaring themselves as ethnic-Macedonians oppose the law. Finally, we significantly confirm the negative direction of Hypothesis 7, i.e., respondents whose mother tongue is a minority language other than Albanian opposes the law.

If we compare the right part of Table 3 (where we have tested the public support for the general idea of promotion of the use of minority languages in Macedonia) with the left part (where we have tested the support for the LUL) we can see only a couple of variations in the results. Firstly, we notice that the variable 'FSM' is statistically significant only in Model 1, while keeping the same direction in the other two models, and then we find 'Age' to be a positive predictor of the support for the promotion of the use of minority languages (which was not statistically significant in the LUL models). Thus we confirm H1, H2, H3, H4, H6, H7 (also in a negative direction) and we reject H9.

In order to be able to better interpret our findings we provide Table 4, which contains the marginal probabilities for Model 3 for both 'LUL' and 'PLM' dependent variables. We see the predicting power of the factor variables for voters to support the LUL and the general promotion of the use of minority languages when the factor variables go from low to high (one unit change), using the full Model 3 for both dependent variables.

The dependent variables 'LUL' and 'PML' will both be observed with the dual measurement: 'zero' score for lack of support and 'one' for presence of support. The independent dichotomous variables change from zero to one, and the categorical variables change gradually for one category (from the first one), while all the rest are held at their means.

For the LUL model, we see the highest positive (significant) predicting power in variable 'Alb\_parties'. This means that the chances to support LUL among the voters for the Albanian parties increase for 61% compared to the rest. SDSM voters will have 32% more chances to support the law than the others, while the participants in the Colorful Revolution 16% more chances than the rest. Focusing on the 'Age' variable we see that the highest positive predicting power can be found when we change from category one to three. That means that respondent within the age group of 41 to 50 will have 40% more chances to support the law than the respondents below 30. Focusing on the negative predictors, we see that the highest chances for lack of support for the LUL are for the ethnic Macedonian community (68%). Then, follow the participants in the 'For a Shared Macedonia' movement (with 27% more probability to oppose the law), the respondents whose mother tongue is a smaller ethnic group's language (with 19% chances to oppose the LUL) and the voters for the two opposition parties VMRO-DPMNE and Levica (with 15% probability to be against the LUL).

We can notice some variations in the predicting probability power of the variables testing the support for the promotion of the minority languages in Macedonia. We see that, albeit at a lower degree, the highest chances for positive opinion on the idea for further promotion of the use of minority languages can be found among the voters for the Albanian political parties (48%), then among the participants in the CR (20%) and for the voters for SDSM (17%). The change in the 'Age' variable in the 'PML model' differs from the change in the 'LUL model', i.e., the highest predicting power is for a change from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 5<sup>th</sup> category. That means that the group above 61 has 31% more chances to support general promotion of the use of minority language than those below the age of 30. Also, we find the change from category 1 to category 3 to predicts positively the support for promotion of minority language, i.e., respondents with higher educational vocation have 35% more chances to support that idea than the respondents with primary education. We see no change in the trend of negative opinion on the law. Once more, ethnic Macedonians, those whose mother tongue is one of the smaller ethnic groups' languages and those voting for the opposition parties VMRO-DPMNE and Levica are those who have the most chances to oppose the idea of promotion of the minority languages (56%, 29% and 15% consequently).

The predictable power for opposing the idea of promoting the use of minority languages among the ethnic Macedonians is for 12% lower than chance that ethnic Macedonians will oppose the very LUL. Only in few factor variables the predictable probabilities are higher for the PML dependent variable than for the LUL.

Participants in the Colorful Revolution have 4% higher chances to support the idea of promotion of minority languages than for the very LUL, and the respondents whose mother tongue is a languages spoken by a smaller ethnic group will have 10% more chances to oppose more the general idea of promotion of the use of minority languages than the very LUL.

Table 4. Marginal probabilities for Model 3 in LUL and PML logistic regressions

Marginal probabilities, at means			
Variable	Value	LUL	PML
SDSM	0 to 1	0.323**	0.168*
Mac_opposition	0 to 1	-0.154**	-0.149*
Alb_parties	0 to 1	0.609**	0.481**
CR	0 to 1	0.160**	0.198**
FSM	0 to 1	-0.266**	-0.114
EthnicMac	0 to 1	-0.677**	-0.565**
SmallMinLang	0 to 1	-0.185**	-0.293**
Southeast	0 to 1	0.053	0.002
Age	1 to 2	0.037	0.078
	1 to 3	-0.005	0.042
	1 to 4	0.113	0.152
	1 to 5	0.285	0.312**
	0 to 1	0.055	0.002
Education	1 to 2	0.335**	0.296**
	1 to 3	0.398**	0.349**
	1 to 4	0.161**	0.214*
	1 to 5	0.245**	0.332**
	1 to 2	-0.218	-0.079
Income	1 to 3	-0.118	-0.028
	1 to 4	-0.107	-0.063
	1 to 5	-0.048	0.007
	0 to 1	0.019	-0.037
CivilServant	0 to 1	0.019	-0.037
N		669	669

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## CONCLUSIONS

In this article we have compared the general readiness of the Macedonian society to accept the idea of a further promotion of the use of national minority languages with the public's support for the Law on the use of languages, which regulates the use of the official languages in Macedonia, in particular stipulating the Albanian language as a second official language on the whole territory.

We have tested thirteen hypotheses on the public support for the LUL depending on voters' party affiliation and political participation, ethnicity and some socio-demographic characteristics. We inquire that the Macedonian voter is not ready yet for a further promotion of the use of the minority languages, while even less ready to accept the concrete law that regulates the language policy in that direction (the LUL). Be that as it may, we notice deep party and ethnic divide within the Macedonian electorate, the ethnic one remaining the most pronounced one. We confirm that voters that support the governing parties support the LUL, while voters that support the opposition parties oppose it. Finally, participants in the liberal-ethnically inclusive 'Colorful Revolution' support the LUL, while the participants in the nationalistic 'For a Shared Macedonia' movement oppose the LUL.

It might seem too apparent to conclude that voters for parties that proposed the LUL will support it while voters for parties that took adversarial stance on the LUL will oppose it. Nevertheless, the asset of this conclusion in our work lays in what we failed to prove. Namely, variables describing the socio-demographic characteristics of the voters, other than ethnicity, have no explanatory power of the level of support for this language policy, which proves (once more) how deeply divided the Macedonian society remains along party and ethnic lines. Macedonian voters continue to 'blindly' follow political parties and are not capable (or willing) to assess public policies through an evidence-based prism.

Accommodating multiculturalism in ethnically deeply divided societies essentially starts with granting basic linguistic rights for all groups. In practice, granting civil and political rights for minority ethnic groups depends mostly on the willingness of the political elites, and increasingly more on the coalition bargaining capacity of the parties speaking for ethnic minorities. Both ethnic parties representing national minorities and mainstream parties are capable of deciding how to treat the issues concerning national minorities according to their prospects for electoral fortunes. It is exactly here where the voters in democratizing, ethnically heterogeneous societies with scarce economies are the most vulnerable. Every policy concerning national minorities in Macedonia still raises the alarm for possible territorial rather than cultural autonomy, due to the vulnerability of the Macedonian voter before the party manipulation. This manipulation has been conducted through various tools such as the subjective journalism and propaganda, or the aggressive nationalistic campaigns. Yet, the most

powerful of all has so far been the high practice of clientelism. Therefore, we go back to the essential remedy for nationalism – the rule of law. By increasing the trust in the political institutions, voters should be more able to ‘defend’ themselves from the influence of the political parties and should be able to see better the benefits of living in a multicultural society without the feeling of threat by the ‘others’.



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The data used in this article was obtained by DIALOGUE – Center for Deliberative Democracy as a part of the activities within the project ‘Impact assessment on the regulation on the use of languages’, which was a part of the sub-granting program ‘Regulatory impact assessment in the shadow: Fostering evidence-based policy making project’. The project was financially supported by the European Union (EU), Institute for Democracy ‘Societas Civilis’ – Skopje (IDSCS) and Center for Economic Analyses (CEA). The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the donors.

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## APPENDIX I

Table I. Correlation coefficients for all independent variables

	SDSM	Mac_ opposition	Alb_ parties	CR	FSM	EthnicMac	Small MinLang	Southeast	Age	Gender	Education	Income	Civil Servant
PML													
LUL													
SDSM	1												
Mac_opposition	-0.1476	1											
Alb_parties	-0.0812	-0.1958	1										
CR	0.3645	-0.1993	-0.0720	1									
FSM	-0.1234	0.3553	-0.0800	-0.1699	1								
EthnicMac	-0.1147	0.2277	-0.5559	-0.0139	0.1575	1							
SmallMinLang	0.1098	-0.0169	-0.0418	0.0726	-0.0607	-0.2379	1						
Southeast	0.0696	0.1700	-0.1792	-0.0396	0.0409	0.2058	-0.0402	1					
Age	0.1111	0.0337	0.0746	-0.0732	-0.0070	-0.0761	0.0111	0.1487	1				
Gender	-0.0215	-0.0347	-0.0867	-0.0078	-0.0472	0.0567	-0.0249	-0.0000	-0.0410	1			
Education	-0.1167	-0.0601	-0.0429	0.0908	-0.0215	0.1489	0.0447	-0.2252	-0.2751	0.1121	1		
Income	-0.0640	0.0467	-0.1450	0.0103	0.0256	0.2805	0.0302	-0.1180	-0.0960	0.0011	0.3687	1	
CivilServant	0.0393	0.0396	0.0877	-0.0634	0.0281	0.0330	-0.0232	-0.0436	0.0452	0.0647	0.1714	0.0676	1

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**Editor-in-Chief:** Goran Ilik, PhD

**Managing Editor:** Mladen Karadjoski, PhD

**Available Format:** Online

**Language:** English

**eISSN:** 1857-9760

**Publisher:** Institute for Research and European Studies

**Fields:** Political Sciences, International Relations, International Law

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Peer review method: Double-Blind

Date of acceptance: March 03, 2019

Date of publication: May 25, 2019

Original scientific article

UDC 323.285(4-627EU)

Scan the QR code:



## SITUATION AND TRENDS OF TERRORIST ACTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

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**Abstract:** *The main subject of interest of this paper is the current situation and the trend of international terrorism in the European Union, explained through security analysis of the committed terrorist attacks and their influence on the European security and stability. Also, it will be shown the measures and the activities of the anti and contrary terroristic fight against the risks and the threats from the terrorism as a result of the recent terroristic attacks. Even though on international level there isn't a common definition of the terrorism as a criminal act, the European Union and the Council of Europe through their most important documents set the concept for terrorism which has helped in the process of creating national security systems for fight against the terrorism. This paper will go through the circumstances of terrorist attacks (failed, foiled and completed) in the European Union Member States, as well as the conditions of the criminal acts through analysis of the statistical data about the court proceedings and the verdicts.*

**Keywords:** *Terrorism; European Union; Conditions; Trends*



## INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

The European Union has developed a wide and complex system for fight against the terrorism (Zirojević 2014, 124-129). There are numerous documents of the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament that are legal, political and action base for appropriate fight against the terrorism. It has been built a good strategy for fight against the terrorism, the Hague Programme, the wide Shengen aquis, many regulations regarding the finances, migrations, asylum etc. Still, many questions remain opened. On the basis of the analysis of the legal regulation and the so far practice of the EU, that refers to the antiterrorist fight, it can be sought that on EU level there still aren't institutions or bodies that would be dealing with the fight against the terrorism (but, there are many bodies that are working on some aspects of the problem) and that this problem is sensitive because of the insufficient coordination of the Union's bodies and the fact that the basic competence for that area belongs to the member countries. That directs to the insufficient operational capability of the EU for efficient fight against the terrorism.

Among the numerous legal instruments set by the European Council, the most important is the Framework decision for fight against the terrorism (EU rules on terrorist offences and related penalties, Framework decision (2002/475/JHA) and amending decision (2008/919/JHA)), adopted on June 13, 2002. The main goal is the terrorism to be defined as criminal-law category, to align the legislation regarding the terrorism as a criminal act and to introduce responsibility for the criminal acts of terrorism. The Framework decision consists of 13 articles and through them in a unique way on the EU territory defines the terrorism and the related crimes, which aims to harmonize the national legislations of the member states. The execution of a terrorist act under this Decision implies commission of some of the classical crimes, with the intention of acting as a differential category, which gives a terrorist qualification to the said criminal act.

The leaders of the European Union at the meeting in Brussels in June 2017 (Atanasov 2017) have reached an agreement about the measures in the fight against the terrorism. A special part of the new measures refer to the fight against radicalization and the use of the internet and the social media in the process of radicalization. The need of preventing foreign terrorists from Syria and Iraq to Europe is particularly emphasized. There was also taken into consideration finalization of the work about the new border systems for information exchange. One of the measures will be sending experts for security and fight against the terrorism in the EU delegations. The European Council have agreed on cooperation within the online industry, calling for social media companies to do everything necessary to prevent the spread of terrorist materials on the Internet, which means developing new tools for detecting and automatically removing such content, for which, if necessary in the future, will be adopted special laws.

At this meeting, the 'Permanent Structured Cooperation' was formed, which means that the funds will be allocated from the special fund for development and construction of unique EU defense systems to equalize the standards and types of weapons in order to avoid unnecessary spending of money. The co-operation between the Union and NATO remains a key for the overall security, namely the fight against cyber attacks, hybrid warfare and terrorism.

## CONDITIONS AND TRENDS REGARDING THE TERRORISM IN THE EU

To better understand the condition of the terrorism within the Member States of the European Union, overview data and explanations are provided by the TESAT reports (Europol 2013-2018), which refer to the situation and the trends of terrorism in the European Union, and have been published by Europol every year.

The conditions and the trends of the terrorism are best seen through the presentation, analysis and interpretation of the basic data about the failed, foiled and completed terrorist attacks in the Member States of the European Union. Thus, the comparative overview for the period 2012-2017 can be seen from Table 1, which provides data on the number of terrorist attacks, the number of EU Member States in which they occurred, and the consequences that have arisen, expressed through the number of injured persons and deaths. On average, 188 terrorist attacks take place every year, and this was average in 7 EU Member States. A total of 1.130 terrorist attacks occurred in the analyzed period, a total of 1.634 people were injured and 386 people were killed. Furthermore, the data can be analyzed for each year separately, in order to determine their dynamics, in terms of declining or increasing, with the data being supplemented by certain characteristic elements referring to EU Member States extracted from Europol reports.

**Table 1. Comparative overview of the basic data on terrorist attacks in the EU Member States in the period 2012-2017** (Source: the data are extracted from the TESAT reports of Europol, referring to the conditions and the trends of terrorism in the European Union)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	average	TOTAL
Terrorist attacks (EU member states)	219 (7)	152 (5)	201 (7)	211 (6)	142 (8)	205 (9)	188 (7)	1.130 (7)
Injured persons	46	9	6	350	379	844	272	1.634
deaths	17	7	4	148	142	68	64	386

In 2012 the number of terrorist attacks in the EU Member States has increased for 26% compared to 2011. Most of the attacks have happened in France - 125 and Spain - 54. Most of the attacks have been related to the separatist terrorism.

In 2013 the most of the terrorist attacks happened in France - 63, Spain - 33 and the United Kingdom - 35. After the increasing in 2012, the number of terrorist attacks in 2013 has decreased under the number of terrorist attacks in 2011.

In 2014 the number of the attacks has increased contrary to the trend in the past years. More than half of the terrorist attacks were reported by the United Kingdom. Even though France and Spain traditionally report most of the terrorist attacks, in France in 2014 the number of reported terrorist attacks has decreased to 51 and in Spain to 18.

In 2015 the number of the attacks has increased a little bit compared to 2014. Almost half of the terrorist attacks or 103 were reported by the United Kingdom, 72 by France and 25 by Spain.

In 2016 more than half of the terrorist attacks or 76 happened in the United Kingdom, 23 in France, 17 in Italy, 10 in Spain, 6 in Greece, 5 in Germany, 4 in Belgium and 1 in Netherland.

In 2017 the United Kingdom experienced the highest number of attacks - 1071, followed by France - 54, Spain - 16, Italy - 14, and Greece - 8. Belgium and Germany reported 2 attacks each; Finland and Sweden noted 1 attack each. Spain, Finland and Sweden reported on jihadist terrorist attacks after a long period of having been unaffected by this phenomenon.

## COURT PROCEEDINGS AND CONVICTIONS FOR TERRORISM IN THE EU

Table 2 shows the comparative data on persons related to terrorist activities in EU Member States for the period 2012-2017. During the analyzed period, a total of 5.144 people were arrested, 2.815 persons were charged and 2.908 persons were convicted. On average, 857 people were arrested each year in 17 EU Member States, 469 people were charged, and 484 were convicted. The number of convicted people in this particular case is higher than the number of charged persons, because the criminal proceedings for terrorism last for several years, so some of the convicted persons are from terrorist attacks of the previous years, when they were arrested and charged.

Further in this paper all these data will be analyzed in detail for each year in particular, in order their dynamics to be determined, through their fall or increase. In the data interpretation, they will be analyzed with certain additional characteristic information extracted from the Europol reports, and taken over from Eurojust official statistics.



**Table 2. Comparative overview of the data for the people related to terrorist activities in the EU Member States for the period 2012-2017** (Source: the data are extracted from the TESAT reports of Europol, referring to the conditions and the trends of terrorism in the European Union)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	average	TOTAL
Arrests (EU Member States)	537 (17)	535 (14)	774 (16)	1.077 (19)	1.002 (17)	1.219 (19)	857 (17)	<b>5.144 (17)</b>
Charged persons	400	313	444	513	580	565	469	<b>2.815</b>
Convicted persons	437	336	452	527	587	569	484	<b>2.908</b>

In 2012, 13 EU Member States reported 149 completed court proceedings on terrorism-related charges. This represents a slight decrease compared to 2011. The court cases completed in 2012 are related to actions taken in a certain period of time starting in the 1970s and ending in 2012. In these court proceedings, locked in 2012, a total of 400 people were convicted. Eighteen people were brought to court on several occasions for various offenses. The total number of judgments pronounced in 2012 - for individuals and legal entities - is 437. Liberation judgments represent 30% of all verdicts pronounced for terrorist offenses. The figure is similar to that of 2011. Of the 50 women charged in the reported court cases completed in 2012, 14 were completely released, and one was acquitted in one case, but convicted in another. The average prison sentence in 2012 in Europe for acts of terrorism was around eight years, equal to that in 2011. The severity of the prison sentences in 2012 ranges from two months to life imprisonment.

In 2013, 15 EU Member States reported 150 completed court proceedings on terrorism-related charges. The number of completed court procedures is similar to the figure reported in 2012 (149). The relevant court decisions in 2013 dealt with terrorist offenses, some of which date back to the 1980s. In this litigation, 313 persons are involved, of which 42 are women. Twelve people appeared in court several times for various offenses. As a result, the total number of verdicts pronounced for terrorism-related offenses in 2013 was 336. In 2013, acquittals represent 23% of all verdicts pronounced on terrorist offenses. The release rate has decreased compared to 2011 (31%) and 2012 (30%), indicating a higher percentage of successful terrorist charges. Seventeen of the 42 defendants in the completed court proceedings reported in 2013 were acquitted. The majority of the released women (14) were brought to court due to charges related to separatist terrorist acts.

The court procedure for terrorist offenses resulted in prison sentences ranging from three days to life imprisonment. In some cases (part of) the sentence was suspended or conditioned for a certain period of time. The majority (47%) of sentences rendered "guilty" in 2013 were five years in prison or less. The penalties of 10 years or more constitute 33% of all penalties imposed - an increase compared to 2012, when they represent 24% of the total. The average prison sentence in 2013 in the EU for terrorist acts is about 10 years, which is more than the average for 2011 and 2012 (8 years).

In 2014, 15 EU Member States reported 180 completed court proceedings related to terrorism. In the court proceedings locked in 2014, 444 people were involved, and 72 of them were women. Six of those individuals appeared in the court several times for various offenses. As a result, the total number of verdicts pronounced for terrorism-related offenses in 2014 was 452. In 2014, the acquittals constituted 24% of all verdicts pronounced on terrorist offenses. The percentage of exemptions in 2013 is similar (23%), which indicates a downward trend compared to 2011 and 2012, when the percentage of exemptions was higher (31% and 30%, respectively). Twenty-eight of the 72 persons charged in the completed court proceedings reported in 2014 were released. The majority of the released women (27) were brought to court for charges related to separatist terrorist acts. The court procedure for terrorist offenses resulted in prison sentences between 14 days and 299 years. In some cases (part of) the sentence was suspended or suspended for a specified period of time. In other cases, guilty verdicts were issued, but without a penalty. The average prison sentence in EU Member States in 2014 for terrorist acts was six years, which is less than the reported average for 2013 (10 years). The majority (70%) of the sentences handed down in convictions with confirmed guilt in 2014 were imprisoned up to five years, an increase compared to 2013 (47%). The percentage of fines of 10 years and more (13%) decreased significantly from the percentage reported in 2013 (33%).

In 2015, 12 EU Member States reported 217 court-related trials. The court proceedings concerned 513 persons and 85 of them were women. The total number of judgments pronounced on terrorism-related crimes in 2015 was 527. In 2015, the acquittals constituted 21% of all verdicts pronounced on terrorist offenses. This percentage is slightly lower than those in 2014 (24%) and 2013 (23%) and continues the downward trend compared to previous years (30% exemptions in 2012 and 31% exemptions in 2011). In some cases, the defendants were acquitted of terrorist offenses, but were convicted of other crimes, such as the illegal possession of firearms, examination of documents, arson and so on. Prison sentences handed down by the courts in 2015 ranged between seven days and 397 years. In some cases (part of) the sentence was suspended or suspended for a specified period of time. In other cases, the defendants were found guilty, but no penalties were imposed. The average prison sentence for terrorist offenses in the EU in 2015 was seven years, which is slightly higher than the reported average in 2014 (six years).

The majority (61%) of the sentences convicted in 2015 were imprisoned up to five years, which is less than in 2014 (70%). The number of sentences of 10 or more years in prison is 20% of all sentences, an increase compared to 2014 (13%).

In 2016, 17 EU Member States reported 275 completed court proceedings in connection with terrorism. The court proceedings concerned 580 persons, of whom 53 were women. The total number of judgments pronounced on terrorism-related offenses in 2016 was 587. Some judgments in 2016 were final, while others waited for a remedy because appeals were filed. With the completion of court proceedings in 2016, a record high conviction rate was registered (89%). The release rate of 11% is significantly lower than in 2015 (21%) and in 2014 (24%) and continues with the downward trend compared to previous years. In some cases, the defendants were acquitted of terrorist offenses, but were convicted of other acts such as illegal possession of firearms, forging documents, preparation of armed robbery, drug production, incitement to racial hatred, etc. The judgments delivered by the EU courts in 2016 resulted in various sentences, including imprisonment, fines, treatment in mental health facilities, socially useful work, and restraining orders. In some cases, the court also imposed restrictions on civil rights and prohibitions of entering the national territory after the termination of the prison term or the citizenship of those convicted of terrorist offenses.

In 2017 17 Member States reported a total of 565 individuals who were convicted or acquitted of terrorist offences. This number is similar to the numbers submitted over the past two years. The majority of the verdicts reported in 2017 are final, while others are pending judicial remedy, as appeals have been submitted. In 2017 the vast majority of verdicts (352) in the Member States concerned jihadist terrorism confirming a trend that started in 2015. Similar to the recent years, the largest part of the verdicts for jihadist terrorism concerned offences related to the conflict in Syria and Iraq; however persons who had engaged with Al Qaeda, the Taliban or Al-Shabaab were also tried in 2017. The average prison sentence for terrorist offences in the EU in 2017 was five years, similar to that of 2016.

However, it should be borne in mind that the severity of the punishment in any case depends on the appropriate crime and cannot serve for any comparative purposes. In some Member States, the average penalty is calculated on the basis of one judgment, while in others it is based on a significantly higher number of judgments.

## THE TERRORISM AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

One of the most important common features of the European countries is finding a balance between the high standards in the field of protection of human rights and freedoms and raising the level of national security from the aspect of protection from terrorism. In contemporary circumstances, any democratic government meets with the dilemma how to regulate this issue, by respecting the human rights and international standards on one hand, and by ensuring effective protection against terrorism on the other. The criminal law as a

system of norms by which the states serve to protect the society from criminality and terrorism as one of its more severe forms has a guaranteed function which implies limiting the State coercion to a reasonable measure that allows enjoyment of the fundamental freedoms and rights of the individual in a democratic state. By following the adoption of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms and the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights, the international community has established effective mechanisms to protect the most important freedoms and rights for further respect and protection. The Convention is particularly important in terms of establishing standards that national criminal law must implement for states to fulfill the conditions for full-fledged EU membership. At the European level, the accepted mechanisms of criminal justice protection from terrorism are preventative with an emphasis on the right to security, which is one of the fundamental rights of the human rights body. The protection of a democratic society against terrorism and the protection of individual rights must be in balance. The practice of the European Court of Human Rights has been created by court judgments concerning the legality of national terrorism legislation and forms the basis for the construction and adjustment of criminal law provisions to prevent possible abuses in criminal law.

The Court procedures get intensified when it comes to lawsuits that arise from counter-terrorist measures conducted by the member states. By solving the numerous cases, in the period of half a century, the Court has built a strong jurisprudence of this area which should provide balance between strong and efficient answer to the terrorism and the protection of the basic human rights.

The terrorism in its essence has potential to undermine the democracy and the rule of law in achieving its goals. In the judgments and the practice of the Court in relation to the fight against terrorism, certain principles have been laid down which pertain to the establishment of a balance between an effective reaction of states and the protection of human rights. The terrorist attacks the foundations of democracy and the rule of law, and the states must defend themselves from these attacks by balancing the human rights and the response to terrorism.

The alignment of proceedings with the provisions of the Human Rights Convention should in no way be understood as disabling the state in the fight against terrorism. It would be contrary to the aims and substance of the Convention itself to interpret its provisions as limiting in terms of countering and suppressing terrorism. The established balance between effective countering terrorism and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms is a legal issue in which an answer must be given by establishing and finding an appropriate balance between the mentioned values of modern society. While respecting certain prohibitions, such as the absolute prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, is apparently linked to the hands of democracy in the fight against terrorism, their consistent respect is an assumption for the preservation of the democracy of a particular

regime whose demolition is one of the fundamental goals of terrorist activity. The existence of the European Court of Human Rights as a control mechanism for respecting fundamental constitutional and criminal legal guarantees constitutes a limitation and a correction for illicit actions by individual states in criminal acts of terrorism. In the framework of the effort to establish a balance between the protection of human rights in criminal acts against terrorism and security, on the other hand, the protection of freedom and rights must have a mild advantage in terms of achieving a higher level of security of society, the violation of some verified criminal justice and criminal procedural principles implies abandoning the idea of constitutional democracy and leading to the formation and strengthening of police states.

### THE INTELLIGENCE IN FUNCTION OF EARLY DETECTION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

One of the common features of the states in Europe since 2001 is the allocation of greater material resources than before for the work of the intelligence and security services for preventive and repressive counterterrorism. As a negative phenomenon, it is noted that Europe naively believes that the fight against the terrorism can be obtained by the traditional intelligence and criminal services.

The danger of transnational terrorism followed by the opportunities for the use of weapons of mass destruction in the attacks has led governments to take a thorough reform within their intelligence and security services, and as far as possible to ensure their cooperation and coordination in the fight against modern security challenges. For example, Germany, the United Kingdom and France, as well as other countries, have established centers for analysis of the terrorist threats that use a fusion approach to integrate intelligence data.

In contemporary settings, the emphasis should be placed on human intelligence through the use of information technology, for improved analysis and cooperation with the law enforcement agencies, as well as providing real-time intelligence information about terrorist activities. This is necessary in order taking elimination measures against those persons for whom there is strong information about the connection with planning and preparation of general hazardous actions. Namely, the challenge of intelligence is to create an information system that will fulfill the modern functions and tasks of intelligence and will incorporate all information systems of intelligence-assisting institutions.

Whether and how much the intelligence process will be effective in carrying out its preventive function in the fight against the terrorism depends on the ability for continuous action and a sound knowledge of terrorist groups and individuals, their plans and goals, their political, economic and psychological motivation and leadership / leadership skills, membership, logistical and financial opportunities (for their secret accounts), relationships with other domestic and international terrorist organizations, the ties with the countries that

sponsor terror as well as with the structures of international organized crime that often appear in the role of their sponsors (Kotovchevski 2004, 176).

First of all (Dojchinovski and Odjakov 2010, 178), the intelligence it is necessary to reveal the identity of the persons who participate in a particular terrorist plan. Of course, you must also find out what the content is, or the purpose of that plan. As a reminder, the primary task of intelligence is to prevent the function or, to put it differently, to be a step ahead of the terrorists and their plans, so that terrorist activities remain a wish on paper without ever being realized.


The biggest challenge for intelligence analysts (Best 2003, 5,10,11) is the problem with the location of the terrorists, that is, to discover where the terrorists will attack. We are witnessing terrorist attacks that at the same time occur in several locations that are spatially thousands of kilometers away, so intelligence services must create such a system of information that will make an effort to get the necessary information and reports for some terrorist attacks.

Also, the challenges of the intelligence services (Gray and Slade 2008, 503) can be highlighted by the various barriers within the intelligence cycle that prevent the efficient collection of intelligence information. Often, the intelligence officers are completely prevented from gathering intelligence information from policymakers. In addition to these political / legal obstacles, there are technological barriers that need to be overcome. Thus, in many cases it is difficult to properly separate the doctrinal steps of collection from processing and exploitation.

## CONCLUSION

The last terrorist activities through the EU show that its Member States are target as well as ground for different and numerous terrorist groups from many countries. The countries that have been target to the terrorists keep trying to protect themselves and to answer through legal norms that incriminate the criminals and to make changes into the organization of the work of the security institutions. Namely, after the attacks of the United States, and then of Spain, the United Kingdom and Belgium, there has been a substantial change in the structure of terrorist organizations and their illegal activities, and thus in the way they are perceived by the states and their intelligence and security services. The sources of danger are no longer individual bullies, but networks of entire organizations. The new content of the terrorist threats can, above all, should be reduced to two basic aspects: the elimination of the local context and the prevalence of individuals within the framework of terrorist actions. It is evident that the intelligence and security systems of the Member States of the EU are continuously paying particular attention to issues related to the unification and coordination of intelligence and anti-terrorist activities that are manifested through the formation of separate institutions and bodies.

When defining the new structure for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on national security, one cannot avoid questions about how to improve security, and not to violate or abuse human rights and freedoms. Vigorous public debates are essential for answering these questions. Clear guidelines formulated in the hearing process can provide public confidence in new policies. Information technology can provide tools to minimize these conflicts, foster co-operation and help them in the assurance that the right information should come to the right people at the right time. The procedures that provide accountability and oversight can make sure that lessons from previous experiences strengthen the country's information strategies to combat terrorism.

The intelligence services should constantly adapt to new needs in the context of the global campaign against terrorism. The renewed emphasis should be placed on human intelligence through the use of information technology, for the purpose of improved analysis and cooperation with law enforcement agencies, as well as real-time intelligence on terrorist activities. This is necessary in order to be taken elimination measures against those persons for whom there is strong information about their connection with planning and preparation of general hazardous actions. 



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**Editor-in-Chief:** Goran Ilik, PhD

**Managing Editor:** Mladen Karadjoski, PhD

**Available Format:** Online

**Language:** English

**eISSN:** 1857-9760

**Publisher:** Institute for Research and European Studies

**Fields:** Political Sciences, International Relations, International Law

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Peer review method: Double-Blind

Date of acceptance: March 22, 2019

Date of publication: May 25, 2019

Original scientific article

UDC 327(669.1)

Scan the QR code:



## NIGERIA'S REGIONAL AMBITIONS: CHANNELS AND CHALLENGES

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**Abstract:** *Nigeria is the most populous black nation in the world, member of the UN Security Council and largest economy of Africa. In addition to its globally acknowledged qualitative oil, it also has large deposits of mineral resources including tin, coal and gypsum, gold and lead. The country is not only engaged in a passionate competition with South Africa to attain the position of a continental superpower preparatory towards becoming a globally acknowledge giant but also comfortably playing a big-brother role among Africa nations. This paper uses documentary analysis to examine Nigeria's social, economic and global potentials of fulfilling its dreams vis-a-vis the potentials of its competitor(s). The paper found out that Nigeria faces multidimensional challenges on its path towards continental leadership ranging from domestic problems of rising crime, incessant insurgency, dilapidated infrastructure, growing unemployment, over-reliance on dwindling oil income and leadership crises among others to intense competition from other strong African countries like South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia. The paper concludes that the country's goal of a regional superpower status is achievable but Nigeria must address its domestic challenges to win the race of attaining continental hegemony.*

**Keywords:** *Superpower; Economy; Military; Boko Haram Insurgency; Hegemony*

## INTRODUCTION

Home to one-fourth of Africans covering a land area of about 1600 square kilometers, with vast human and material resources within its geographic confines, Nigeria prides itself as the giant of Africa (Sotiriou 2015). However, questions are being raised on whether Nigeria's domestic problems are not strong impediments capable of not only halting the country's growth but also retarding its achievements towards greatness especially in the face of stern competition from other strong economies that faces little or none of the Nigeria's problems of insurgency, secessionist movements, chronic corruption and leadership crises (BBC 2014). This debate prevails on radio, on TV, online and on the street of not only Nigeria but many African countries. It demands answers to whether South Africa's membership of BRICS, its western European connections and its vast and well positioned mining industry can tilt the competition to the advantage of the former apartheid infested country. Though other competitors of continental greatness – Ethiopia and Egypt – have their areas of strength, this paper dwells more on the two frontrunners regardless of Ethiopia's successes in agricultural diversification and processing and its globally famous airline that contributes a staggering \$2 billion per year (World Bank 2014) and Egypt's longstanding tourist strides in Pyramids and culture as the cradle of civilization and its continental military superiority (Mikva 2015). Noteworthy is the fact that regardless of this paper's snubbing of great strength in these capable countries, they significantly play a key role in determining the Africa's continental superpower in the areas of partnership, treaties, bandwagoning and other diplomatic and military alliances. Hence the paper will assess among others, avenues for cooperation especially in peace missions across the continent to reveal the most deserving of Africa's leadership at the global scene.

## CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

The term superpower refers to a strong state that exerts influence over, and capable of dominating others in international relations especially through use or threat of its military, economic and cultural superiority. The term is defined as "a country that has the capacity to project dominating power and influence anywhere in the world, and sometimes, in more than one region of the globe at a time, and so may plausibly attain the status of global hegemony" (Miller Lyman 2015). Going by this explanation of Miller, it amounts to naught, any attempt at assuming the status of sub-regional, regional or continental superpower because a superpower must possess the capacity to go beyond its immediate environment and control the world. Samuel Huntington in his classic writing titled the lonely superpower agrees with Miller and opines that "the superpower could effectively resolve important international issues alone, and no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so."

These are qualities that neither Nigeria nor South Africa possess and may not possess in foreseeable future. Even, United States is increasingly becoming unable to control the world and solve crucial international issues alone without the cooperation of others states. The use of military force becomes impossible or at least ineffective without willing and capable allies to reduce excessive burden and distribute damages and casualties among supportive nations, and legitimation of the United Nations to give war a beautiful and acceptable cause in order to avoid condemnation and gain popular support both at home and abroad. Thus, (Huntington 1999) and (Haines 2015), concludes that the contemporary world lacks a unipolar superpower but has a *uni-multipolar* system where a strong superpower exist and several other major powers that aid the actions of the *unipower* through an interwoven and interdependent power relationship. This latter position leaves the possibility of becoming a superpower more open and impliedly admits the possibility of Nigeria becoming one of the major powers with strength that surpasses all other African nations and capable of exerting influence over all others while at the same time not disregarding the possibility of becoming a global superpower in future.

Hence, a nation must possess certain resources of power capable of catapulting itself to a position of power that others must accept willingly or unwillingly. Such resources and determinants of international prowess are subject to intellectual polemics but some features such as population, geographical advantage, strong economy, resources, military prowess, diplomacy and dominant culture are undeniably essential (Kennedy 1987). The higher the population of a country the better its chances of enriching its military personnel to stand the test of other great powers especially when it comes to land battles. Population also makes a country a center of attraction for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) due to its ability to absorb end products, accommodate wider and stronger competition and provide large market more than countries with smaller population. A large landmass negates the possibility of quick annihilation by a strong power and to some extent gives the nation a possibility of retaliatory strike unlike smaller nations than can be exterminated from the face of earth within hours of first strike. The stronger the economy of a state the higher its capacity to support large populations and sponsor large military and diplomatic engagements within and outside the country; hence, a nation with a weak economy, incapable of supporting other aspects of state may find its population and large expanse of land as mere liabilities than assets. Large military personnel and dexterity serves as physical resources of international power that threatens real and perceived adversaries, gives protection against territorial aggression and makes a nation a worthy partner with other major powers across the globe in their drives towards attaining mutually super-ordinate advantages or solving common problems through the use of coercion. A robust diplomatic ability prevents sanctions, secure new and maintains old friendships; and lead nations to solve problems and achieve symbiotic goals using words instead of bullets while a dominant culture especially in the fields of music, dress, films and

thoughts makes a nation to possess a model-like aura worthy of emulation by less capable nations. Agreeing significantly with (Kennedy Nossal 1999) states”

[G]enerally this term was used to signify a political community that occupied a continental-sized landmass, had a sizable population (relative at least to other major powers); a super-ordinate economic capacity, including ample indigenous supplies of food and natural resources; enjoyed a high degree of non-dependence on international intercourse; and, most importantly, had a well-developed nuclear capacity.

This statement not only agrees with Paul Kennedy’s claims but also brings to light another requisite feature of a superpower, which others failed to recognize. The issue of self-reliance especially for the supply of basic needs to the nation’s population is essential to the attainment of a superpower status. Though, no nation can survive as an island unto itself, too much reliance on others for food, shelter, fuel and simple tools reveals the weak spots of a nation on which competitors and adversaries can easily manipulate through the use of sanctions, trade boycotts, unfair tariffs, and creation of Free Trade Zones (FTZ).

## EXAMINING NIGERIAN ECONOMIC STRENGTH

Previously, Nigeria was seen as a mono-centric economy that relies essentially if not wholly on the mercy of rising oil prices and fails to develop other aspects of the economy such as agriculture, solid minerals, manufacturing and service industries making it persistently listed among the single export nations of the world. In recent times however, Nigeria is fast releasing itself from the cocoon of over reliance on oil exposing a new, not previously conceived size, structure, and strength in almost all sectors of the economy. Formerly, the oil sector contributes as much as 85% of Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product but with the current rebasing, Oil and gas, agriculture and trade contributes only half (54%) of Nigeria’s GDP with oil having a share of 15.8% less than agriculture (22.1%) and trade has 16.5% (World Bank 2014). Masetti (2014) explains this rapid expansion and diversification as an outcome of rebasing Nigeria’s GDP from 1990 to 2010 as the new base year. This rebasing increases the industries being measured from 33 to 46 with the service sector having a share of more than 50% and enabled the country to attach value to some industries like mobile film industry, communication and internet services that were hitherto either non-existent or contributed little to the economy back in 1990. The IMF recommends changing the base year every five years to capture changing realities but Nigerian statisticians left the base year unchanged for many years resulting in providing inaccurate figures to the world as the country’s GDP.

**Table 1: Sectoral Shares in Nigeria's GDP, 2012: A Comparison of Newly Re-Based & Older GDP Estimates**  
(Source: NBS cited in Word Bank, Nigerian Economic Report, 2014)

	NEW	OLD
Agriculture	22.1	33.1
Crude Oil & Gas	15.8	37
Trade	16.5	15.5
Manufacturing	7.4	1.9
Food & Tobacco	4.4	-
Construction	3.1	1.3
Transportation	1.3	1.6
Telecommunications	8.3	0.8
Electricity & Gas	0.5	0.2
Finance & Insurance	2.8	1.6
Real Estate	7.7	4.5
Entertainment, Broadcasting, Motion Pictures & Music	2.0	-
Public Administration	3.1	-
Professional, Scientific & Technical Services	3.7	-
Others	5.7	2.5

**Table 2: GDP Growth in Selected Sectors 2011 – 2013 (New Estimates) – A Comparison of Newly Re-Based & Older GDP Estimates** (Source: NBS cited in Word Bank, Nigerian Economic Report, 2014)

	2011	2012	2013
Total	5.3	4.2	5.5
Non-Oil GDP	5.8	5.8	8.4
Agriculture	2.9	6.7	2.9
Crude Oil & Gas	2.3	-4.9	-13.1
Manufacturing	17.8	13.5	21.8
Including Foods, Beverages & Tobacco	7.3	6.6	11.8
Electricity, Gas & Utilities	39.5	14.6	14.6
Construction	15.7	9.4	14.2
Trade	7.2	2.2	6.6
Transportation	6.0	-3.4	3.8
Telecommunications & Info Services	1.2	3.7	4.7
Entertainment, Broadcasting, Movies & Music	10.5	1.9	24.1
Real Estate	0.4	5.6	12.0



'The Economist' (2014) explains this gargantuan change of figures that:

To come up with an estimate of GDP, statisticians need to add together estimates of output from a sample of businesses in every part of the economy, from farming to service industries. The weight they give to each sector depends on its importance to the economy in the base year. A snapshot of Nigeria's economy in 1990 gave little or no weight to fast-growing parts of the economy such as mobile telephony or the movie industry. At the time the state-owned telephone company had a few hundred thousand customers. Today the country has 120m mobile-phone subscriptions. On the old 1990 figures, the telecoms sector was less than 1% of GDP; it is now almost 9% of GDP. Motion pictures had not shown up at all in the old figures, but the industry's size is now put at 1.4% of GDP. The old GDP figures were based on an estimate of output. The new figures are cross-checked against separate surveys of spending and income. The sample on which the data are based has increased from around 85,000 establishments to 850,000.

This paper must quickly clarify that the rebasing is not the cause of economic progress but rather reveals the true picture of the Nigerian economy which have been inaccurately reported over the years. The post rebasing figures show glaringly good performances from manufacturing, service, agriculture and oil industries, a large deposit of gas and an attractive mining hub, Nigeria proves itself a real giant with diversifying economy capable of greater achievements. With a population of about 140 million people (NPC 2006) most of which falls within working age of 15 – 50 (World Bank 2014), the country has the requisite labor force to catapult itself to the orbit of world leaders.




Figure 1: Rebasing changes GDP structure (Source: NBS, in Masetti 2014)



The rebasing makes Nigeria's economic strength far better than its closest rival South Africa which has a total GDP of USD382.3bn compared to Nigeria's USD 451.7bn and with 127.6 million active mobile lines it is the largest mobile market in Africa and one of the 10 largest markets in the world with its economy still having rooms for greater investment. Thus, since 2012, it surpasses South Africa to become the largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and portfolio inflows (Masetti 2014). This explains to a large extent, the tremendous growth of the service industry, manufacturing sector and other non-oil segments of the economy that were hitherto insignificant contributors to the economy. With new seemingly serious political leadership in place and relative peace due to the successes in the fights against insurgency, Nigeria stands a chance of improving its economy even further.

### NIGERIA'S MILITARY STRENGTH: A FORCE OR A FAILING

Though Nigeria's military is rated fourth in Africa (after Egypt, Algeria and South Africa) its experience in peace missions especially in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola and Darfur; as well as dealing with internal strives and insurgency such as Boko Haram helped to give it the essential practical proficiency that others lack (Mikva 2015). Nigeria's large population supports its military drives with 3,455,147 youths reaching military age annually, 130,000 active frontline personnel, 32,000 active reserve personnel and a total of 72,319,838 available manpower. This feat is attained due to sheer size of Nigeria's population and remains unattainable for any African country.

**Table 3: A comparison of Nigerian and South African Military Strength** (Source: Global Firepower Index, 2015)

	NIGERIA	SOUTH AFRICA
<b>POWER INDEX SCORE (Inverse)</b>	<b>1.1602</b>	<b>0.9233</b>
Total Population	177,155,754	48,375,645
Available Manpower	72,319,838	25,913,422
Fit for Service	40,707,659	14,093,327
Reaching Military Age Annually	3,455,147	964,139
Active Frontline Personnel	130,000	88,565
Active Reserve Personnel	32,000	17,100
<b>LAND SYSTEMS</b>		
Tanks	148	195
Armored Fighting Vehicles	1,420	2265
Self-Propelled Guns	25	43
Towed Artillery	339	97
Multiple Launch Rocket Systems	30	50
<b>AIR POWER</b>		
Total aircraft	98	209
Fighters/Interceptors	10	17

Fixed Wing Attack Aircraft	10	17
Transport Aircraft	42	106
Trainer Aircraft	35	67
Helicopters	38	96
Attack Helicopters	9	12
NAVAL POWER		
Total Naval Strength	75	30
Aircraft Carriers	0	0
Frigates	2	4
Destroyers	0	0
Corvettes	0	0
Submarines	0	3
Coastal Defense Craft	12	9
Mine Warfare	3	4
OIL RESOURCES		
Oil production	2,525,000bbl/day	192,000 bbl/day
Oil consumption	280,000 bbl/day	591,000 bbl/day
Proven Oil Reserves	37,200,000,000 bbl/day	15,000,000 bbl/day
LOGISTICS		
Labor Force	51,530,000	18,540,000
Merchant Marine Strength	89	3
Major Ports & Terminals	3	5
Roadway Coverage	193,2000	362,099
Railway Coverage	3,505	20,192
Serviceable Airports	54	566
FINANCIAL AID (in USD)		
Defense Budget	\$2,330,000,000	\$4,610,000,000
External Debt	\$15,730,000,000	\$139,000,000,000
Reserves of Foreign Exchange & Gold	\$47,700,000,000	\$48,460,000,000
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)	\$478,500,000,000	\$595,700,000,000
GEOGRAPHY		
Square Land Area	923,768 km	1,219,090 km
Coastline	853 km	2,798 km
Shared Border	4,477 km	5,244 km
Waterways	8,600 km	0 km

Based on the figures in table 3, Nigeria excels in manpower and resources (especially petroleum) while South Africa is far better in terms of Air Force and naval equipment as well as better military logistics and preparedness. This gives South Africa a better hand in military hardware and explains its power-index of 0.9233 which ranks it 32nd out of 106 rated countries against Nigeria's 1.1602 that places it 41 out of 106. The GFP ranking is an inverse rating with 0.0000 as a perfect score (lower numbers indicate higher military strength), which is used to consider over fifty factors and rank countries, based on their ability to wage

conventional war (Mikva 2015; GFP 2015). Despite Nigeria's weaker military strength, its contributions to peace missions in Africa and the world are unsurpassed by any African country. It started contributing to peace mission right after independence in 1960 and remains a key contributor since then. Nigeria actively participated in peacekeeping missions in Congo, Namibia, Angola, Western Sahara, Mozambique, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan and South Sudan. Nigeria's near-unilateral missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Guinea Bissau, Cote d' Ivoire where it provided military equipment and personnel costs, increases its fame in light of needs to keep global peace. Adeniyi (2015) posits:

As the preponderant power in West Africa, Nigeria has been the main provider of military and other resources for ECOWAS peace operations to the tune of US\$8 billion in its various missions in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, and Sierra Leone. During the peak of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars in the 1990s, Nigeria provided over 70% of ECOMOG's military and civilian personnel, as well as logistical support. In 2003, it deployed 1,500 troops to the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), and a medical and signals team to the ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire in 2003 (ECOMICI). In 2004, 1,500 Nigerian troops were deployed in Darfur as part of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Recently, Nigeria also provided 1,200 troops to the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), and 200 police officers to AMISOM. Nigeria deployed the first set of individual police officers (IPOs) in Africa in ONUC in 1960 while the pioneer Formed Police Unit (FPU) of 120 officers was deployed in Liberia in 2004.

South Africa started contributing to International missions through the South African Development Community (SADC) to Lesotho in 1998 and made its debut as a contributor to UN peace missions in 1999 in Congo, which was 39 years after Nigeria's first mission in Congo. As at September, 2015, South Africa participated in 14 UN missions compared to Nigeria's 25 outings. In addition, Many Nigerians held key civilian and military positions in UN peace missions such as Prof. Ibrahim Gambari who served as a UN representative and Head of Mission in Dafur, Mr. Olu Adeniji also serve similar role in Sierra Leone and Central Africa, Major General J.A. Ironsi led the UN mission in Congo as a force commander, a position that was held by five other Nigerians after him including Major General Chris Garuba, Lieutenant General Isaac Obiakor, Major General Moses Obi, Major General Joseph Owonibi and General Martin Luther Agwai in Angola, Liberia, South Sudan, Liberia and Dafur respectively; Thus, with more than 12000 personnel deployed to various peace missions, Nigeria is placed fifth in the world in terms contributing men to keep global peace(Babalola 2014; Lotze 2015; Adeniyi 2015). In recognition of these contributions towards a more stable and peaceful world, Nigeria was re-elected in February, 2014 to continue serving as chair of the UN Peacekeeping Operations Panel (Babalola 2014).

This is clear pointer to the roles Nigeria play in stabilizing the continent and clear will to carry the lot and spend in the interest of peace, restoration of order and progress.

## NIGERIA AND THE AFRICAN UNION

Nigeria's commitment to the African Unity is anchored around its cardinal foreign policy goals of maintaining good, development oriented relationship with immediate neighbors, African countries and the world at large as presented shortly after independence to the United Nations General Assembly on October 7, 1960 by the country's first Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and enshrined in the nation's constitution of 1999 (Ashiru & George 2013). This policy thrust ensured the maintenance peaceful relations with all African nations regardless of size, population, economic wherewithal or influence.

This situation was further enhanced by Nigeria's role in balancing the ideological conflict that ensued shortly after independence of most African states concerning the direction of pan-Africanism. On one extreme lies the Casablanca group consisting of countries like Ghana, United Arab Africa Republic, Morocco and Algeria who believe that Africa should delink from all forms of relationship with former colonial masters and establish a united African state to further the interest of Africa while at the other extreme was the Brazzaville group which consisted mainly of all former French colonies that advocated for continued influence of the former colonialists. A proposition viewed by Casablanca group as too subservient and will end up ensuring continued economic exploitation of Africa by the Europeans. Nigeria spearheaded the moderate Monrovia group consisting of Ethiopia, Libya, Liberia, Somalia, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Senegal that proposed gradual but continues approach to political and economic cooperation of African states that will ensure balanced relationship of African states with other countries of the world based on mutual respect and equality by ending all forms of colonialism and adhering to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. (Gusau 2013, 177). Nigeria's belief in total eradication of racism and apartheid led to its huge financial commitment towards the eradication of the unholy scourge of apartheid, which led to its honorary member of the frontline states and Chairmanship of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid. Thus when it came to the transformation of the Organization of African Unity to the EU-modeled African Union, Nigeria's contribution is best captured by Ashiru & George (2013):

Furthermore, it was Nigeria that provided the leadership that enabled Africa to see clearly the way forward in establishing the African Union. The powerful and sovereign supra-national entity, which Libya proposed and tried to promote, subsequently became tempered and was replaced by the gradualist approach of a European Union model to continental organization, favored by Nigeria and a majority of member states. A Nigerian, Professor Adele Jinadu, was one of six experts that produced the Draft Constitutive Act of the African Union.

## MANAGING DOMESTIC CHALLENGES

Corruption is no doubt the greatest Nigerian enigma; it is a cancerous conundrum that has eaten deep into every cranny of the Nigerian state and a reason for the country's low level of respect in the International community. It has grown to a level that corruption seemed to have received quasi-official recognition and permeated the police, anti-corruption agencies, education, health service delivery and the presidency. In the year 2014, when President Goodluck Jonathan was asked on a national television broadcast on allegations that he isn't serious in his fight against corruption, he retorted ""Over 70% of what are called corruption, even by EFCC and other anti-corruption agencies is not corruption, but common stealing." This stand openly contradicts the provisions of the Corrupt Practices and other related Offences act of 2000 that describes corruption to include "bribery, theft, embezzlement of public funds, undue gratifications, fraud and "other related offences" (Balogun 2014). This statement and its kinds serve as encouragement to corrupt officials and a serious impediment on against the anti-corruption crusade. With regards to the police pension scam, the Editorial of Punch Newspaper averred:

For a country notorious worldwide for condoning corruption, very few incidents have offered as much insight into the endemic and pervasive nature of corruption in public office as the Maina case...Many even believed the government was tacitly providing him a hedge against arrest and investigation...at [the] time when Inspector-General of Police, Mohammed Abubakar, who was ordered to produce Maina at the Senate, said he was nowhere to be found, the PRTT boss was said to be cruising around town in bulletproof cars, under heavy police protection.

However, with the ascension of President Muhammad Buhari to the presidency on 29<sup>th</sup> May 2015, the tripods upon which his administration's policies are anchored are Anti-Corruption, Security and the Economy. This resulted in a vigorous, intensive and extensive war against graft that resulted in the retrieval of 3.95 trillion naira and the restoration of Nigeria's long lost glory as a country of hope and opportunity for all. Some of the achievements of his anti-corruption crusade as reported by Premium times (2016) include but not limited to:

- Right from the moment he won the Presidential Election in 2015, the impression of the President as a "no nonsense and incorruptible leader" sent a signal to looters of public funds, with many of them returning funds that had been stolen under the previous administration.
- To create a framework for prosecuting the war against corruption and institutionalize probity, President Buhari set up an Advisory Committee on War Against Corruption

under the leadership of eminent Prof. Itse Sagay to tighten the loose legal provisions through which corrupt persons escape prosecution.

- The anti-corruption battle is gaining ground with several high profile cases already in the courts. The administration is being guided by the rule of law in the prosecution of corruption cases.
- President Buhari enlisted the support of multilateral institutions like the World Bank and IMF, security agencies, Western countries and other friendly nations to locate and repatriate a stolen asset which has already started yielding fruits.
- At a London summit on anti-corruption, President Buhari announced that Nigeria will begin the full implementation of the principles of the OPEN contracting data standards.
- In the first quarter of 2016, President Buhari embarked on trips to the Middle East to sensitize the governments on the need to repatriate stolen assets and hand over the looters for trial in Nigeria. In January, Nigeria and UAE signed Judicial Agreements on Extradition, Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters.
- In March 2016, the Federal Government and the Swiss Government signed a Letter of Intent On the Restitution of Illegally-Acquired Assets forfeited in Switzerland. Under the agreement, Switzerland will repatriate \$ 321 million USD illicitly acquired by the Gen. SaniAbacha family.
- In March 2016, the Presidential Committee set up to probe contracts awarded by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) from 2011 to 2015 announced the recovery of over N7 billion from indicted companies and individuals.

These and many other feats attained, have rekindled hope in Nigerians that the nation can attain the peak of its potentials and compete favorably with another nations of the world.

## CHALLENGES AHEAD

Now more than ever, Nigeria is having bundles of problems to contend with. It faces the challenges of Boko Haram insurgency which to a larger extent has not only crippled the economy of most societies in the Northeastern and north-western regions of the country but also made government to spend almost all government resources on security of lives and property to the detriment of other sectors of the society. This resulted in closure of schools, burning of markets, sporadic killings in cities, extermination of villages and closure of international borders; affected international businesses, stalled agricultural activities and increased destitution (Cheri 2014). Closely related is the recent uprising in the Southeastern part of the country where several secessionist movements for the creation of the Biafra as a sovereign state out of Nigeria is looming high and attracting international attention (Ikhioya


2015). Decades of leadership crises catapulted Nigeria to a position of international disrespect by portraying Nigeria a corrupt nation where electoral malpractice, cyber-crime, fraud, drug trafficking and embezzlement of public funds are the norms rather than exceptions. The green passport became an insignia of trouble in the eyes of international community that earns its bearer the misfortune of serious frisking and interrogations due mainly to soaring level of impunity, money laundering and drugs and human trafficking.

Despite its large, arable land, Nigeria still remains an importer instead of exporter of food products. A nation that fails to attain food sufficiency is food insecure and may not be capable of feeding itself in hard times of war and can easily be silenced by the threat of sanctions. In 2008, Nigeria produced 2million MT of milled rice and imported 3million MT which indicates that the country could only produce 40% of its domestic needs. This deficiency is believed to be caused by outdated land tenure system, inefficient and corrupt fertilizer procurement and distribution strategy, poor irrigation system, failure to innovate user friendly and cost effective farming tools and frequent post-harvest losses that distract willing farmers (FAO 2015). In terms of electricity generation, quite a number of Nigerians still live in darkness as electricity generation and distribution defies all reforms due mainly to corruption. After injecting 3.2 trillion naira into the electricity project, Nigeria with about 160 million people by 2013, could generate only 4000 megawatts of electricity (0.03 kilowatts per head) compared to South African 45,000 Megawatts (1.02 kilowatts per head) (Cheri & Ibrahim 2013). This invariably cripples the economy especially the manufacturing sector that survives on gas thereby incurring cost.

## CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it can safely be concluded that Nigeria more than South Africa and all other contenders, possesses the advantage of numbers, diverse economic viability, relative military strength, influential cultural asset and international diplomatic recognition to lead the African continent and serve as a regional superpower capable of resolving conflicts, providing aids and rallying support for a common cause and forging alliances to solve African problems. However, Nigeria must address its domestic problems of insurgency, ethnic and religious clashes, corruption and infrastructural defects before it can meaningfully claim continental leadership. Nigeria has also been rated one of the most corrupt countries of the world by international agencies and the 2015 General Elections victory of Mohammed Buhari was on his take on Boko Haram, corruption and overhaul of economy. President of Nigeria, General Mohammed Buhari is committed to his election promises to wipe out the Boko Haram scourge and corruption from Nigeria. One can see so many positive changes and rebuilding of Nigeria's image under the committed leadership of President Buhari. The ongoing war on Boko Haram and its success will make a drastic impact on Nigerian economy and polity as well as regional and international peace.

Recommendations:

- i. Nigeria should emphasize in its subsequent Federal budgets the need to acquire modern military equipment such as submarines, Attack-Helicopters and Aircraft carriers to enhance Nigeria's military position.
- ii. National Orientation of citizens on the strength of the country and its ambitions should be embarked upon to mobilize the citizens to support their governments in achieving such onerous goal of becoming an undisputed continental superpower.
- iii. Diversification of the economy especially manufacturing, agriculture and mining sectors of the economy should be considered a major priority to reduce the country's dependence on oil and increase self-reliance on basic needs such as food, furniture and water.
- iv. A law should be enacted to ban or limit the importation of rice, fish, toothpick, and textiles in order to protect and motivate local producers of those goods thereby reducing the pressure on foreign currency exchange. 



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**Editor-in-Chief:** Goran Ilik, PhD

**Managing Editor:** Mladen Karadjoski, PhD

**Available Format:** Online

**Language:** English

**eISSN:** 1857-9760

**Publisher:** Institute for Research and European Studies

**Fields:** Political Sciences, International Relations, International Law

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Peer review method: Double-Blind

Date of acceptance: March 03, 2019

Date of publication: May 25, 2019

Original scientific article

UDC 321

Scan the QR code:



# DETERMINANTS AND IMPACTS OF POLITICS OF GODFATHERISM AND REGIONALISM IN THE YOBE STATE

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**Abstract:** *The politics of godfatherism and regionalism has become a phenomenon in the political development of many nations Nigeria inclusive. The paper examined the determinants and impacts of politics of godson and regionalism in Yobe state. Indeed, the politics of godson or the elites have entered every hook and crannies of the state and have affected the political arrangement of the political system. The paper is qualitative in nature, data were generated from secondary sources where several related articles, newspapers, magazines, books were consulted etc. In explaining the topic under study, the researcher adopted Elite theory. This theory was propounded by Vilfredo Pareto in 1935, the postulation of the theory is that elites could only be replaced by another set of elites, meaning that the majority are unavoidably governed by the minority. The study found that the politics of godfatherism courses and affect the political development of Yobe state by restricting power in the hands of the few, in a specific geopolitical zone of the state. This has leads to inter-party and intra-party defections, decamping and conflicts among the party members. Therefore, the study recommends the adoption of the direct primary election in chosen candidate in all level of governance. INEC should also make a law that will discourage money politics and punish culpritinvolved in such an illegal act. To minimize the politics of Godfatherism, there is a need for political awareness campaigns on the effects of political godson on the political development of the state.*

**Keywords:** *Determinants; Godfatherism; Impacts; Politics; Regionalism; Yobe State*

## INTRODUCTION

The politics of godfatherism and regionalism has featured prominently in the political history of independent Nigeria. The problems arising from godfatherism are myriad and it is one of the greatest glitches facing the Nigerian political system. The problem is such that the god-son oftentimes is a stooge of the godfather and he that *"pays the piper dictates the tune"* (Edigin 2010, 174). The failure of the god-son to meet the demands of the god-father is often punished with impeachments or denial of re-election. With the return to democratic rule in 1999, the country witnessed a heightened tempo in the politics of godfatherism. In Yobe State for example, godfather politics was given expression by the political tussle between Bukar Abba Ibrahim vs Alhaji Adamu Maina Waziri; Late Governor Mamman B. Ali vs Alhaji Adamu Maina Waziri; Late Governor Mamman B. Ali vs Late Senator Usman Albishir, Alhaji Adamu Maina Waziri vs Late Senator Usman Albishir, Governor Ibrahim Geidam vs Alhaji Adamu Maina Waziri.

## THE HISTORY OF YOBE STATE

The study area of the research is Yobe State which came into being on the 27th of August 1991. It was carved out of the old Borno State by the Babangida administration. Yobe State is made up of 17 local government areas. These local government areas are zoned into three geopolitical Zones: Zone A, B, and C. In addition, the state is made up of people of different ethnic groups, culture, and backgrounds. Among the available ethnic groups are Kanuri, Fulani, Badawa, Ngizimawa, Karekare, Bolewa, Mangawa, Ngamawa, and Hausa among others. Yobe State has a projected population of about 3,294,100 (City Population DE 2017, 1-2).

As noted above the state comprises Zone A, B, and C. But since the inception of democracy in 1999, the state is been ruled by Zone A. except in 2007 when late Governor Mamman B. Ali contest, struggled and won the governorship election. Though, he ruled the state for 18 months only and answers the almighty call in 2009. This gave the opportunity for Governor Ibrahim Geidam to sworn in as the governor of the state constitutionally. Governor Ibrahim Geidam ruled the state for two and a half tenure after the demised of his boss in 2009. Surprisingly, the incumbent governor nominated a candidate from same Zone to run for the post of governorship in the next coming general election 2019. This scenario is in line with the elite theory that power is circulating among the elites in the political structure of the state. These godfathers offer the services of their support only in expectation of physical and monetary returns and other form of returns such as contract, influencing appointment and project to a certain location (Togbolo 2012, 1-2). Looking at the above set-up it is understood that politics of godfatherism has eaten deep into Yobe politics this corresponds with the opinion of Plato, Aristotle, Tacitus, and other classical philosophers who largely centered on



the concentration of political power in the hands of a few in the early Greek and Roman society. Thinkers such as Pareto, Mosca, Michels, and Marx too devoted their political analysis on how power is used and misused by the ruling class in diverse settings. The domination of power by the hegemonic class in many parts of the contemporary society can thus, be said to be nothing new but has a vigorous pedigree (Albert 2005, 79).

## THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICS OF GODFATHERISM

Historically, the godfatherism became popular in Nigerian political movements in the 1960s, and early post-independence leaders became godfathers (Mamah 2004). The deed of godfathers was noticeable at the return to civil rule in 1979, but military administrations that branded the 1980's congested its action. A study by Alabi & Tunde (2013, 6), observed that the political godfather phenomenon is not new in Nigeria context. This situation commenced during the First Republic when the leading nationalists of the country (Zik, Awo, Tafawa-Balewa, etc.) prejudiced and controlled political activities in Nigeria. However, there are lots of changes between the philosophical godfatherism of the First Republic and the unpolished form Citing (Gambo, 2007). Bernard drew the basis of godfatherism in electoral politics to the city of Chicago in the United States of America in the pre-world war II era, "when the heads of criminal gangs sponsored politicians in elections, manipulated the results to get them elected and, in turn, received protection and contracts from their political godsons" (Bernard, 2009).

The 1999 civil rule accompanied in another form of godfatherism, which reached its peak during the spiteful destruction of lives and properties that, viewed the fierce aggression between a godfather (Chris Uba) and governor of Anambra state (Chris Ngige). This act brings to the forefront a new dimension to the practice of godfatherism in Nigeria. This contrasted with the roles played by godfathers in Nigeria's democratic exercise between 1958 and 1983 (Mamah 2004).

The politics of godfatherism become widespread in Yobe State political system in 1999 to date, when those in power became the political godfathers in the state politics. The deed of godfathers was noticeable in the state in 2007 when late governor Mamman B. Ali of the blessing memory came out to vie for the post of governorship in the state, only a few politicians were in support of his intention to contest for the post. Most of the political leaders and the party stakeholders were not in his support. This is because he has no political godfather that will support him to vie for the post, but he keeps on struggling in actualizing his political dream to become the governor of the state in 2007. However, late Senator M. B. Ali scored a major victory at the Supreme Court. The victory was in respect of a case brought by late Senator U. Al-Bashir disputing the replacement of his name with that of late Ali as an aspirant of the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) for the 2007 governorship election (Com 2018).

## PROBLEM STATEMENT

The politics of godfatherism has eaten deep into the political movements of many nations, including Nigeria. The politics of godfatherism has become part and parcel of the political condition of actualizing the political dreams of the contestants in the state. Several problems were identified as a source of politics of godfatherism. The central argument is that in the Yobe politics "godfatherism" has become the key or pillar to many politicians to win election. This is because many contenders cannot contest and win even for a single term, without the influence of the Godfather. But because of the influence of the godfathers many people are contesting and winning the election at all cost, because of the power of the godfathers. This problem of godfathers is extensively practicing in all parts of the country, including Yobe, it is observed that to contest for any political post it has become necessary to have strong political godfather before considering and run for any elective offices or even political appointment. This has created a wide vacuum among the contestants and the state at large, because those without the godfathers cannot contest for any post. It is understood that all the positions won because of the influence of godfathers cannot yield positive development. This is because the political elites asked contestants to sign an agreement to ensure that they agree with all the promises that they had entered with the elites. The contestant makes sure that all the money spends on him during the election were paid completely with interests. This led to political crisis between the aspirants and the godfathers, by extension among the citizens in the state or constituency (Gideons, 2010; Ohiole and Ojo, 2016, 2). This crisis has created a wide gap in the socioeconomic development of the state. For instance, if the godfathers sponsor a candidate into an elective position, such as governor, or president, then he has the power and right to recommend for commissioners or ministers for a political position into the cabinet and to request for exaggerated contracts (Ukhun, 2004 p16). Given this, the paper merit to examine the impacts of politics of godfatherism and regionalism in the Yobe state.

## OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

1. To examine why political godfathers, sponsor a candidate into Yobe state politics;
2. To investigate the effects of the politics of godfatherism and regionalism on the political development of Yobe state

## METHODOLOGY

This paper is qualitative, here the researcher used a secondary method in generating relevant and related literature, books, articles, magazines, and newspapers were consulted.



All the relevant literature consulted were systematically reviewed in explaining the topic under study (Zaleha Othman 2018).

## RESEARCH DESIGN

Considering the nature of the topic this study is case study approach because it helps the researcher in understanding the depth situation or social phenomenon. It Provides an in-depth understanding of a case or cases under investigation. It also assists in developing an in-depth description and analysis of a case or cases (Creswell 2009; Zaleha 2018).

## LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF GODFATHERISM

The term godfatherism have been defined by several scholars based on their perception and understanding. In a study by Adeoye (2009), the term used to define the connection between a godfather and godson. A godfather is a kingmaker, boss, mentor, and principal, while godson is the beneficiary and recipient of the legacy of a godfather. A godfather is someone who has built unbelievable respect and follower (voters) in the community and possessed a well-organized political stand, and general acceptance from an electorate that could secure victory for candidates of his choice (Adeoye 2009, 72).

In another development a study by Edigin (2010, 175), describes or sees godfather as a human being who plays god to his people. He provides their basic needs for them, protects them and assists them to secure and achieve their objectives. He further states that "his support could be seen as an investment, which he believes must yield some profits in the future".

The godfatherism is an impediment to Nigerian democracy. It is adversative to the freedom and welfare of the peoples. Therefore, the problem of godfatherism should then not be preserved as a party affair but should be treated with legal action by the government and the party stakeholders. To gain control over the state structure the politics of godfatherism need to tackle and control this is because, with the politics of godfatherism, godfathers often adopt different systems to outmaneuver their oppositions. Therefore, in Nigeria several approaches were used to win elections such as rigging, thuggery, violence and manipulations of results so often go with elections (Wenibowei 2011, 72).

In a related view Jibrin Ibrahim defined the category of godfatherism, during an interview granted to the BBC on 10 November 2003 as "men who have the power personally to determine who gets nominated and who wins the election in a state". For instance, Governor Chimaroke Nnamani of Enugu, who had a running battle with his godfather, Senator Jim Nwobo, for over two years, defined godfather from his own personal experience as follows: The 'political godfathers' in Nigeria build a collection of supporters around them and use their power, which is often tied to financial deliberations, to operate the rest of the

society toward his or her interest. Political godfathers use their power and influence to block the involvement of the masses from Nigerian politics. The elite theory explained the above situation that power is rotating between the elites and subjugating the masses to subordinate positions. This signifies that the elites and the politicians are political porters: They decide who is to take part in the national politics and under what situations (Albert 2005, 80). The politics of godfatherism is one of the notions that open thin doors when it comes to determining who gets what in the political scene. Though, in the context of this study, the literary meaning and characteristics of godfather need to be highlighted. Literarily Godfathers are seen in Nigeria to be men who have the power personally to determine both who gets nominated to contest and wins an election (Alabi and Tunde 2013, 5). Thus, the demand for sustainable democracy in Nigeria is to expand both political and socio-economic situation of the country through massive people participation in the policy and decision-making process, but contrary to Nigerian political system where those that reached political power in both arm of government legislative and executive were elected to power through the influence and support of some political 'godfathers' in many states, nevertheless, the desire of political godfathers is to hold political and socio-economic powers, both at the center and the local units as strategies to administratively influence the activities of political office holders. Such as the Governors and Legislators in terms of employing people into numerous posts, such as Ministers/Commissioners, Chairmen of the boards, Secretaries to the various Institutions, DPM and Treasurers of Local Governments as well as allocation of some developmental projects into various local government of interest across the state (Alabi and Tunde 2013, 2-3). This is in line with the summation of Elite theory which buttressed that political power is shared among the political elites at the expense of the masses. To explain the above assertions (Albert 2005, 81) noted that an important issue raised by Pareto and Marx in their works is that political elites insulate and isolate themselves from their society and try as much as possible to reproduce themselves from within. They do all possible within their reach to ensure that non-elites do not join their membership. This is in line with the postulation of the Elite theory, which believes that power is rotating among the elites by sidelining the masses to subordinating positions. To ensure this, the political elites maintain a safe, functional distance from the rest of the society. They reproduce themselves on an individual and selective basis in a process which Pareto specifically referred to as the 'circulation of elites'. In a related development, a study by Alabi and Tunde (2013), disclosed that most Nigerian policies are usually determined by political godfathers to allow them to fix in their contenders to the corridor of power. In the recent time, the politics of godfatherism has extended to upper, lower and state house of assembly. For instance, in 2015 the governor made same political miscalculation by using the power of incumbency to deny the conduct of the primary election in the state, this led to party defection of some party members to PDP. However, the defections of those party members to the opposition party gave victory to some PDP aspirants to win the election in some part of the state which is very abnormal in the history of

Yobe politics. It is observed that history will repeat itself in the coming general 2019 if this political miscalculation persists in the state (Sale 2018). In a similar view Sale (2018), disclosed that same thing applies to Yobe North senatorial district where the ruling party has fielded the longest-serving senator in the state, Senator Ahmed Lawan, the current Senate leader. Political analysts in and around the state posited that Adamu Maina Waziri has contributed immensely in making PDP in Yobe State weak. They said since the inception of democratic rule in 1999, Waziri has been the sole gubernatorial flag bearer of the party and has never for once won election or allow somebody to make any move to contest. He is being accused of pocketing the party and tilting it to where it will serve his personal interest. Some party faithful in the state went to the extent of accusing him for working for the ruling APC. Presently, there is a serious political crisis between the present Senator and Waziri. Based on the political analysis if this internal party wrangling between A. Waziri and M. Hassan, if not amicably addressed before the coming general elections, it will no doubt lead to PDP losing the seat to APC, and if this happens, APC will be happy, because Zone B is the only Zone among the three senatorial Zone s, that is being representing by PDP. And the only Senator that is giving Yobe APC a serious fight and sleepless night (Sale 2018).

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In explaining this paper there are several theories that can support the politics of godfatherism, but for the purpose of this research, the researcher adopted elite theory to explain and supports this study.

### ELITE THEORY

This theory was propounded by Vilfredo Pareto in 1935 the assumption of the theory is that elites could only be substituted by another set of elites, meaning that the masses are necessarily ruled by the few elites. This idea was stated by Pareto 1935 the law of elite circulation, to support the argument elite theory defines 'elites' as actors controlling resources, occupying key positions and relating through power networks (Yamokoski and Dubrow 2008). Therefore, the concept of elites is more closely related to the Weberian idea of power, understood as the capability of implementing one's will, even against the will of others (Weber 1922, 696). The power can be achieved through material and/or symbolic resources. Consequently, elites can be defined as those in possession of those resources (Reis 2005). This theory dwelled on how power is been shared in the society. The theory believes that power can only be shared among the elites at the expense of the masses either they like it or not.

## THE POLITICS OF GODFATHERISM IN YOBE STATE

The politics of godfatherism courses a lot of problems in the political movements of many states, including Yobe state. These problems include intraparty and interparty conflict, party defection or party decamping. However, these conflicts arising from godfatherism has become one of the major problems affecting the Yobe political arrangement. According to Sale (2018, 1-2), since the creation of Yobe state on 27<sup>th</sup> August 1991 by Babangida military administration, the state has been governed by the Kanuris mainly from Yobe East senatorial district. Though, late Senator Mamman B. Ali of the blessed memory was able to break the curse before he died two years into his four-year term. He further added that as 2019 general elections is fast approaching; there are doubts that the situation may remain the same. Although, opposition party PDP in the state still hasn't organized its self well to face the ruling party. For instance, in Yobe South senatorial district, the battle for the Yobe South Senatorial seat within the PDP is between the serving Senator M. Hassan and A. M. Waziri. It is still confusing because party faithful who are loyal to A. M. Waziri are parading that he is the candidate while those loyal to M. Hassan are also parading that M. Hassan is the candidate. This has created problems and confusions among the PDP followers. This confusion has left PDP members in a serious predicament. At last the party has declared Senator M. Hassan as the winner of the primary election (Usman, 2018). The ruling party APC is banking on this. If care is not taken, APC will capitalize on this and wrestle the seat from PDP. Based on the above scenario it is observed that the situation is no different with Yobe East senatorial district where the All Progressives Congress (APC), has returned the serving Governor as its candidate for the 2019 Senatorial election. PDP in the Zone is reluctant and has shown sign of defeat long before the election (Sale, 2018).

In preparation for the 2019 general elections and to demonstrate the power of incumbency, Yobe State Governor, Ibrahim Gaidam, has endorsed the nomination of the national secretary of the ruling All Progressives Congress, APC, Mai Mala Buni, to fly the party's governorship ticket in the state after 10 years of his administration. The funny part of this political domination is that Governor Bukar Abba, Governor Ibrahim Gaidam and Mai Mala Buni are all from same Zone. This signifies that Zone A has dominated the political arena of the state (Odunsi 2018).

To show the power of incumbency governor Gaidam nominated several candidates in various posts across the state, among those endorsed are current Senate Majority Leader, A. Lawan, for Senatorial ticket, just as he endorsed his spokesman, A. Bego, for Jakusko/Bade Federal Constituency, Engineer A. D. Aliyu for Yobe South Senatorial seat, though some of the nominations were later revolt because of the power and influence of godfatherism in the political movements of the state politics.

## DIRECT PRIMARY ELECTION

To overcome the problem of godfatherism and maintain free fair and credible election, the APC National Chairmen announce the adoption of direct primary elections in all the states in the country. The mode of the primary election is to select candidates for the coming 2019 general elections. This was rises from its leadership meeting in Abuja. Comrade Adams Oshiomhole-led National Executive Committee, he announced that all the contested would be chosen through the direct primary election. This decision was not in any way ambiguous. The President supported the adoption of the direct primary election for all APC candidates across the nation (Oladesu 2018). The Chairman explained the adoption of the direct primary election would give all registered members of the party the opportunity for participating in the process of determining those to represent them at all level of governance. This essentially explains the typical democratic style (Ojeifo 2018). The National Chairman emphasized that:

We note that direct primary election is free from the vices associated with the indirect primary. Direct primary cannot be manipulated. It is not prone to corruption, we want to grow democracy. We want the party members to have ownership of the party. We want to give our members a sense of belonging (Oladesu 2018, 1-2).

The All Progressives Congress (APC) was asked to adopt the direct primary for the selection of its candidates for next year' elections to boost internal democracy, National Chairman Adams Oshiomhole said. He told the nation that the party decided to 'liberalize' its shadow polls by making all registered members automatic delegates. He said the option will reduce the corruption and manipulation associated with the delegates system, which always generates huge post-primary crises (Oladesu 2018). This would as well minimize the power of incumbency in the political movements of the nation. And, to enable the general citizens who is willing and interesting to contest for any political position. The elite theory is centered on the power rotation among the elites, at the sake of general populous.

To curtail the problem of godfatherism all the political parties should adopt and implement these policies of the direct primary election, this would help in sanitizing the election process at all level of government. It would as well lead to free fair and credible election by electing credible candidates in electives positions. Although, some states across the nation didn't adopt the direct primary election, including Yobe. This is because of power incumbency and interest to manipulate the political power to a certain geopolitical Zone that has been dominating the state politics for many years (Sale, 2018). The politics of godfatherism has become part and parcel of Yobe politics. Looking at the structure of state house of assembly it is noted that most of the members have dominated the position since 1999, some have inherited the post and sustain it for many years because of the influence

and the power of Godfatherism that has denied the masses from contesting for the posts. This is the true picture of the Elite theory that believes in power circulation among the elite in the society.

## THE DETERMINANT OF POLITICS OF GODFATHERISM AND REGIONALISM

The study found that there are several determining factors to politics of godfatherism and regionalism. These include but not limited to the power of incumbency, influence, money, political thugs, money politics, lack of political awareness, selfishness and greediness, lack of exposure, over-ambition, nepotism, and politics of regionalism among others. There is a developing tendency in Nigeria which designates that an anticipating contender must have and depend on a godfather with the necessary influence, capital, and power to get he/she into voting political office. The implication is that contestants no longer depend on their acceptance among the voters but on their chosen godfathers to support them secure democratic successes (Aderonke, Awosika and Olanrewaju 2013, 70).

Similarly, it is observed that corruptive predispositions increase the monetary base of the godfathers by generating a wide variety of problems in the politics and government because the godfathers use money to place their godsons and wards in several positions of power (Oviasuyi 2009, 73).

According to Ohiole and Ojo (2016, 4), the election sponsors are rich people that come out willingly to contribute kindly towards the voting success of a party or sponsor aspirants throughout the election. He might be less worried about the active politics or management of government but thinks of responsive policies from the government. "Nigeria's godfathers in the XXI century sponsors election, but not all election sponsors are godfathers". Though, Godfathers reign across all spheres of the society: academics, legal, and religious environment (Ohiole and Ojo 2016).

In line with the above assertion, a study by Popoola (2014), disclosed that political godfather-son fight has been distressing Nigeria's development. The battle entrenched in the crash of interest, needs, values, and capitals, involved political office holders in the highest ladder of administration.

## THE IMPACTS OF GODFATHERISM

The study found that dissertation of politics of godfatherism had so much predisposed the political life and socio-economic of the country and particularly in the fourth republic. It had added ample care at the current time as a result of its need methods of enunciation. It has become almost incredible for an individual to hold political office either by election or appointment without condescending a godfather because of their power and influence (Joe 2010, 1-2). The politics of godfatherism and regionalism has a negative impact

on the political structure of Nigeria and Nigerians. Indeed, the right to elect individuals of their choice to rule them was deprived given the circumstances in which godfathers-imposed contenders of their favorite on the generality of the people. This is, to say the least very hostile to the creeds of democratic law (Chukwuma 2008, 87).

The politics of godfathers in the state are not simple sponsors of political campaigns, rather they are people whose influence stems not just from wealth but from their capacity to organize violence and corruption to manipulate central, state or local political schemes in support of the candidates they champion. A study by Oluloyo (2014, 3), observed that godfather request a considerable grade of control over the government not in order to support or form government policy, but to extract direct financial return in the form of government resources stolen by their politicians or gave to them as further opportunities for the implant. The over-concentration of influence, wealth and power of politicians describes the ascent for the regulating of the political structures and institutions by the ruling class in society. However, the struggle and the resulting standards have impacted significantly on society in a various way. In the present emerging democratic practice, the power struggles among the members of the ruling class have given rise to violence in different forms and digress. In a related opinion study by Ohiole and Ojo (2016, 10-11), revealed that Nigeria politics has been characterized by godfatherism, religious and tribal politics, money-bag politics, regionalism, and party politics.

Ohiole and Ojo (2016, 11) added that political godfatherism is based on political substitution relating to financial and moral aid where the godfather is the main donor and the godson the primary receiver, as a result, the common people are being destabilized with no dividend of democracy. Meanwhile, Godfather has endangered the existence of Nigeria nascent democratic practice. For instance, the illegal removal of Oyo State Governor Ladoja in 2006 lead to political uncertainty in the state. In an interrelated version a study by Oviasuyi (2009, 74), exposed that there has been a lot of catastrophes in Nigerian politics and Administrational crisis of self-assurance in the voted representatives, a loss of trust in the democratic rule and a growing hindrance at government, also, a growing frustration at the insignificance individual's vote in the political development. All these disasters are disasters instigated by the unconsecrated association of godfatherism that believes in the power of incumbency and influence. The godfatherism is not new a new phenomenon in Nigerian political movements. It has only assumed a new form, under the current republic of democratic governance. Partially because the Nigerian economy is still at the primitive stage of accumulation of wealth by the politicians and commissioned representatives with little or no fruitful capacities. In the Nigerian context, it is believed that politics is the only means of attainment of state resources (Aderonke, Awosika and Olanrewaju 2013, 71). The politics of godfatherism and politics has become the overriding feature describing contemporary politics in Yobe state. The role of a political phenomenon has wedged on the body politics of the state negative virtues which are now a potential danger to the state democracy and



democratic development (Aderonke, Awosika and Olanrewaju 2013, 71). Nigeria joined the comity of democratically governed countries, it has continued to experience an unparalleled rise in political ferocity extending from an increases crime wave, political assassination, armed robbery, and religious riots as a result of the crisis that emerged between godfather and godson (Ohiole and Ojo 2016, 2).

The advent of godfatherism modeled a great threat not only to good governance but also to the socio-economic development and stability of democratic governance. Perhaps, one of the most disturbing and damaging influences of godfatherism in Nigeria's fourth republic was in the domain of making nonsense of a truly free, fair and credible electoral process in which the electorates by right are expected to freely elect people of their choice into public office to represent their interests (Nkwede, Ibeogu and Nwankwo 2014).

## FINDINGS

Looking at the topic under study, the researcher found that the truth is that most honest, accountable and dedicated political aspirants in Nigeria are not financially sound they did not possess the financial power to contest and win the primary election, regardless of the general election, most of them are hiding under the umbrella of godfathers appears rational. However, the introduction of money-politics into Nigeria political system preferred the political godfathers, who are ready to support any candidates of their interest. This is in line with the assertion of the Elite theory which believes in power domination within a certain group of people. In relation to this, those contestants that are frantic for power had to pledge alliance to the godfather for a guaranteed charming ticket or else they would not have the ticket to contest for any post (Adeoye, 2009 p270). The godfatherism and political conflict have become the central feature depicting present-day Nigerian politics (Aderonke, Awosika and Olanrewaju 2013, 74). This disclosed that:

One thing with politics is that you must believe in godfatherism. If you did not believe in it, you would not be in daddy's place," Reverend Jolly Nyame, the governor of the Northern Taraba State, told Nigeria's The Sun newspaper. He then added that "Whether you like it or not, as a godfather you will not be a governor, you will not be a president, but you can make a governor, you can make a president." "I am the greatest godfather in Nigeria because this is the first time an individual single-handedly put in position every politician in the state (Olarinmoye 2008, 69).

On this Coker (2004), observed that "godfathers of Nigeria politics have always used their positions, power, and influence for their personal exaggeration to the disadvantage of the poor masses".




## RECOMMENDATIONS

To minimize the problems of godfatherism politics in Yobe state, the following factors are recognized (by Bernard 2009), and must be put into consideration to curtail these illegal acts (Alabi and Tunde 2013, 19):

- There is a need for political awareness campaigns to put an end or to minimize political Godfatherism in the state.
- All elective positions in Nigeria context should be made unappealing. The impression of paying huge allowances and salaries to elected leaders should be stopped, this is to discourage the godfathers and those politicians that are contesting for money sake.
- All political parties should categorically specify time and venues for the primary election to avoid confusion and misleading of the electorates or the voters.
- Political godfatherism should be cast off and reinforced democratic institution to evade from the politics of godfatherism of central government policies and programmes in order to sensitize the citizens on the importance of contributing in the election, and citizen awareness should arise on demanding a good response from the ruling class.
- It is therefore, suggested that godfatherism should not be treated as a party affair, but should be offered political, social and legal treatment by the government and the stakeholders in the state.
- Power of incumbency should be restricted by employing provisional government in place of incumbent President, Governor and Local Government Chairmen shortly before the commencement of the next elections campaign. This will curb the practice whereby the public office holders supervise over the elections in which they are contesting and conspire with godfathers to rig the election results.
- Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should adopt the use of electronic voting for all elections in the country to curtail electoral scam this will reduce the elections rigging and will as well encourages the interested aspirants to vie for any position of their choice.
- All political parties should adopt the principles of direct primary elections at all level this would give room for every interested citizen to contest and participate in politics.
- All political party should reduce the price of nomination or contesting forms to a reasonable and affordable amount, this would create an avenue for the masses to contest in their various constituencies, local government, state as well as the federal level.
- There is the need for increased confidence in the duly elected officials and increase faith in the democratization process.

- The electoral law should lay stress on appropriate conduct of primary elections into various positions to improve the rights of the voters in the choice of their aspirants or representatives.
- Electorates should be allowed to vote for the preferred aspirants during elections without pressure by political brutes who are part of the devices of godfatherism.

## CONCLUSION

The study concluded that the politics of Godfatherism has become the leading feature describing the modern Nigerian politics. It is obvious that godfatherism is not a new phenomenon in the history of Yobe politics and without it the politics of regional or side domination would have been a history. And no expressive impact would have been made in most endeavors of humanity including politics. The effects of godfatherism are conspicuous and featuring people on the face. This has changed into a hydra-headed monster as observed by Aderonke, Awosika and Olanrewaju (2013, 74), which he explained that if nothing is done can shorten the hard-gotten democracy. The study further observed that Yobe politics characterize with these types of godfathers: Most especially those who serve others, those who expect the society to serve them, and even those who channel their resources into criminal activities. The paper completed that politics of godfatherism has become a social phenomenon that has entered the hook and crannies of every state, including Yobe, and has dominated the political settings of the state. This paper concludes by knowing the inevitability of godfathers in politics but there is a need for appropriate supervision of godfather/godson association. 

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**Editor-in-Chief:** Goran Ilik, PhD

**Managing Editor:** Mladen Karadjoski, PhD

**Available Format:** Online

**Language:** English

**eISSN:** 1857-9760

**Publisher:** Institute for Research and European Studies

**Fields:** Political Sciences, International Relations, International Law

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Peer review method: Double-Blind

Date of acceptance: April 21, 2019

Date of publication: May 25, 2019

Original scientific article

UDC 314.15:365(477)

Scan the QR code:



## SOCIAL WORKERS TRAINING TO THE WORK WITH INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: UKRAINIAN EXPERIENCE

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**Abstract:** *The article is devoted to a problem of social work in Ukraine – the European Union help to internally displaced persons as a special category of citizens which appeared in Ukraine because of military conflict on Donbass, which is provided through educational work with social workers in new social, economical and political conditions. The aim of the article is to represent theoretical basis and methods of organization of educational work with social workers in the field of informative and explanatory work with internally displaced persons by the means of multidisciplinary brigades coming to the places of their compact residence. The authors of the article are the first ones to substantiate and explain scientific approaches to such kind of educational work (competent, family-centered, androgynous, activity, multidisciplinary, 'help for self-help') and taking it as basis explain content, forms and methods of social workers.*

**Keywords:** *Social Workers; Internally Displaced Persons; Places of Compact Residence; Family-Centered*





## INTRODUCTION

According to the UN today Ukraine sets the 8<sup>th</sup> position in the world as to the amount of internally displaced persons; official data of the Ministry of social policy of Ukraine says that there are about 1600000 of such kind in the country. So the problem of integration, social, cultural and professional adaptation of the internally displaced persons in Ukraine is rather sharp. Confirmation of this can be considered by the laws that were adopted in the country recently: "state law of Ukraine as to the internally displaced persons", program on integration of internally displaced persons made by the cabinet of ministers of Ukraine (2017) etc. According to the law internally displaced person is a Ukrainian citizenship, who permanently lives in Ukraine and who was made to leave his place of living or made it by his/her own will because of or to avoid negative results of armed conflict, temporary occupation, widespread manifestations of violence, massive human rights violations and natural or man-made emergencies. The causes of the crisis of people live in places of compact residence lays in their crowding, isolation, lack of finance (retired, people with special needs, families with underage children can live at places of compact residence only if they pay for their utilities). Unfortunately the camps turned up to be long-time shelters for those internally displaced persons, who do not have means of existence and found themselves in a difficult living situation. According to state legislation of Ukraine as to social work and social services difficult living situation in particular can be considered the basis for practical and active social work with internally displaced persons in places of their compact residence. Taking into consideration that internally displaced persons in places of their compact residence mainly don't come to social service authorities by themselves (as social service authorities do not give money or other kind of financial support) in one hand, and in the other (also according to Ukrainian legislation) social work with a person can be done only if a person (client) voluntarily accepts it, for taking an internally displaced person out of the camp (place of compact residence for internally displaced persons), integrating him/her into the host community, regrafting the feeling of subjectivity and responsibility for their own lives nowadays we need a new form of social work with such a category of citizenship – mobile (outgoing) informative and explanatory social work. Unfortunately those 3,5 years of living in places of compact residence for internally displaced persons (the average term that a person or a family already got as an experience) didn't let to integration and adaptation of internally displaced persons into local communities. This requires restructuring the work of social services and special advanced training for workers in such services. In particular, in Berdyansk, which has a population of 112,000, the number of temporarily displaced persons was 10,000 for 2017 (in 2014, this figure increased to 20,000), this problem was solved by the EU project "creating an integrated assistance system for temporarily displaced persons from the ATO zone", for the implementation of which the city received about 1 million 350 thousand Euros.



One of the obligatory activities of the project was the training of social workers of the City council of Berdyansk to work on conducting outreach social work in multidisciplinary mobile teams in compact areas of temporarily displaced persons. This training was conducted in Ukraine for the first time. Under the terms of the project, it was aimed to form professional competences of social workers for this type of work.

The Ukrainian scientist V. Kremin (2014) in his publication spayed attention to the issues of professional training of a future specialist for work in the social sphere. The results of the analysis of scientific studies indicate that a significant amount of theoretical research on the formation of competences of future social workers has not yet been brought to the level of practical recommendations for working specialists. Problems of theoretical nature, substantiation of possibility and expediency of advanced training of social workers at the workplace have not been studied at all; the requirements of competence approach in the context of working with temporarily displaced persons in the mobile field multidisciplinary team were not taken into consideration in particular. Existing studies reveal theoretical and methodological foundations for the preparation of social workers for work in the context of a military conflict and with temporarily displaced persons in certain social services and social protection agencies. But the preparation of social workers for multidisciplinary teamwork, work in places of compact residence of temporarily displaced persons also was not the subject of attention of scientific and pedagogical research. All studies concerned social services` and individual specialists` professional activity in peaceful conditions. The theoretical foundations and teaching methods for such work still should be developed and put to practical test. Foreign studies on the issue of social workers` professional education concern individual theories of social work (help for self-help), practical training for working in peaceful conditions with different categories of clients, families, situation of migrants in other countries and helping them.

In the process of working on the Project, we formulated the hypothesis: if in the process of training social workers apply competence, multidisciplinary, native-centered, activity, androgothic approaches, the concept of 'self-help' for the selection of content, methods and forms of learning, apply training of students on their own experience and use active and interactive methods of training, it will help to increase the competence of social workers of the City council of Berdyansk to the holding of information and educational multidisciplinary social work temporarily displaced persons in places of their compact residence. The aim of the study was to test the hypothesis and to demonstrate its influence upon the socio-pedagogical experiment on the formation of the professional competence of social workers before conducting informational and explanatory work with temporarily displaced persons in places of compact residence. As the participants of the social-pedagogical experiment on the Study, there were chosen 20 social workers of various social services at Berdyansk City council - direct participants of the forthcoming Project of informational and explanatory work with temporarily displaced persons in places of their

compact residence. The Project's limitation was connected with the prohibition of using the initial and final sections of the results with the students; it was allowed to use only the growth of their professional competence in the description of the results in the scientific articles. The control group did not include the experiment, since it covered all social workers in the city of Berdyansk and the project was implemented only here in Ukraine. Measurement was conducted with respect to changes in the professional competence of only the listeners of the seminar. There were still no social workers in places of compact residence, despite the fact that many stereotypes about temporarily displaced persons circulate in the city.

Therefore, the preparation of social workers for departure to places of compact residence required the justification and development of methodology and content. The research was conducted in several stages: 1) training of trainers for work at seminar on the issues follow: production of the program, criteria for the effectiveness of training and their indicators, levels of formation of professional competence of students, preparation of presentations for sessions, development of input and output questionnaires, methodological recommendations for students. 2) Entrance examinations of students and determination of their expectations and motivation as to the course. 3) Training process: 2 days of auditorium and 3 days of practical work (departure to places of temporary displaced persons' compact accommodation). 4) Carrying out the final questionnaire and analyzing the results of the initial questionnaire, determining the increase in the formation of professional competence of social workers.

## THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

While developing the training program of the seminar course and questionnaires to determine the formation of professional competence of social workers, methodological recommendations we proceeded from the following theoretical foundations:

1. According to the legislation the first and final result of the educational process in Ukraine is the formation of competence. Competence is a dynamic combination of knowledge, understanding, skills and abilities. The development of competencies is the goal of contemporary educational programs (Kremin 2014, 8). Competences are usually divided into specific and general. Taking into consideration the need of raising the level of specific (professional) competence of social workers of various social services in the field of social work in general, modern studies present a person as new clients of social services, places of compact residence - as a new direction of theoretical and practical work. Following the need of nowadays social workers to conduct the professional activity in a mobile multidisciplinary team based on common competencies that were not previously studied, we also chose the following general competencies for formation during the training session (interpersonal skills and abilities in particular): 1) the ability to work in an interdisciplinary team, a positive attitude towards disparities and other cultures, the ability to work in a different environment, ethical

obligations, interpersonal skills (Kremin, 15). 2) System competence: ability to apply knowledge in practice, research skills and abilities, ability to adapt to new situations, ability to generate new ideas (creativity), understanding of culture and customs of other people, ability to work independently, desire to succeed (Kremin, 16).

The professional competence of social workers for carrying out informative and enlightening social work with temporarily displaced persons in places of compact residence includes, thus, the motives of work, knowledge about its contents, forms, methods, peculiarities of carrying out, ability to work in a team, in another environment and in a new place - places of compact residence, to produce a common action plan, to assess the needs of temporary displaced persons in places of compact residence, the formation of such a team seminar and the training of the basics of communication among themselves and with a new category of clients, to collect information for them and be able to speak before them in mass, individual and group informative and explanatory work, to analyze the needs of clients and to use various forms and, depending on the situation, take into account the differences in the subcultures of the atoms and local residents, behave ethically in places of compact residence, be targeted at the help and self-help of temporary displaced persons, rather than on their permanent support, to be able to communicate without conflicts, to avoid professional burnout, effects of stress.

2. The family-centered approach in informative and enlightening social work means the priority of the rights and integrity of the family, the person, and in the family and society, the priority of the rights of the child. The emphasis was placed on the protective function of a social worker.

3. Activity approach involves the use of knowledge in practice, the use of such forms of work, as visiting classes, activities of different nature.

4. Androgogic approach involves learning on their own experience as a principle of andragogy, which involves taking into account the experience of training social workers for such work. It was different for all the students who even work in social work on the basis of 3 different laws about her – ‘on the protection of childhood’, ‘on social work with children and young people’, ‘on social services.

5. The multidisciplinary approach became important because of the need to save resources and to co-opt them to work in mobile outbound teams of social workers who work in different state authorities and services. It envisaged the existence of a single terminology and the theory and methodology of the work of the outgoing team, the unity of the plan of action and the ability to distribute duties in accordance with the joint plan of work.

6. ‘Help for self-help’ implies the attitude of social workers to temporarily displaced persons as integral subjects of work, as to clients who already have their rights, goals, interests, experience, intentions, resources and responsibilities as you choose a solution. The result of self-help is the ability of temporarily displaced persons to independent living, the ability to independently solve problems on the basis of mastering their rights and

development of life skills through partnership with a specialist, participation in groups of self-help in a direction or on their own initiative, through self-education, through independent practical activities, other ways.

## THE CONTENTS OF TRAINING

The developed syllabus of the seminar for social workers was based on these approaches and envisaged the formation of the professional competence of social workers for conducting informational and explanatory social work with temporarily displaced persons in places of compact residence. It included the following issues that were implemented during the seminar by trainers:

**Day 1:** introduced the participants of the training, determined the rules, identified the expectations, revealed the level of formation of professional competence of employees, acquainted with the statistical data of the temporary displaced persons in the region, the region, places of compact residence, gave a description of the social status of this category of people, introduced the problems of temporarily displaced persons, reviewed the signs psychological trauma and methods of work, prevention and support of a person with various manifestations of traumatic behavior; a separate unit (invited speaker was adviser to the Ministry of Social Policy for temporarily displaced persons) considered legal framework of status of temporarily displaced persons and their rights.

**Day 2:** the participants gained knowledge and developed their professional skills on the following directions: the basics of social work with temporarily displaced persons, including those from temporarily displaced persons in places of compact residence, methods, features, methods of carrying out informational and educational work with temporary displaced persons, adult education methods ; features of the perception of information temporarily displaced persons through the prism of the mentality, conditions and peculiarities of life, ways and channels of communication at places of compact residence, the concept of a team, signs of a team and, roles, conducting exercises on team building, determined the methods and ways of trusted social worker to work with temporarily displaced persons, reviewed concept image of a social worker in practice worked its components, the organization of a multidisciplinary team, its functions and tasks.

**Day 3:** considered basic human needs, methods for diagnosing needs, worked out exercises to motivate people to accept social services; organization and conducting of on-site classes into places of compact residence; practical exercises to identify people's needs; actions and confidence-building exercises; method of holding focus- groups, registration of an act of assessment of the needs of the family, dialogue, communication between the social worker and the family temporarily displaced persons.

**Day 4:** analyzing outcomes, needs of temporarily displaced persons at places of compact residence, working out ways and methods of meeting needs of temporarily

displaced persons; exercises on organization of perception by clients of information on ways of realization of their rights in the period of temporary residence in the community; prevention of conflicts with clients; conducting of informative and explanatory work on temporary displaced persons at the place of residence according to requests.

**Day 5:** observation of temporarily displaced persons during cultural events; revealing peculiarities of communication, behavioral tendencies; conducting individual counseling temporarily displaced persons; main directions of work of a social worker in a multidisciplinary team with temporarily displaced persons; prevention of professional burnout.

## THE CRITERIA AND INDICATORS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK

In order to measure the level of formation of professional competence of social workers in the field, the following criteria were chosen: knowledge of the problem, professional skills and attitudes to temporary displaced persons, comprehensive criteria - readiness for information and explanatory work with temporarily displaced persons. Indicators were chosen as following: completeness of knowledge on the problem (on the problems of temporarily displaced persons, places of compact accommodation, adult education, adult education methods, assessment of the needs of temporarily displaced persons in SJO, the content of information and explanatory work, content of social services, multidisciplinary team, legal and the theoretical foundations of such work), ability to motivate, advise, conduct informative and explanatory work, possession of adult education methods, evaluate needs, work in a multidisciplinary team; the attitude of social workers to temporarily displaced persons: both to subjects, objects of work, as to victims, the desire to work with them in places of compact residence. Competence was determined by the self-esteem of the students-whether they are ready for such work in a multidisciplinary team in places of compact accommodation with temporary displaced persons. Three levels of the formation of the professional competence of social workers were identified to provide informative and explanatory social work with temporarily displaced persons in places of compact residence: high, medium, low. The high level was characterized by the fact that social workers had full knowledge of the problem, possessed the skills necessary for such work, had the desire to work with the temporary displaced persons and treated them as subjects of work. The average level of professional competence had certain gaps in some indicators and was characterized by partial possession of knowledge, skills, unstable desire to work with temporarily displaced persons. The low level was characterized by almost complete lack of knowledge about the problem, the lack of development of skills for such work, the reluctance to work with temporarily displaced persons, the attitude towards them as victims or as objects of work.

## METHODS OF EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK

To assess the level of professional competence of participants in the training course 'Organization of information and awareness-raising social work for temporarily displaced persons', a questionnaire of participants and follow-up of the training were applied. The survey was conducted on the first and last day of the course (inbound and outbound). Incoming questionnaire contained 30 questions that covered the structure of topics that were part of the content of the course. The questionnaire studied the formation of the professional competence of the listeners in conducting informational and explanatory work on temporarily displaced persons in places of compact residence and in the community. After the seminar completion, the students were asked to fill out a questionnaire on the formation of the professional competence of social workers and the evaluation of the seminar. In this regard, some of the questions were repeated to track changes in the formation of the professional competence of listeners to informative and explanatory work on temporarily displaced persons in places of compact residence and community.

## RESULTS OF TRAINING

Results of training increase in the professional competence of social workers before carrying out informative and explanatory social work with temporary-displaced persons in places of compact residence is given in Table 1.

Table 1. Changes in the levels of the professional competence of social workers before social work with temporarily displaced persons


Criteria for the professional competence's formation	Levels of formation	Increase %
Cognitive: completeness of knowledge	High	95
	Average	-45
	Low	-50
Operational: formation of skills necessary to work with temporarily displaced persons in places of compact residence	High	80
	Average	-20
	Low	-60
Motivational: attitude to temporarily displaced persons and working with them in places of compact residence	High	25
	Average	-10
	Low	-15

Table 1. note that the highest gain was due to cognitive and operational criteria, while the motivational criterion was the least increment. Although 35% more of social workers are ready for such kind of work. These data show the influence of stereotypes on work and the fact that, despite the lack of 100% positive motivation for such work and positive attitude of temporary displaced persons in places of compact residence, social workers still work with them. All the participants were content with the content of studying in the seminary, their expectations were true, and the conditions of the seminar and handout in the form of methodological recommendations were all rated as high. After the seminar, all social workers became motivated for such work, as evidenced by the difficulties mentioned. Participants in the training course understood their role in informational and advocacy work with temporarily displaced persons as having changed from the understanding that displaced persons need psychological support to be sure that temporary relocation should be provided with comprehensive assistance. It is necessary to gradually move from self-help to help.

The attitude of temporarily displaced persons to consumers of material goods has changed, although participants in the workshop understand that they are all different. It turned out that there is a need to stimulate the consumption of social services in temporarily displaced persons and specifically implement at least part of the wishes of temporarily displaced persons for solving the needs of life, communicating, communicating information, organizing temporary displaced persons. This requires both the coordination of services and the attraction of material resources (TV, radio, Internet, newspapers, booklets). Every day, the atmosphere of the training changed to a warmer and less intense, people had warm and trustful relationships with each other, multidisciplinary brigades formed. Specialists became aware of the interaction and function of services, have established a personal relationship. Specific issues were raised regarding the organization of departure of teams, the work of the ICP, and the conscious attitude to work with temporary displaced persons, although they believe that their locals living in difficult living conditions live worse. The group is calm, professional, is mutual assistance, support, courage, ingenuity, creativity, cooperation of resources and opportunities, which is an important factor for the efficient work of the multidisciplinary team at the exit.

## CONCLUSION

The hypothesis put forward during the development of the training program for the seminar was confirmed and the theoretical approaches the program of the seminar was developed on, allowed holding it at a high level and ensuring the formation of professional competence of social workers of various social services of the city. On the basis of the foregoing, we can state that the proposed hypothesis is confirmed, the course's aims have been completed, and informational and enlightening social work with temporarily displaced persons in places of compact residence can be carried out only after separate training of

social workers of future multidisciplinary teams based on a program based on a competent, androgogic, activity, family-centered, multidisciplinary approaches and the concept of 'self-help'. The prospects for further research are the development of social workers' training programs for temporarily displaced persons on a case-by-case basis, taking into account age, the problems of temporarily displaced persons, the differentiation of social services for them, and, accordingly, a problem-oriented approach to this. But that is the subject for further research. 



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**Editor-in-Chief:** Goran Ilik, PhD

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**Available Format:** Online

**Language:** English

**eISSN:** 1857-9760

**Publisher:** Institute for Research and European Studies

**Fields:** Political Sciences, International Relations, International Law

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Peer review method: Double-Blind

Date of acceptance: February 11, 2019

Date of publication: May 25, 2019

Review article

UDC 314.15:323.14

Scan the QR code:



# THE REFUGEE CRISIS, BREXIT AND THE RISE OF POPULISM: MAJOR OBSTACLES TO THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

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**Abstract:** *This article describes the main challenges that the European Union is facing over the last years. It also analyzes the European Integration process and the emergence of the European Union. European integration process began after the Second World War. European politicians realized that 'the old continent', which was destroyed and razed to the ground, needed unification in order to play more important role in the bipolar international system. The European integration was a step by step process, which reached its culmination after signing the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, when the European Union was formally established. The European Union created very favorable ground for free movement of people, goods, services and capital within the internal market. Despite these positive developments, new threats emerged over the last years that can put an end to the European integration process. From these threats and challenges, particular attention is dedicated to Britain's exit from the European Union (Brexit), rise of radicalism and populist parties, migration crisis and a heightened terrorism threat.*

**Keywords:** *The European Integration Process; Brexit; Populism; Extremism; Migration Crisis*

## INTRODUCTION: THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

The European Union is a supranational organization which includes 28 Member States of Europe. It is the product of the European integration process which began after the Second World War. After World War II, the international system was no longer Eurocentric. Europe, which was destroyed and razed to the ground, was no longer a major force in international politics. World War II considerably changed the balance of power and ended the European hegemony in the world (Korneli Kakachia 2011). The bipolar system was established and the European dominated international system became a thing of the past. Two superpowers emerged after the World War Two - the United States and the Soviet Union and divided Europe into two separate spheres of influence. Soviet Union established totalitarian communist regimes in Eastern Europe. There was a constant fear of spread of Communism in the rest of Europe. European leaders realized the necessity of uniting European nations in order to have 'more weight' in international affairs and play more important role in international politics.

The European statesmen came to the conclusion that the maintenance of peace and stability would only be possible if the Franco-German rapprochement could be achieved and if these countries would be integrated into a common political space. In order to avoid new wars and conflicts, European states had to reject imperialism, chauvinism, and closely cooperate with each other.

On September 19, 1946 former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech at the University of Zurich and voiced the idea of creating "a United States of Europe". As he stated: "There is a remedy which ... would in a few years make all Europe ... free and ... happy. It is to re-create the European family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe" (European Commission, 2019). According to Winston Churchill it was necessary to accelerate the European Integration process and recreate the 'European Family' in order to avoid new hostilities and wars on the 'old continent'. Sir Winston Churchill believed that the first step towards the European unification process should be the creation of the Council of Europe.

The Congress of Europe was held in The Hague in 1948. The congress was attended by 750 delegates from different European countries, as well as observers from the US and Canada. The Congress discussed ideas on the development of political co-operation between European countries. It was decided to establish the Council of Europe. The congressional participants expressed their views on the role and structure of the Council of Europe. On 5<sup>th</sup> of May 1949, the Charter was signed and The Council of Europe was founded by the Treaty of London. Nowadays, Council of Europe plays very important role in protecting human rights and the rule of law promotes the consolidation of pluralist democracy and deepens political cooperation between the European States (Valeri Modebadze 2015).

One of the most important steps towards the European integration was the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. The author of the idea was Jean Monet, who believed that the Coal and Steel Industry of Germany and France should be under the supervision of one supranational authority, which would control the production of these resources, and therefore no country would use them for waging war. The purpose of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community was to prevent new wars and conflicts between France and Germany. In 1951, on the basis of the Treaty of Paris, which was signed by six European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg), the European Coal and Steel Community was founded (Valeri Modebadze 2015).

The next stage of the European integration process was the establishment of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. The European Economic Community was created on 1<sup>st</sup> of January 1958, after the Treaty of Rome entered into force. After the establishment of the European Economic Community, the common market and united economic space was created, tariffs and customs duties were abolished, which facilitated the deepening of economic, commercial and trade relations between the European countries.

Soon the Rome Agreement was followed by other important agreements. In 1965, a merger treaty was signed which came into force in 1967 on the basis of which three institutions (European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community) were merged into a single institutional structure. 1992 is a turning point and a significant moment in the history of the European Union. In 1992, 13 states of the European Economic Community signed a Treaty of Maastricht which entered into force on 1<sup>st</sup> of November 1993. After signing the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union was formally established. European Union has developed into a single market, which creates the favorable ground for free movement of people, goods, services and capital within the internal market. Nowadays, European countries have very close economic and political links with each other. They became so interdependent that no country is willing to wage war against other European states and carry out expansionist policies. The very important moment in history of the European Union was the introduction of a common currency, which further accelerated the economic integration of the European countries and simplified business procedures between EU Member States. The EU is often viewed as the basis for the European stability and prosperity (Valeri Modebadze 2015).

Despite the above mentioned positive processes, European Union is now facing a number of challenges. Since the 2008 global financial crisis many Member States of the European Union have faced considerable economic, financial and social problems. The economic and refugee crisis has contributed to the rise of radical political parties and euroscepticism.

As a result, anti-European sentiments are widespread among many European nations. Among the most prominent challenges, that the Member States of the European Union are facing, are the following:

- Britain's Exit from the European Union (Brexit);
- Rise of radicalism and Populist parties;
- Migration crisis and a heightened terrorism threat.

## BRITAIN'S EXIT FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION

Perhaps the most serious challenge facing the continental Europe is the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union, also known as 'Brexit'. In June 2016 a public referendum was held in the United Kingdom, to decide whether the UK should leave or remain in the European Union. 51.9% of Voters favored leaving European Union, whereas 48.1% supported to remain in the EU (Alex Hunt and Brian Wheeler 2019). The leaders of the European Union are especially afraid of 'Domino Effect'. The United Kingdom's exit may accelerate the disintegration process in the European Union, destabilizing not just the region, but the entire world. The EU officials and European governments are determined to make Britain's exit from the European Union as painful as possible for fear of the spread of euroscepticism, populism and extremism across Europe. If populist right-wing leaders in France and other Member States of the EU will come to power, they might accelerate the breakup of the European Union. German government expressed the concern that Brexit may lead to a domino effect, listing Austria, Finland, the Netherlands and Hungary as countries that could follow the UK's lead (John Lichfield 2016).

Brexit could strengthen anti-EU movements and anti-European sentiments in the Member States of the European Union. Former President of the European parliament Martin Schulz fears that Brexit could trigger 'the implosion of the European Union'. As he stated in an interview with the German newspaper 'Frankfurter Allgemeine': "If the British leave the EU, there will be demands for further exit referendums" (Frankfurter Allgemeine 2016). Schulz expressed his concern that in the future, in other Member States of the European Union right-wing and left-wing populists may come to power. Schulz blames the heads of state and government for the loss of confidence in European institutions: "Hardly any of the heads of government really fight to get to the hearts of people" (Frankfurter Allgemeine 2016).

The biggest problem for the Member States of the European Union is how to untangle thousands of ties binding United Kingdom to the 'Old Continent'. In 2018 more than half a million people demonstrated in London against the upcoming withdrawal of Britain from the European Union and demanded from British government to arrange a new referendum. However, Theresa May's government is not willing to hold a new referendum and is determined to carry out its plan despite the massive protests from the British people.



The main disadvantage of Britain's exit from the European Union is that it is slowing the United Kingdom's economic growth. British economy is a highly open economy, which has been closely interwoven with the rest of Europe. Therefore, Brexit will have negative impact on the British economy and in the future may cause the economic crisis in Britain, as well as in Europe.

In case of the disintegration of the European Union, small and economically weak countries would suffer most and would feel the negative consequences of the EU implosion.

President of Austria Alexander Van der Bellen does not rule out that the negotiations on Britain's exit from the EU might fail, which would mean a Brexit without an orderly agreement. According to him such a scenario would probably be the worst scenario for the British people. He expressed his concern at the opening of European Forum Alpbach: "The Brexit decision is comparable to leaving the plane at high altitude" (Thomas Mayer 2018).

## THE RISE OF RADICALISM AND POPULIST PARTIES IN EUROPE

The popularity of extremist parties in Europe is on the rise. The results of recent elections and public opinion polls show that far-right political parties are gaining popularity in many Member States of the European Union. The rise of extremist parties sends tremors across Europe. In 2018 two populist parties - the Five Star Movement and The League formed a coalition government in Italy. We have witnessed the rise of popularity of right wingers and extremists in other European Countries as well, such as France, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Sweden.

Populism draws strength from public opposition to multi-culturalism, mass migration processes and the perceived 'decline' of national identity and national culture. People attribute the 'decline' of national identity to the arrival of large numbers of migrants and the rise of multi-culturalism. The refugee crisis and the recent terrorist attacks in France, Belgium and Germany contributed to the strengthening of populist nationalist ideas in the European Union. The 'new right' criticizes European politics, defend the idea of closing the borders and oppose migration processes to Europe. Despite their euroscepticism, most of them have representation in the European Parliament and some right – wing parties have even used European funds in their campaigns (EUROEFE 2016).

We can mention some of the right-wing political parties, the popularity of which is rising over the last decades in Europe:

*Alternative for Germany (AfD)* is a right-wing populist party in the Federal Republic of Germany. Since its foundation in 2013, the AfD has gained more and more popular support. The party is often criticized for right-wing extremist tendencies. It became the thirds largest political party in Germany after the 2017 federal elections and obtained 94 seats in the bundestag. It is a newborn force known in Germany as 'the teachers' party', since it is led by macroeconomists.



This party is against the European integration process and is often described as the Eurosceptic party. Its supporters criticize the single currency and the pan-Europeanism. The party has grown significantly since 2015 and the number of its supporters has increased considerably. It has become, first and foremost, an anti-immigration party, since it rejects Angela Merkel's welcoming policy toward migrants. The AfD often criticizes Angela Merkel's welcoming policy toward refugees, particularly from the Arabic countries. It advocates the deportation of those migrants, who have committed crime in Germany. More than 1.5 million migrants arrived in Germany since 2015 and the AfD supporters believe that this migration process has caused the rise of crime in their homeland. Alternative for Germany (AfD) is in favor of closing the EU borders in order to limit migration processes to Europe (Jefferson Chase 2017).

Another right-wing political party that is famous for its Europhobic discourse is the *National Rally*, until June 2018 known as *the National Front*. It is a right wing political party which was founded in 1972 by Jan - Marie Le Pen. It is an anti-European party which opposes the French membership of the European Union. Current leader of the party – Marine Le Pen supports French withdrawal from the European Union (Frexit). During the French presidential election, which was held in 2017, she promised French people to organize a French referendum on EU membership if she were to win the presidential election. The party members are in favor of a zero tolerance approach to law and order issues and opposes multiculturalism and free migration. France has traditionally been a recipient of immigrants and the migration processes have caused the emergence of multicultural society. Immigrants are perceived as a threat to French society due to a multitude of factors, and the terrorist attacks that the country has suffered in recent years - committed, for the most part, by young French radicalized children or grandchildren of immigrants. Party supporters are known for their xenophobic attitudes and sentiments (El Orden Mundial 2018).

If the above mentioned parties will come to power, then European Union will be in serious trouble and it might cease to exist. The rise of populism and nationalism represents a serious threat to the European Union. The strong man of the populist government of Italy, Matteo Salvini is a hard eurosceptic and believes that: "The current European Union is a walking dead" (Julio Algañaraz 2018). The right-wing populist parties of Europe intend to unite in order to have more 'weight' and influence in the European parliament. The union of all these parties would form a political group that could surpass the 250 MPs in the European parliament. In this way they could create a very powerful force that could have more influence in European politics. Matteo Salvini regularly meets the leaders of the right-wing populist parties in order to unite Europe's anti-migrant and national political movements and create a political union – 'Freedom Front' (Idafe Martin 2019). The 'Freedom Front' will include following right-wing parties: The National Rally, the League, the Belgian Flemish Interest, the Dutch Party for Freedom, and Austria's FPÖ. According to Le Pen the aim of this new movement is to fight against the European Union (New Europe 2018).

## MIGRATION CRISIS AND A HEIGHTENED TERRORISM THREAT

In 2015 and 2016, the European Union (EU) has accepted a large number of refugees from the Middle East & Africa and as a result experienced an unprecedented migration crisis. This refugee crisis is the largest humanitarian and migratory crisis in Europe after the Second World War. In an interview with the German newspaper 'Die Welt', the Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev made it clear that this migration crisis is the most serious challenge that the 'old continent' is facing nowadays.

Anti-immigration sentiments are rising across Europe. Italy has chosen the first populist government in Western Europe. In all countries, anti-immigrant movements are gaining popularity, and Merkel's position seems very fragile. American president, Donald Trump, added fuel to the fire during the US presidential campaign, when he sharply criticized Merkel's decision to keep open Germany's borders to Syrian refugees and called it an 'insane' decision. Over the last years Germany has accepted the highest number of refugees and asylum seekers. According to the German newspaper 'Suddeutsche Zeitung' the immigration issue had a negative effect on Merkel's popularity and almost cost her the job. The chancellor affirms that she does not regret the decision she took on 4<sup>th</sup> of September 2015, for humanitarian reasons, but despite this, has decided to tighten immigration policy in recent years. The issue of immigration remains the biggest challenge in Europe (El Tiempo 2019).

Many terrorists entered Europe which was disguised as refugees or migrants. According to one study more than half of the terrorist attacks carried out in Germany from 2014 to 2016 were committed or planned by refugees. Since Germany has accepted refugees from Syria and Middle East, it has been a constant target of terrorism. A study published by the think tank 'Heritage Foundation' shows that the attacks committed by foreign militants has increased exponentially in 2016, at the height of the migration crisis. The planned attacks by the refugees hit nine different European countries, although they directed their anger mainly towards Germany (12 of the 22 plots) (La Gaceta 2017).

Before the arrival of refugees from the Middle East, Germany was not a principal target of jihadists and militants. The arrival of refugees gave rise to many social problems: crime rates and violence has increased drastically in many German cities and towns, Germany experienced unprecedented rise of terrorist attacks. In 2016, 60% of all attacks perpetrated in Germany were carried out or planned by foreign militants who had fought or trained in Syria. (La Gaceta 2017).

Another serious challenge that the European countries are facing is how to integrate such a large number of refugees into European societies. The vast majority of refugees are not familiar with the European culture and don't speak the European languages. Their integration into European societies will be very time-consuming and complicated process. Many European politicians question whether Europe can afford to shelter such a huge number of refugees.

Migration crisis led to the radicalization of European society. The refugee crisis and the attacks perpetrated by armed extremists in Belgium, France and Germany deepened the feeling of xenophobia. These feelings were later manifested in attacks against migrants and in a support for populist parties that oppose immigration in the Member States of the EU.

## CONCLUSION

The European Union is facing a number of challenges that threatens its existence and might put an end to the European integration process. From the above mentioned challenges perhaps the most serious threat is Brexit that could trigger the domino effect and may accelerate the disintegration process in the European Union. If the United Kingdom decides to leave, this might encourage other countries to exit from the European Union. Brexit could strengthen anti-European and populist movements in the European Union.

The number of right-wing political parties, that are famous for their Europhobic discourse, are growing little by little. Many leaders of these populist movements and right – wing parties are against the European integration process and support the withdrawal of their homelands from EU. If they will come to power, then European Union will be in serious trouble and it might cease to exist. Refugee crisis and migration processes from the Middle East and Africa also strengthen anti-European sentiments and provide the fertile ground for the rise of populism and radicalism. The migration crisis and terrorism created favorable conditions for the strengthening of populist movements and extremist political parties in European Union.



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**Editor-in-Chief:** Goran Ilik, PhD

**Managing Editor:** Mladen Karadjoski, PhD

**Available Format:** Online

**Language:** English

**eISSN:** 1857-9760

**Publisher:** Institute for Research and European Studies

**Fields:** Political Sciences, International Relations, International Law

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Peer review method: Double-Blind

Date of acceptance: March 03, 2019

Date of publication: May 25, 2019

Review article

UDC 364:341.171.075 (497.115:4-627EU)

Scan the QR code:



## THE LEGAL NATURE OF SOCIAL INSURANCE IN KOSOVO IN THE SPIRIT OF EU INTEGRATION

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**Abstract:** *Benefits, according to social insurance funds, have the nature of compensation for lost profits. Hence, the social insurance function has to meet the most important subjective requirements, provide for bare needs, and fulfil minimum standard of living. Contemporary states undertake a series of economic, social, cultural, health, and legal measures to ensure the protection of individuals and family. Various authors define the level of satisfying the needs as the social minimum. Thus, a special law provides the right to material benefit for those in need. Therefore, Kosovo pays special attention to family, mothers, children, martyrs, invalids, veterans and KLA members. The social insurance scheme in the Republic of Kosovo is not defined by a special law, but is defined by a set of laws. Thus, Kosovo has currently legal infrastructure necessary for beneficiaries of the social insurance scheme, though not in the desired form and capacity.*

**Keywords:** *Social Insurance; Status of Social Need; Special Social Protection; Social Minimum*

## INTRODUCTION

Analysing the legal nature of social insurance in the Republic of Kosovo under the current conditions of economic and social development means first of all, identifying the essence, the main features and elements of the benefits of the social insurance system, and future development and perfection trends of social protection.

Can any natural person be subject to social law? Hence, the question is whether this right can qualify as a universal right? That means, do all citizens of a state enjoy this right? In fact, some of the social rights are, or should be, universal.

Thus, for example, the right to life, the right to education and vocational training, the right to health protection, respectively to environmental protection, the right to material and social security, etc. So, here is about the rights belonging to everyone, namely universal rights, which are considered of particular social importance, as opposed to other social rights.

It is difficult to accept that a person can be found who once in his life has not been or who will not be in the future subject to one of the social rights. Care of these people should be especially undertaken by the state. The concept of social insurance was built to this regard, as a system that will protect people from poverty and the uncertainties caused by different events (social risks). Social insurance aims to provide citizens with protection against certain risks that would manifest a reduction or loss of professional ability, would lower their standard of living, or would impose new obligations or burdens.

Social insurance is a constitutional obligation, which guarantees the right to benefit payments from social insurance in the future when an individual becomes disabled for work as a result of old age, illness, etc. Through social services, the state seeks to mitigate the level of poverty and social exclusion for individuals and families and to create opportunities for their integration through the provision of a system of interventions, services and care to improve living.

## MATERIAL AND METHODS OF WORK

During the course of the study, various scientific and professional sources were used, including university textbooks, papers and scientific articles, analysis, national and international constitutional and legislative acts of social law.

## DISCUSSION

### *Needs as part of personal dignity*

Need is part of the personality structure, and the state, in which the personality is, does not enable him/her to satisfy in general or fully the needs. This state may be caused by: 1. personal characteristics, or 2. socio-economic and cultural circumstances in society, or 3. natural circumstances.

Being in a state of social need is something that happens regularly to the individual or social group. There are authors who for the "state of social need" find that this is a state characterized by the real effective lack of necessary means for the maintenance of those that make such requirements (Tintić 1977, 125; Šunderić 2009, 118). However, there are also authors who characterize the 'state of social need' as an influence of natural and social circumstances on the life of an individual or group of people who, because of these circumstances, cannot normally meet their biological needs of life and other social needs (Zelenović – Lakičević 1987, 14). The expression "need for social protection" means the need in which families are and whose social security is endangered or threatened, since their income cannot provide the minimum standard of living (Todorović 1990, 4). However, there are authors who with 'social threat' mean certain deficiencies that threaten the performance of their vital functions and their reproduction, as well as their very existence (Lakičević 1983, 2-3). The state of social need is the natural-biological state of the individual, which does not depend on the individual, since this state can neither be created nor can be changed by him/her. Social threat does not create this state, but it leads to it, where the individual or social groups cannot satisfy the needs or, as it is otherwise called, 'the state of social need' (Robaj 2018, 109). Social justice arises from the conflict between the subjective demand for certain benefits and the objective opportunity of the individual to provide them. In this context, the solution is used: "I have the right, if I need something (I am in a state of social need) because of my social state and I can exercise this right if I wish" (Heller 1981, 105).

Contemporary states undertake a series of measures, ranging from economic, social, cultural, health and legal ones, which guarantee the protection of the individual and family (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights). Benefits in the social insurance system perform the function of replacing professional earnings or the function of supplementing income in the case of benefits that are subject to family obligations (Durand 1953, 270). Benefits in accordance with the social insurance fund have the nature of compensation and represent compensation for lost profits (Dypeyroux 1978, 130). In family benefits, the amount paid is not considered a benefit or replacement of the salary but a supplement to salary (Lyon - Caen 1955, 371).

Therefore, the social insurance function is to meet the basic survival needs, thus the most important subjective needs (Ravnić 1976, 56). Social insurance performs the function of survival by providing minimum needs or the so-called social minimum.

### *Persons benefiting from social law*

Some authors emphasize that the basic needs of life are human existential needs, the basic needs, and the needs that guarantee basic social security. While other authors also think that human existential needs are: the need for food, clothing, heating, health protection, minimal housing conditions, basic conditions for education and employment, the need for care, custody, service, education and social care (Zelenović - Lakičević 1987, 17). In the opinion of some authors, these needs fall within the fundamental human rights. While different authors emphasize that these are the needs that ensure basic social security, namely the existential need (Šunderić 2009, 123; Robaj 2018, 111). However, there are also authors who define the level of satisfying needs as the social minimum (Tintić 1977, 27).

The social minimum or social security minimum is defined by law. Thus, the special law provides for the right to a material insurance, which is the right of the individual who lives alone, i.e. the family, which provides income below the minimum social security level established by law. Similar to the lawmaker, even in the theory of social law, is concluded that threatened is the family living in the general state of life, a state which is below the level of degree determined by the society (Vrcan 1984, 94). Ancient is the truth that man as a practical creature could not exist if it were not a creature of needs, and if it were not possible for them to satisfy them (Tanović 1975, 12). Therefore, it is about the aspects of legal protection of the fundamental values of human existence. It is about the needs which are considered as certain rights for human life (Miličić 1989, 5-6).

There are several phenomena (air) which the human body during physiological action takes without engaged effort (Pešić-Golubović 1966, 313). It is also implied that there is no motivation for such activity during such taking (Rot 1980, 93). However, there are needs that are supplemented by content such as food and housing, clothing, etc., for the acquisition of which it is imperative for the individual to make efforts. Thus, the relationship between need and content can be defined as the relationship between need and value. The subject of need and value is the individual or social group (Tanović 1975, 12; Marković 1963, 114).

## PERSONS WHO ENJOY SPECIAL SOCIAL PROTECTION

### *Family, mother and child*

Family, mother and children enjoy special social protection and care in every country. Therefore, Kosovo, by virtue of positive law, pays special attention to the family, mother and children (Kosovo Law on Social and Family Services 2012, Article 1). Family enjoys special protection, as in every society, it represents the basic social group, in which important functions are exercised such as: reproduction; care and custody of children. Women (mothers) enjoy special protection, regardless of the nature of their childbearing. Childbearing requires protection during maternity, growth and child care period. Protection function, i.e. some of its forms, under certain conditions, can also be enjoyed by the father of the child (Kosovo Law on Labour 2010, Article 39).

The state, respectively, the society that does not care for the reproduction of the population is threatened by survival, or by existence itself. Plato, 2100 years ago, said: "the issue of children is not just an exclusive family issue and parent concern, but also a general issue of the state-society, since the children are ultimately the future state" (Vidaković 1932, 33). In the sense of the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (of UN), a child is considered a human being who has not reached the age of 18. Pursuant to this international legal act, UN Member States are obliged to undertake all actions related to guaranteeing and securing the rights of children guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The child enjoys special family and social care, and protection due to their bio-psychological nature as well as due to the importance of care for the child, the family and the society.

Development of the child protection function derives from the particular interest of the society, namely the social community to ensure the reproduction of the population, which can be achieved in addition to the childbearing function and training of children and youth, for taking over the role in society and work (Milosavljević 1984, 181). Contemporary states undertake a series of measures, ranging from economic, social, cultural, health, and legal ones, which provide for the protection of the family and the child (European Convention on Human Rights, Article 12).

### *Categories emerging from the war*

Martyrs, invalids, veterans and members of the Kosovo Liberation Army, civilian victims of war and their families, are social categories that enjoy special social protection by law. The law aims at defining the status and financial support through pensions and special benefits for categories emerging from the KLA war, who with their sacrifice and contribution were decisive factors for freedom and liberation of the country (Law on the Status and the

Rights of the Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans, Members of Kosova Liberation Army, Civilian Victims of War and their Families, 2011). According to the law, a National Martyr is considered the member of KLA who has died in war for liberation of the country from 1997-1999. Whereas, KLA Invalid of War is a KLA member, whose body has been damaged over 20% due to a wound, injury or disease that has suffered in the war from 1997-1999. Civilian Invalid of War is the person whose organism has been damaged at least 40% due to a wounds received from weapons during the war. Veteran of KLA is the citizen of Kosovo and the foreign citizen who has become a member of KLA during the period 1997-1999. Civilian Victim of War is the person who was killed or got wounded by the enemy forces, and later died within the period from 27.02.1998 up to 20.06.1999.

## SOCIAL INSURANCE SCHEME

The social insurance scheme in the Republic of Kosovo is not defined by a special law, but social insurance is defined by a set of laws. Thus, Pension Funds of Kosovo are provided by a special law (Law on Pension Funds of Kosovo 2012, 2016). According to the same law, these forms of pensions are provided: 1. Basic Pensions provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare; 2. Individual Savings Pensions provided by the Kosovo Pensions Savings Trust; 3. Supplementary Employer Pension Funds; 4. Supplementary Individual Pensions. Any person who is a permanent resident of the Republic of Kosovo and has reached the retirement age is entitled to receive the basic pension. Whereas, the provision of supplementary individual pensions is provided by the Law on Insurance, whereby each person, according to their will, has the right to get insured for supplementary individual pension at a licensed insurance company (Law on Insurances 2015, Articles 7-8). Social and family services are regulated by a special law (Law on Social and Family Services 2012), which defines and regulates the provision of social and family services to people in need and families in need. While the Law on the Social Assistance Scheme in Kosovo regulates basic age pensions, old age contributors' pensions, disability pensions, early pensions, family pensions and invalidity pensions, as the first pillar pensions funded by the state.

## TYPES OF INCOMES THAT CAN BE OBTAINED

### *Illness income*

When we try to define the notion of social insurance risk, we should note that it is a compulsory insurance for persons who perform work, whether they make it in the form of an employment relationship, whether they do it independently with their own means or perform activities in the form of a profession (Bakraçi 2007, 103-104). Based on the social insurance system of the Republic of Kosovo, employer is responsible to employee for damages caused

by injury at work, professional illnesses or work-related illnesses, according to the principle of objective responsibility of the rights of liabilities (Law on Safety and Health at Work). Benefits for illness fall into the category of short-term benefits and cannot last more than 3 months, but never 12 months.

### *Maternity income*

Social rights, above all, have arisen as a result of the changes that took place in the character of social relations, the changes that conditioned the relationship and the new social practice (Herman 1990, 15). The right to maternity benefits, in addition to domestic acts, is also guaranteed by acts of international law (European Social Charter, Article 17).

Thus, from the maternity benefits, the subjects of the social insurance scheme benefit payment as: 1. income for maternity; 2. income for maternity compensation, when the place of work is changed; 3. compensation for childbearing (Çuçi-Peto 2007, 140-237).

The income for maternity is enjoyed by the woman because of her pregnancy and childbearing. Also, in order to benefit maternity income, a woman must be covered by social insurance for a 12-month period, which means that this woman should have been employed for one year. Every woman who has been employed has the right to benefit 9 months of income on behalf of maternity, the first 6 months of maternity leave are paid by the employer with compensation of 70% of the basic salary; The following 3 months, maternity leave is paid by the Kosovo Government with a 50% compensation of the average salary in Kosovo (Kosovo Law on Labour).

### *Pension income*

Pension is the amount of income that a subject can benefit when incapable of work due to their age, or illness (Çuçi-Peto 2007, 149). Age of retirement is determined by law. Age of old age pension in most countries (states) is 65 years (Kosovo Law on Labour).

According to the applicable law, the categorization of beneficiaries from the pension schemes is as follows: 1. Basic age pension; 2. Old age contributors' pension; 3. Permanent disability pension; 4. Early pension; 5. Work disability pension; 5. Family Pension (Law on Pension Schemes Financed by the State, 2014).

### *Supplementary pensions*

Supplementary pension is the amount of money that persons who perform constitutional functions benefit. The President of the Republic of Kosovo earns the rights set by law after the end of the mandate for which he/she was elected. The President of the Republic of Kosovo, after the end of the mandate in accordance with the law, has the right to



pension, the amount of which is 70% of the salary received by the President (Law on the President of the Republic of Kosovo 2009). The deputy, after the end of his/her mandate, has the right on supplementary pension, if a deputy has practiced his/her task for at least one mandate and is fifty-five (55) years of age. The deputy, who fulfils the conditions defined by law, realizes a supplementary pension in amount of 50% of the basic salary of the deputy (Law on Rights and Responsibilities of the Kosovo Deputy 2010). For the family members of the supplementary pension user who has died, the family pension is determined in the amount of 70% of that pension on the day of death. The right to family pension has the spouse and children up to the age of 18, respectively up to the age of 22, if they continue the higher education. With the law on the benefit of former high officials, as beneficiaries are defined: former President of the Assembly, former Prime Minister and former President of the Supreme Court of Kosovo. Former high officials who have performed for at least 6 months one of the aforementioned functions shall be entitled the status of the former High Official to receive a monthly payment in amount of 70% of the actual salary of respective function (Law on the Benefit to Former High Officials 2008).

### *Income for occupational accidents and occupational illnesses*

Subjects who suffer from an accident at work, occupational illnesses, are eligible to income, regardless of the years of insurance. The years of insurance constitute the main reason why persons who can become disabled as a result of work accident and occupational illnesses are not treated in the group of biological invalids (Çuçi-Peto 2007, 217-218). Persons who suffer from injuries or illnesses that result from a work accident or occupational illnesses, regardless of their seniority, are entitled to: additional medical care and rehabilitation, disability care, compensation for reasonable damages, and in case of death.

Employer is obliged to cover all medical treatment expenses for employees who have suffered injury at work or professional illnesses, if they are not insured at an insurance company (Law on Safety and Health at Work 2013).

### *Unemployment income*


Creating social security, in fact, means psychological benefit. Social security is a feeling that is formed in people, which is expressed in the pledge that the acquired socio-economic status will not worsen if it comes to change, but surely it can only be improved (Šefer 1974, 177). According to a group of authors, social insurance in the broader sense represents "a comprehensive system as an integral part of the economic and social policies that should establish the most sustainable and reliable basis for a free, sustainable and secure development of everyone" (Nedeljković 1973, 127). In the context of economic life and social conflicts, emerges the "state" which conceptualizes and establishes employer-employee

relations in the field of relative autonomy (Robaj 2017, 18). If the state takes on the role of taking care of the economically weak, then this care, which is the purpose of this function, actually ensures their existence (Tasić 1938, 111). In essence, this understanding is that the concept of economic freedoms means that the state must protect the individual from social risks and provide every citizen with minimum living conditions (Marković 1982, 579).

Unemployment is an involuntary event that may come as a result of low economic development, or as a consequence of the irresponsibility of the individual. However, unemployment is associated with negative consequences both in the economic state and in the social state of the individuals who are struck by it. The state, in addition to other means utilised to avoid the negative phenomena that this problem has caused, has also created a protection system in the event of unemployment. The unemployment protection system is intended to provide monthly, temporary economic assistance in order to meet the basic needs of life. The unemployment protection system works through the assistance that is part of the social insurance system (Robaj 2018, 138). According to Kosovo legislation in force, unemployment income can only be benefited by a family where none of them is employed (Law on the Social Assistance Scheme in Kosovo 2012).

## CONCLUSION

Social insurance through its system is a guarantor for continued financial benefits or other assistance type mitigations towards persons unable to work due to age, permanent disability, temporary disability, maternity, unemployment.

Through social insurance, the state tries to alleviate the poverty and social exclusion for individuals and families as well as create opportunities for their integration through an intervention, service, and care system for the improvement of life. Thus, Kosovo, invoking on the principles of the rule of law and the principles of European jurisprudence has also made concrete efforts and steps in the constitutional and legal guarantee of social rights as inalienable rights. However, it should be borne in mind that the existence of the constitutional and legal framework is only a prerequisite for the rule of law and the social state. Equally important is the functioning of various mechanisms of control of the implementation of constitutional and legal norms, and in particular the creation of a new social mentality for equality and social justice. But, the low level of economic development dictates the quality and form of protection of social rights. The concept of democratic consolidation has to do with the broad and deep legalization of the political system. This implies institutional protection of the economically and socially weaker strata, which have a vital need for the helping hand of the state. The Republic of Kosovo should do even more to build a social and democratic state, based on equality and social peace as universal values. 

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**Managing Editor:** Mladen Karadjoski, PhD

**Available Format:** Online

**Language:** English

**eISSN:** 1857-9760

**Publisher:** Institute for Research and European Studies

**Fields:** Political Sciences, International Relations, International Law

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Peer review method: Double-Blind

Date of acceptance: April 04, 2019

Date of publication: May 25, 2019

Review article

Thematic section: *Neo-Ottomanism*

UDC 327(560:438)

Scan the QR code:



## NEO-OTTOMANISM IN TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY: A POLISH PERSPECTIVE

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**Abstract:** *The main objective of this article is to analyze the impact of Ankara's reference to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire on contemporary Turkish foreign policy and the attitude of Poland towards such a reversal in Turkish diplomacy. Turkey is now more aware that it has no chance of gaining European Union membership. In this situation, Ankara has begun to emphasize its Eurasian character and is trying to build its influence in the region, in particular among eastern and southern neighbors. To have a greater impact on its neighbors, Turkey refers to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The weakening of Ankara's political relations with the western world is particularly worrisome for Poland, which appreciates Turkey's geostrategic position and its role in the European security system. The greatest concern among Poles is caused by the political and economic rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow. What also disturbs Poles is the fact that Turkey, which had made pro-democratic efforts, is departing from the principles fundamental to Europeans.*

**Keywords:** *Neo-Ottomanism; Turkey; Poland; Foreign Policy*

## INTRODUCTION

The main objective of this article is to analyze the impact of Ankara's reference to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire on contemporary Turkish foreign policy and the attitude of Poland towards such a reversal in Turkish diplomacy. Under Erdoğan's leadership, Ankara has been searching for its new role and the position of its State in the world. According to Turkish politicians, Turkey's former policy, which was mainly aimed at tightening relations with European countries and the US, has driven Turkey to a dead end. Turkey is now more aware that it has no chance of gaining European Union membership.

In this situation, Ankara has begun to emphasize its Eurasian character and is trying to build its influence in the region, in particular among eastern and southern neighbors. To have a greater impact on its neighbors, Turkey refers to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The weakening of Ankara's political relations with the western world is particularly worrisome for Poland, which appreciates Turkey's geostrategic position and its role in the European security system. The greatest concern among Poles is caused by the political and economic rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow. What also disturbs Poles is the fact that Turkey, which had made pro-democratic efforts, is departing from the principles fundamental to Europeans. What is more, the retreat from the principle of the secularity of the Turkish state to strengthen religious influences in Turkey constitutes another concern for Poles. It is difficult to accept the fact that Erdoğan uses religious rhetoric addressed to Muslim societies residing in the European Union countries. This type of behavior evokes negative emotions and can contribute to the outbreak of social crises in European countries. Turkey's engagement in the problems of the Middle East is also alarming. Turkey, as a member of NATO, may thus involve the organization, which may put its unity and effectiveness to test. Such behavior is particularly dangerous for Poland, which bases its security guarantees on NATO.

## HISTORICAL CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE FORMATION OF POLISH-TURKISH RELATIONS

The history of Polish-Turkish relations is extensive and dates back to the beginning of the fifteenth century, when in 1414 King of Poland Władysław Jagiełło sent his envoys to the court of the Sultan Mehmed Çelebi. This event is considered the beginning of bilateral relations between those countries. However, further Polish-Turkish relations resemble a sinusoid - years of peaceful relations intertwined with decades of wars and mutual hostile approaches. In 1444, as a result of the expedition of the King of Poland and Hungary Władysław III who, incidentally, was to stop the Turkish expansion in the Balkans, the Battle of Varna broke out in which the Polish king was killed. The lost battle resulted in Poland's withdrawal from active politics in the Balkans. For the Turks, however, it presented an

opportunity to expand deeper into Europe. During the conquests carried out by the Turks in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, almost all of the Balkans was conquered and the powerful Ottoman Empire became a dangerous neighbor of Poland. At that time, the Polish Kingdom focused its attention on problematic relations with Russia and sought peaceful relations with Istanbul. Those efforts resulted in the signing of a peace treaty in 1533, which guaranteed relative peace on the Polish-Turkish border.

In the sixteenth century, trade relations with Ottoman Turkey flourished. Fabrics, carpets, spices, oil, coffee and cold steel were brought to Poland. Poland, on the other hand, exported grain, wood, leather and honey. In the seventeenth century, tensions at the Polish-Turkish border intensified due to, on one hand, mutual looting invasions of the Cossacks, who were Poland's subjects and, on the other hand, the Tartars, who were the vassals of Turkey. Polish-Turkish relations began to deteriorate. The Polish nobility began to highlight the role of Poland as the bulwark of Christianity defending Europe against Islam, while Turkey tried to take advantage of the internal crises in Poland and expand further into Europe. The most obvious ally for Poland in the fight against Turkey was Austria. In 1683, both countries signed an agreement on mutual assistance in the event of Turkish aggression. Various beneficial effects could be seen a few months later, when in the course of Kara Mustafa's expedition to Vienna, the King of Poland, Jan III Sobieski, came to Austria's aid and defeated the Turkish army outside Vienna. Poland became a part of the Holy League, together with Austria, Venice and the papacy, which waged war against Turkey in the seventeenth century. Until the end of that century, Poles considered Turkey their enemy and called themselves the defenders of Christianity. Military actions were ended in 1699 by the signing of a peace treaty in Karłowice. Following that, there were no conflicts between the two states and trade relations developed. The culture of the Orient became popular in Europe, which was particularly visible in Poland, where Polish nobility began to wear Turkish outfits. One can say that it was the beginning of the so-called soft power of Turkey in Europe (Polska i Turcja: 600 lat wspólnej historii 2014). Relations with Turkey improved over time with the growing threat from Tsarist Russia, which constituted a mutual challenge for the policies of Warsaw and Istanbul. When, in the second half of the XVIII century, Poland, as a result of the partitions, disappeared from the map of Europe, Turkey did not recognize the eradication of Polish sovereignty which Poles had never forgotten. In the next century, Turkey was perceived by Poles as an ally in their efforts to regain independence. Turkey also welcomed Polish refugees who, after unsuccessful uprisings for independence, had to seek refuge outside the borders of the partitioning states. In the mid-nineteenth century, one of the Polish groups of refugees settled near Istanbul and created Adampol - which in Turkish was called Polonezkoy, where Polish traditions, customs and language have been cultivated to this today (Poland – Turkey: A Love Story 2013). When, in 1918, Poland regained its independence, it restored its official relations with Turkey.

Since 1920, in Istanbul, there has been Polish representation in Turkey and after the end of the Turkish War of Independence, Poland was the second country in the world which recognized the Republic of Turkey in 1923 (Mierzwa 2015, 7) and established diplomatic relations with it. At that time, the Treaty of Friendship was signed between the states, declaring cooperation and peaceful intentions.

In 1932 Marshal Józef Piłsudski, the Head of Poland, made an official visit to Istanbul. Following the end of the Second World War, Polish-Turkish relations deteriorated due to the fact that they ended up in adverse political blocs. During the 'Cold War', Poland belonged to the circle of Soviet influence and became a member of the Warsaw Pact, while Turkey became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1952. Bilateral relations were revived after 1989. In 1993, both countries signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which referred to the treaty signed during the interwar period. The treaty envisaged cooperation in consolidating democracy, respecting human rights and territorial integrity as well as increasing security within the region. Subsequently, a number of agreements on economic and tourist cooperation were also concluded (Kapłońska 2013, 33-37). Despite the fact that both countries are located in mutually distant parts of Europe, as a result of the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the restoration of democracy in Poland in 1989 they found themselves in the same group of European states, which perceived NATO as their guarantee of security. Poland, following the eradication of Russian bases from its territory in 1993, began to seek full membership in the North Atlantic Alliance, and was supported, among others, by Ankara in achieving that goal. The efforts of the Polish government were finalized in 1999, when Poland became a NATO member and therefore an official ally of Turkey. Another challenge for Poland's foreign policy was membership in the European Union, to which Turkey also aspired. Poland, when it was still only a candidate, also officially supported Ankara's European efforts, and following Poland's accession to the EU in 2004, successive Polish governments consistently supported Ankara's integration aspirations.

What is also very characteristic is the fact that the support for Turkey's membership in the EU was not only declared by Polish politicians, but also by Polish society, which was evident in public opinion polls. Until 2015, relations between Poland and Turkey were basically exemplary, especially when taking into consideration the 600th anniversary of the Polish-Turkish relations in 2014, which was pompously celebrated and involved a number of political, economic and cultural events being organised in both countries. To commemorate that event, the then President of Poland Bronisław Komorowski paid Turkey a visit in March 2014, and in October of the same year Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu came to Poland (Relations between Turkey and Poland). In the entire history of the Polish-Turkish relations after 1990, the only problem was the resolution of the Polish Sejm adopted in 2005, condemning the Armenian Genocide. For obvious reasons, it was met with critical reaction from the government in Ankara. Once relations between the European Union and Turkey began to deteriorate, which particularly intensified after 2015, the Polish government

expressed some concern regarding the direction in which Turkey's foreign policy was heading as well as the perception of threats to European security. Particularly worrying for the Polish government was the deepening political cooperation between Ankara and Moscow. This concern was also shared by Polish society, which changed its attitude towards the Turks. This was particularly visible following the 2015 migration crisis (Dahl 2018, 38-39), which was generated by Turkey's policy to advertently trigger that crisis in order to put pressure on the European Union to speed up the accession. In Polish society the positive opinions of that friendly Turkey, which did not recognize the partitions of Poland in the 18th and 19th centuries are scarce nowadays; rather more pronounced are the opinions of a Turkey which violates democracy, human rights, sends illegal migrants and flirts with Russia and Iran.

### NEO-OTTOMANISM IN TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

When in 1923 Kemal Pasha Atatürk determined the political basis for the functioning of the Republic of Turkey, he strongly rejected the Islamic legacy of the Ottomans. The Turkish leader had ambitions to build the young republic as a strong, secular and modern nation-state. The Ottoman Empire was stigmatized as being a backward and despotic state, which was driven by principles contrary to the principles adopted by modern European countries and Atatürk's goal was to make Turkey a country based on European fundamentals. Those were revolutionary political and social changes which successfully affected Turkey's foreign policy until the end of the twentieth century. Turkey strengthened its relations with European countries and at the same time distanced itself from the Arab states. Ankara emphasized the will to move away from its Middle Eastern identity and become a European state. The European direction in Turkey's foreign policy was also a priority following the Second World War. During the Cold War Turkey clearly defined itself as a country that belonged to Western Europe and the so-called free world by joining the North Atlantic Pact.

The disintegration of the two-block system was a great challenge for Turkish politicians, who feared that a lack of the main threat that the Soviet Union posed would undermine Turkey's importance for Western countries. The unstable situation in the Balkans and the Middle East, however, quickly contributed to strengthening Turkey's role as a vital state and ally for European countries and the USA in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, Turkish politicians began to notice that the changing international environment created new opportunities to shape Turkey's foreign policy.

As a result of the demise of the USSR, new states emerged whose societies had been under the influence of the Ottoman Empire in the past. Also in the Balkans, as a result of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, new countries emerged wherein Muslim societies played an important demographic role, and which were associated with the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in Ankara. That situation cast new light on the possibilities to shape Turkey's foreign policy.

Until then, Turkish politicians perceived their country as a peripheral and frontier country in the European system. In the new situation, Turkey was no longer on the periphery, but rather between the Balkans in the west and the Muslim post-Soviet republics in the east and the Arab states in the south. The common denominator was the past as well as religion. The societies of those countries were once part of the Ottoman Empire. In the rhetoric of Turkish politicians, the slogans describing Turkey as Eurasian state began to surface, and the importance of common cultural, religious and historical values that would enable broader cooperation in the region under the leadership of Turkey was emphasized. Unofficially, that direction in Turkey's foreign policy was described as neo-ottomanism, although this term was not used by politicians for fear of generating a negative response among neighbors who could treat it as Turkish neo-imperialism or revisionism. Turkish elites did not want to give the impression that Turkey had any expansionist intentions (Yanik 2016, 483).

The idea of building the state's position based on ottomanism appeared in the statements of the Turkish president, Turgut Özal, at the beginning of the 1990s. Referring to the legacy of ottomanism, and, in particular, to the common denominator - religion in the form of Islam, was supposed to be a remedy for the pacification of Kurdish separatism and for strengthening Ankara's influence among Muslim societies in the Balkans, the Caucasus and post-Soviet republics in Central Asia (Yanik 2016, 481-482). Zuleyman Demirel continued Özal's vision, and offered to help those countries to carry out their political transformation on the basis of the systemic solutions functioning in Turkey (Aydin 2014, 385). Such assistance, of course, also meant building and consolidating Turkey's influence in those countries, which translated into Demirel's slogan to create "*a Turkish world spreading from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China*" (Tuysuzoglu 2014, 90). That was the evidence that Turkey had the ambitions to be a leader for those countries.

The subsequent leader of the Turkish state, Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdoğan, continued to strengthen Turkey's international position in the region. His Foreign Minister in the AKP government, Ahmet Davutoğlu, believed that Turkey should refer to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and take advantage of the geopolitical conditions. Turkish politicians began to envisage the role of Turkey as an important player not only in the region but also as a central state - located in the centre of Eurasia. Turkey's location on the globe predestines it to influence the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey had been self-limiting and underestimated its potential thanks to its location (Yesilyurt and Akdevelioğlu 2009, 40). Turkey allowed itself to be degraded to the role of a peripheral state and taken advantage of in the game between the powers. In the past, instead of promoting its own interests, Ankara was involved in a broader policy of Western States, whose goals were pursued with Turkey's engagement. Ankara should pursue its own interests and use its position to promote its own vision of shaping the international environment as a regional and global power (Grigoriadis 2014, 161).



The main element of Davutoğlu doctrine was the 'zero problems with neighbouring countries' principle, by implementation of which Turkey wanted to strengthen its image as a stable and predictable country, attractive to its neighbours and distant partners. To achieve that, Turkey intended to use its soft policy attributes, i.e. to use economic and cultural contacts to obtain the greatest influence in its environment.

The belief in its own strength and in the importance of its position in the international arena was emphasized by Turkish politicians, which coincided with the weakening of Turkey's relations with the USA and the European Union. The worse the relations between Turkey and the West were, the stronger Turkey's independence and the superpower role became. Discrepancies in Ankara's and Washington's policies regarding the situation in the Middle East created tension between them. Ankara's relations with Brussels were also not the best because the situation in Cyprus put a halt to the process of negotiations with the European Union (Szymański 2011, 15).

Turkish politicians significantly highlighted the Eurasianism of their country, indicating that a modern Turkey, with European values and oriental culture, is a bridge to building relations between Eastern and Western civilizations (Yanik 2011, 80). Davutoglu stressed that if Ankara wanted to be a meaningful player in the region, it must move away from the current policy focused only to the west. Turkey tightened its relations with the Arab countries, but at the same time its relations with Israel deteriorated. In that respect there was a dependence; the worse the relations between Turkey and Israel were, the better the relations with Arab countries and the stronger the position of Turkey in the Muslim world (Marcou 2013, 2). Erdoğan began to strongly defend the Palestinians and tried to take over the role of a leader of Islamic states by criticizing the Israeli policies in the region. Turkish politicians, astounded by their current economic and political successes, began to clearly aspire to define their state as an emerging power. Erdoğan presented ambitious goals for the Turkish society, the greatest of which was to obtain the status of a world power in the next few decades (Barrinha 2014, 166).

The credibility of Turkish politicians' declarations regarding Turkey's positioning on the international arena was checked quite quickly. The consequences of Ankara's involvement in the events of the Arab Spring and its involvement in disputes with a number of countries in the region depreciated the possibilities of Turkish diplomacy. It came to pass that Turkish foreign policy based on the principle of "zero problems with neighbouring countries" could not be implemented due to the unstable international environment in the Middle East. Turkish ambitions of building a powerful position collided with the resistance of other players in the region, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran. What is more, the economic situation in Turkey deteriorated which also limited its chance to exert influence on direct neighbours and undermined the image of Turkey as an emerging power. However, the failure to implement the policy of 'zero problems with neighbouring countries' did not weaken the policy of referring to the Ottoman legacy.



Erdoğan clearly focused on shaping Turkey's independent policy in the region. He began to frequently refer to Islam as the element connecting the Turkish nation and the countries in the region. In 2014, Turkey refused to participate in a coalition built by NATO to combat the Islamic State (Park 2015, 581), which strained its relations with the alliance members. In the following year, as a result of the conscious policy of 'flooding' European countries with immigrants and refugees, Turkey deteriorated its relations with the European Union (Dahl 2017). The climax in the deterioration of Turkey's relations with European states and the US was an attempt to carry out a failed coup in Turkey in July 2016. Erdoğan then accused European leaders of lacking in solidarity, and the US of protecting Fethullah Gülen, whom he considered the ringleader of the putsch. Since Erdoğan still uses the coup to eradicate his internal political opponents, which has resulted in the violation of human rights and democratic principles, relations with the Western world are constantly deteriorating which for Turkey means searching for new allies. Since 2016, Turkey has been approaching Russia and Iran.

Those three countries have formed their own coalition regarding the cessation of the war in Syria, but also regarding the division of influence in that country. There is no surprise that Turkey began to collaborate with Russia and Iran, since European countries as well as the US expressed no interest in active participation to end the Syrian civil war. Turkey, which wanted to have influence on the situation in neighbouring Syria, had to engage with the countries that were directly involved there.

The rapprochement with Russia and also with the Arab countries was a result of Turkey's ambition to base its strong international position on the energy resources hub. Turkey admittedly has modest deposits of raw materials; however, they are located exactly between the producers of such resources and their recipients. On one hand, there is Russia, countries of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, and on the other hand, the European economies hungry for raw materials. Being a world hydrocarbon distribution power is also widely present in the statements of Turkish politicians, who want to promote the image of Turkey as an emerging power. Turkish foreign policy ambitions are increasingly distancing Turkey from Europe and democratic standards, thus anchoring it in the world of authoritarian states, associated mainly with Russia and the Arab states. Turkey is systematically destroying its image as a stable, credible and predictable partner in the eyes of Western countries. The depreciation of Turkey's image is also related to its eagerness to revise the Treaty of Lausanne from 1923, which shaped the borders of modern Turkey. Erdoğan believes that the treaty is not adjusted to the ambitions and position of Turkey in the world. Such statements are particularly dangerous as they undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in the region.

## A POLISH PERSPECTIVE ON NEO-OTTOMANISM IN TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

Following the fall of the Iron Curtain, Poland joined the same bloc of Western countries as Turkey. Although both countries are located in distant geopolitical regions, they can be called NATO's front countries. In the case of Poland and Turkey, their external eastern borders are at the same time the external borders of the North Atlantic Treaty. As members of the alliance, both countries should support one other, solidarize and approach with an understanding of the problems arising from their individual international environments. Basically, until 2015, Poland tried to be loyal to Turkey, which was shown in the support of the Polish government for one of the main priorities of Turkey's foreign policy, namely gaining membership in the European Union. The effects of the cooperation were especially visible when, after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, Ankara, together with other alliance members, condemned Moscow for the violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. What is more, by condemning Russia, President Erdoğan defended the Muslim population of the Tatars living in the Crimea. The Turkish leader also encouraged more NATO activity in the Black Sea Basin, urging them to organise joint manoeuvres with Ukraine (Balcer 2016). Poland, for whom the greatest security threat was posed by Russia, has remained particularly sensitive to Moscow's aggressive policy. Russia's military interference in neighbouring Ukraine is treated as an act of aggression, which also threatens Polish interests (Stępniewski 2017a, 17-25). One has to remember that there has been a prevailing rule in Poland that there is no safe Poland without independent Ukraine. Ukraine acts as a buffer state between Poland and a powerful and dangerous Russia (Stępniewski 2017b, 171-177). That is why the joint opposition of all NATO members against Russia's military activity was also a signal confirming the unity of the alliance.

Since 2015, Turkey has been gradually demonstrating the separateness of its position due to the strained relations with European countries and the USA. The worse the relations were, the more Turkish politicians referred to ottomanism and emphasised the uniqueness of their state as a geostrategic power located in the centre of Eurasia. The emphasis of Turkey's Eurasian character was associated with the search for elements that would highlight Turkish relations with other countries in the region. That is why Turkey more frequently referred to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and emphasised its affiliation to the Muslim community. Highlighting the Eurasian character of the state, which until recently was described as a Western European state, *de facto* means a reversal towards the eastern countries. This is particularly evident in Turkey's policy towards Russia. Since the unsuccessful putsch in 2016, Turkey's relations with the Western world have been dreadful, and isolated Turkey began to look for new partners behind its eastern border. The need to control the situation in Syria resulted in the Turkish-Russian rapprochement. Following the failed coup, Erdoğan made his first international visit to Russia.

The rapprochement of a NATO member with the biggest rival of the alliance, which Russia is according to Poland, impinges not only on the interests of the alliance and undermines its unity, but also, especially for Poland, demonstrates a lack of solidarity. It is no surprise that Turkey has become an unpredictable and unreliable partner for Poland. In Poland, the Turkish-Russian love affair is observed with great concern. Until recently, it was thought that Turkey, as a Black Sea country, could constitute a counterbalance to the expansion of Russian influence in the Basin, which would mean support for Ukraine and its territorial integrity. But as it turned out, Turkey actually accepted Russian influence in the Black Sea and allowed for its unobstructed activity in the region so as not to hinder relations with Russia. Putin basically took advantage of Turkey's isolation by the West in order to establish closer cooperation. There is also no support for the Tatar population of Crimea in Erdoğan's statements anymore. From a Polish foreign policy and security perspective, the Turkey's pro-Russian turn is a like a stab in the back. Turkey's decisions to purchase the S-400 missile defence system from Russia cast doubt on Turkey's loyalty to NATO partners. Turkey, although officially still an ally of the West, has caused a number of problems for NATO Member States. One of the elements of Turkish neo-ottomanism is in reference to the religious factor and is the attempt to interfere in other countries' politics under the pretext of protecting the interests of Muslims.

This is particularly visible on the Balkan Peninsula, where Erdogan has repeatedly demonstrated support for Turks, Albanians and Bosnians. Interfering in the Balkans has always had tragic consequences not only for that region, but also for the rest of Europe. Referring to the religious factor on an international scale, which is often associated with Turkey's internal political campaign, has become extremely dangerous. It should be remembered that any Balkan crisis would also affect Poland. It is in the interests of the entirety of Europe to stabilize the situation there and not to exacerbate it. As a negative example of Turkish agitation, we can put forward the encouragement of the Muslim minority in Greek Thrace to organise an independence referendum.

Another element related to neo-ottomanism are the claims made by Turkish politicians, especially Erdoğan, regarding the revision of the Treaty of Lausanne establishing Turkey's borders. In Turkish rhetoric there are considerably more arguments that the Treaty of Lausanne was unjust, disadvantageous for Turkey and limited the possibilities of Turkish expansion. Turkish demands for the return of Mosul, or the desire to occupy the northern territories of Syria are particularly worrisome for NATO allies, including Poland. Treaty revisionism and its domino effect have always ended tragically, which is shown by the genesis of the Second World War. The involvement of Western allies in conflicts with Turkey's neighbouring countries is particularly dangerous. Turkey also behaves aggressively towards Greece – not only a NATO ally, but also Poland's partner in the EU. The demands for the return of Greek islands in the Aegean Sea are also questionable. Until now, Poland has tried not to interfere in those issues and has avoided any conflict with both NATO allies, but the


more Turkey approaches Moscow, the greater the support of Poland as well as other members of the alliance may be for Greece. According to Poles, another negative element related to the emphasis of the Turkish position in the region is the treatment of immigrants and refugees residing in Turkey as a kind of demographic weapon used by Ankara in relations with European countries. It was the refugee crisis of 2015 and the 'forwarding' of about 1 million emigrants to Europe that contributed to the turmoil within the European Union, which, among other things, resulted in Brexit (Dahl and Skomorokhova 2017).

The migration crisis also changed the attitude of Poles towards Muslim communities (Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska 2016), but also translated into a negative attitude towards Turks. Polish society, which, according to the opinion polls, supported Turkey's accession to the EU and showed sympathy for the Turkish people a few years ago, has definitely changed its approach. In recent polls, the negative attitude of Poles towards Turks prevails. The most staggering thing is that Poles dislike Turks more than Russians! Obviously, Polish-Turkish relations at an intergovernmental level remain cordial and correct. In November 2017, President Erdoğan made an official visit to Poland. This was the first visit of the Turkish leader to the European Union after the failed coup. The Polish government was one of the few in Europe that limited its criticism of Erdoğan's actions against his opposition and the violation of the rule of law and the principles of democracy.

Economic cooperation and tourist exchange are still developing. However, with regards to foreign policy and security, Poland finds it difficult to refrain from participating in the official criticism of the Turkish-Russian rapprochement.

## CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, Turkish neo-ottomanism is growing in strength with the deterioration of Turkey's relations with European states and the US. Emphasising Turkey's Eurasianism, referring to the religious community of Islam, or revisionism of the Treaty of Lausanne as well as the territorial claims are more present in the rhetoric of Turkish politicians the more Ankara moves away from European standards. Europe, including Poland, realises how much it actually needs Turkey mainly for security reasons. Turkey has the second largest army in NATO and has an extremely important geostrategic position. It is a kind of buffer for Europe, which separates the Old Continent from the unstable states of the Middle East. For Ankara admittedly, NATO membership and good relations with European countries are also important, because they guarantee security against the unpredictable Arab states. They also provide Ankara with some reinforcement in its relations with Russia. Without such a political background and Western security guarantees, Turkey would certainly not be treated with such respect by Russia. However, Erdoğan's game to balance Turkey between the West and Russia is tremendously dangerous for the credibility, effectiveness and unity of the Alliance. Poland is particularly critical of that game, since NATO is the key guarantor of its security and

perceives Russia as its greatest threat. Polish politicians hope that the Turkish-Russian love affair is temporary and related to finding a solution to the Syrian conflict. Some experts claim that Turkey and Russia are too divided; they have different interests in the Caucasus, in the Armenian-Azeri conflict and in the Central Asian post-Soviet republics. However, further development of the situation is difficult to predict, as Turkey is moving further away from Europe, and, following the migration crisis which caused anti-Islamic sentiment in Europe, the European Union is definitely not interested in strengthening relations with Turkey. The crisis in those relations is compounded by Erdoğan's violation of the principles of democracy and the rule of law. The key question remains as to whether Ankara will maintain its alliance with the West in the future knowing that there is no chance of attaining full membership in the European Union? Is it enough to be a buffer state, albeit with a privileged economic relationship with the EU? Will Ottoman resentment take over and push Turkey more to the East? Considering Poland's interests, the determinant in shaping relations with Turkey will be its policy towards Russia and the probable achievement of its position as an energy hub. 

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**Editor-in-Chief:** Goran Ilik, PhD

**Managing Editor:** Mladen Karadjoski, PhD

**Available Format:** Online

**Language:** English

**eISSN:** 1857-9760

**Publisher:** Institute for Research and European Studies

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Peer review method: Double-Blind

Date of acceptance: March 22, 2019

Date of publication: May 25, 2019

Review article

Thematic section: *Neo-Ottomanism*

UDC 323.1:316(560)

Scan the QR code:



## THE IDENTITY OF THE MODERN TURKISH NATION-STATE: SEVERAL POLITICAL & SOCIOLOGICAL REFERENCES

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**Abstract:** The modern Turkish state is a typical nation-state, as it is originally defined by the Westphalian international political and legal order. This essential feature of the modern Turkish nation-state is the product of the theoretical concept and the fundamental political and ideological principles and postulates of Kemalism (Kemal Atatürk), that is, the paradigm of the modern Turkish constitutionality and the modern Turkish determination of its national identity. This national identity is the identity of a nation-state, that is, the identity of a nation as a political nation, as a citizens of the modern Turkish state (nation-state). The modern Turkish national identity in this sense does not have its own classical ethnogenesis, that identity is not an ethno-national identity, but it is identity of a true nation-state that includes in itself all the special ethno-national identities, united as a Turkish national identity of a nation-state. The ethno-national identity for the paradigm of the modern Turkish national identity is exclusively only private and personal determination of individuals citizens of the modern Turkish nation-state, which does not recognize, accept or admits the constitutional-legal order of the modern Turkish state. More over, these ethno-national identities have treatment of a factor of essentially jeopardizing the integrity and cohesion of the modern Turkish nation-state.

**Keywords:** *Ethno-National Identities; Treaty of Lausanne; Kurds; War in Syria*

## INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Turkey today is a very attractive subject for studying practically of all social sciences. Within the framework of the modern global political and total social relations, the Republic of Turkey is emerging as an extremely relevant factor. Thus, Turkey has a very important regional geopolitical power and role, a role that is concentrated and in the concept, policies and ideology of Neo-Ottomanism; its army within the framework of the NATO Pact is in any case the second army in terms of its fighting power, just behind the US Army; it has an economy that fully deserves its place in the G20, despite the current problems it faces; the current political leadership of Turkey has built a completely clear autonomy within contemporary international political and economic relations, with unreserved advocacy and protection of Turkish state and national interests, and regardless of any opposition and reaction to such Turkish policies. In this context, one must emphasize the very large attractiveness for scientific research, especially for sociological research, of the concept of the identity of the modern Turkish nation-state. This identity is identity of a typical nation-state and its study represents an extraordinary opportunity in reality and empirically (it can be said "live") to study this type of identity. The results of these research on the identity of the modern Turkish nation-state are contained in numerous bibliographic units. Of course, these research, despite their necessary interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinary, are basically and primarily sociological research. Indeed, in various such researches, the emphasis on the sociological interest of researchers is placed on various sociological aspects of the complex of identity of the modern Turkish nation-state.

In the continuation of this text, the research focus, as far as the length of this text permits, will primarily be put on the emphasis on the functionalist sociological theoretical basis and framework of the concept of the nation-state; the establishment of the exclusivity of the national identity of the people that constitutes its state as a nation-state and determines the name of the state as a derivative of its national identity, that is, as a derivative of the national name; the emphasis on the direct and fundamental conflict of this concept with the concept of multiethnicity, multinationalism and multiculturalism; the exclusion of the possible existing multiethnicity, multinationality and multiculturalism as factors and contents of the constitutional and total legal order of the state and their locating exclusively within personal and private, that is, domestic/house relations. And then, by analyzing the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations and the Treaty of Lausanne, we will show how in the Republic of Turkey, just as in the Republic of Greece (and its concept of national identity and its concept of constitutional setup are concepts of typical nation-state), a significant level of ethnic, national and cultural homogeneity has been achieved, precisely as it defines and requires the concept of a nation-state. At the same time, very clearly, in this text, extremely elementally, the challenge and the problem with the Kurds facing the modern Turkish nation-state must also be contained, and inevitably, in this context,

it will be necessary, also elementary, to include the relevant aspects of the war in Syria, that is, the points of that war on which are expressed the fundamental Turkish national and state interests.

## THEORETIC MARKING OF THE CONCEPT OF NATION-STATE

It must be emphasized immediately that the whole of this theoretical elaboration devoted to the concept of the nation-state completely applies and to the particular Turkish model of a modern nation-state. It is a crystal clear functionalist theoretical and conceptual basis of the determination and functionality of the nation-state. In order for a community or body to function at least on an elementary level of optimum, then at least the elementary level of integration and cohesion of the community or the body must also be provided inevitably. All special parts or organs of the community or the body must be put into function to achieve the meaning of the existence of the community or the body. In reality they do not exist outside the community or the body, they do not have any function or some cause and purpose for existence if they are not integrated in the community or in the body in order to provide the required and necessary contribution for the optimal functioning of the integrated community or of the integrated body. The optimal level of integration and cohesion of the community or body as a fundamental and essential condition for achieving and providing the ultimate level of functionality of the community or body can by no means be achieved through retention, maintenance and development of the various types of differences, oppositions and conflicts that are real and objective within the community or the body. In order to achieve and ensure the optimal level of integration and cohesion of the community or the body, one must find, define and impose a single basis on which to build and develop the quality level of integration and cohesion of the community or the body, a basis that does not contain differences, oppositions and conflicts (Jaffrelot 2003).

This theoretical and conceptual elaboration fully applies and to the concept of the nation-state. The nation-state should overcome all differences on the basis of the ethnic, national, linguistic and all sorts of different cultural identities that actually exist within its framework, within the nation-state as a kind of community or as a kind of body, of course in order to lay the foundations of a real and objective maximum possible level of quality of its functionality as a community or as a body and within the framework of the existing total social relations and constellations. The overcoming of ethnic and national differences, oppositions and conflicts through the concept of the nation-state is done through the political and sociological concept of the nation as a political nation. This means that all citizens of the state as a nation-state are members of one and the same political nation, that is nation, regardless of their personal and private ethnic and national affiliation (Wimmer 2010).

This political and sociological construction has an essential and fundamental function—it should be the basic substance of the integration and cohesion of the community, community and as a state constitution and as a society, as a social community. According to this concept, according to this functionalist concept, this must be because integration and cohesion can not be grounded, built and developed by preserving, nurturing and deepening real-life social differences, oppositions and conflicts, regardless of what kind they are, including those who are ethnic and national. In any case, there must be found some basis for social integration and cohesion that will highly effectively and productively off all relevant conflicting social differences and oppositions, including ethnic and national differences and opposites.

This goal through the concept of a nation-state, generally and elementally speaking, is done so that the nation who constitute their own state as a nation-state, and which gives a name to that state that most directly and most immediate can express its national identity, that constitutive nation determines and identifies their national identity as a national identity of the entire social community, and promotes this identity to the strongest and consistent way, defends and strengthens it through the constitutional and legal order of the state and through its various policies, that is, literally through the whole set of possible state policies, including, of course, and through the policy of criminal law. The constitutional and total legal order of the state as a nation-state does not contain and does not recognize ethnic and national diversity. This diversity can exist only on a personal and private level, it can exist only in the home, in the family, and in any case the state has no obligation through the complex of its policies to promote, nurture, develop and deepen that diversity (Walby 2003).

Contrary to all this, the state as a nation-state with all its policies, as well as with all its resources and capacities, must promote, impose and defend the national identity of its constituent nation, nation who give the name of the state, as a public identity and as a state relation, the status and the characteristic of all separate ethnic and national identities. For the state as a nation-state, in this particular case for the modern Turkish nation-state, all its citizens are Turks, they all have a Turkish national identity as members of that Turkish nation-state. This means that all of them in their public life, that is, in relations with the Turkish nation-state should accept the national identity of the constitutive nation, because that national identity of the nation constituting its own state as a nation-state (and that state receives its a name as a derivative of the national identity of that constitutive nation) to the highest possible level of functionality must be the main substance of the integration and cohesion of the nation-state and of the overall social relations (Bayar 2014).

Because of all this, that is, in order to ensure the elementary functionality of the concept of modern nation-state, that nation-state, including the modern Turkish nation-state, must inevitably impose the new and modern national identity of the nation as a political nation on all separate ethnic and national identities, these separate ethnic and national identities are brought into a state of voluntary or involuntary adaptation and assimilation in

relation to the modern national identity of the nation-state (van Bruinessen 1997). Therefore, in this sense, the nation-state, including the Turkish nation-state, with all its capacities, resources and powers, as well as with appropriate decisive policies, must inevitably prevent any public promotion of minority national identities. It is by no means the existence of national minorities as public and as a state relationship, status and character, and as an obligation of the state, to promote, nurture and develop the identities of national minorities on the basis of accepting a concept of minority national rights.

In this context it is very important and interesting to point out that the modern nation-state, including the Turkish nation-state, in no case must accept, and does not really accept, that it is a multilingual state. This is something that is quite normal when it is known that one of the most fundamental principles and postulates of the nation-state is the non-acceptance of the existence of multiethnicity and multinationality within the state. The nation-state insists on its own only official language, because the nation-state language, as an essential and fundamental element of its national and total cultural identity, sets and treats that language as one of the most essential and most fundamental substances and factors of its integration and cohesion, as well as the integration and cohesion of the entire social community (Aydingun 2010).

This theoretical elaboration of the nation-state concept, among other things, inevitably shows and suggests that it must be constituted exclusively as a unitary state. In no case must it allow any forms and contents of its federalization – political, territorial, cultural, economic, fiscal etc. (Ozbudun 2011).

The modern Turkish nation-state is a secular state, with a concrete model of secularism that is very hard and excluded a model of a secular state. Islamism, or pro-Islamism, of Erdogan's Justice and Development Party is ideological and political (pro) Islamism that does not touch them, does not problematize and does not deny the basic constitutional and total legal principles, postulates and norms of secularism, just as he is set in Turkey's constitutional and legal order (Gormez 2012).



## CONVENTION CONCERNING THE EXCHANGE OF GREEK AND TURKISH POPULATIONS AND TREATY OF LAUSANNE

The Greek concept and model of a nation-state, just like the Turkish concept and model, is also a typical and classic concept and model of a nation-state. Therefore, for the purpose of achieving as much ethnic and national homogenization as possible of the two nation-states, the Convention (also known as the Lausanne Convention)<sup>1</sup> and the Treaty (and also known as the Lausanne Treaty)<sup>2</sup>, referred to in the above subheading, were adopted.

The Convention was signed between the governments of Greece and Turkey in Lausanne on January 30, 1923 (Turkey ratified it on August 23, 1923, and Greece two days later). With the Convention and the Treaty in reality ended the Greco-Turkish war fought in the period from 1919 to 1922. The convention agreed on a simultaneous exchange of population between the two countries-the resettlement of Orthodox Christians from Turkey to Greece and Muslims from Greece to Turkey, with the exception of Muslims from Western Thrace and Orthodox Christians from Constantinople, or Istanbul. These Muslims were concentrated in the north of Greece, along with Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia, of which one not very large part was previously resettlement from Greece to Bulgaria based on the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine. It is very easy to notice that the Convention does not speak of ethnic and national identities, but only religious, which will be specified and developed in the Treaty half a year later. The convention covered about two million people-1.5 Orthodox Christians and 500 000 Muslims.

The mentioned Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine<sup>3</sup>, in Bulgaria also known as the Second National Catastrophe, was imposed on Bulgaria as a defeated side in the World War I. The treaty was signed in Neuille-sur-Seine, France, on November 27, 1919, and with it Bulgaria lost significant territories. For us, this Treaty is important because it stipulates in Article 56 line 2 the adoption of a Convention<sup>4</sup>, which provides for emigration, determined as voluntary, on the part of the Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia to Bulgaria-the Convention between Bulgaria and Greece on the replacement and voluntary emigration of minorities. With this convention, in reality, (at least a formal legal) international-legal attempt was made for the legalization of the forced resettlement of Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia in Bulgaria.

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<sup>1</sup> Lausanne Peace Treaty VI. Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations Signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-vi\\_-convention-concerning-the-exchange-of-greek-and-turkish-populations-signed-at-lausanne\\_en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-vi_-convention-concerning-the-exchange-of-greek-and-turkish-populations-signed-at-lausanne_en.mfa)

<sup>2</sup> Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, [https://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty\\_of\\_Lausanne](https://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne)

<sup>3</sup> Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, and Protocol and Declaration signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine, 27 November 1919, <http://www.gwpda.org/1918p/neuilly.html>

<sup>4</sup> CONVENTION ENTRE LA GRÈCE ET LA BULGARIE RELATIVE A L'ÉMIGRATION RÉCIPROQUE SIGNÉE A NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE LE 27 NOVEMBRE 1919, [https://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie\\_B/B\\_17/02\\_Communautes\\_greco-bulgares\\_Annexe\\_1.pdf](https://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie_B/B_17/02_Communautes_greco-bulgares_Annexe_1.pdf)

On the other hand, and the Bulgarian interest was to get of the Greek population, through the alleged voluntary exchange of population, which was concentrated in Plovdiv and along the coast of the Black Sea, and they received pecuniary compensation for real estate. However, despite all the pressures on the population on both sides of the border, the number of population who moved was inadequate in terms of the state and national goals of the two countries - 800 people moved out of which no more than 250 Macedonians. What Greece did not achieve with this convention, it has significantly achieved it with the Lausanne Convention, which was imposed as a defeated part of Turkey in their mutual war between 1919 and 1922. Then Greece settled a total of 1 230 000 Orthodox Christians, of which 640 000 in Aegean Macedonia, changing the drastically ethnic and national composition of the population in Aegean Macedonia. In the homes of the Macedonians who still stayed in Aegean Macedonia, one or more refugee families were accommodated, of course, in order to make the life of the Macedonians unbearable. The forced accommodation was followed by the seizure of fields, inventars and other household utensils (Kiselinovski 2018).

The Lausanne treaty, at an extremely relevant international legal level, legalized and strengthened the provisions of the Conventions. The Lausanne treaty in this sense is a complete international legal confirmation and recognition of the concept and model of the modern Turkish nation-state, along with the same confirmation of the modern Greek nation-state. The treaty was signed in Lausanne on July 24, 1923 between the Ottoman Empire on the one hand and France, Britain, Italy, Japan, Greece and Romania on the other. The Treaty defines and guarantees the borders of the modern Turkish nation-state, the Republic of Turkey. At this point, it must be emphasized that the border in the Aegean Sea is the most neural point in the relations between Turkey and Greece. Erdogan recently even mentioned a possible request by Turkey to revise this border. The problem is basically the determinant of geography-the Greek coast is rich in islands in contrast to Turkish. In this way and in accordance with the existing international maritime law, the Aegean Sea for Turkey turns into an ordinary small lake, a fact that for Turkey there are quite large negative geostrategic, defensive and security consequences besides the economic and tourist consequences (Sasajkovski 2012 ). However, for the subject of this text, the most important thing is that the Treaty obliges the two countries, Turkey and Greece, to respect the minorities within their respective countries. But the Treaty, just like the Lausanne Convention, does not define these minorities as ethnical and national, but exclusively only as a religious-orthodox Christian in Turkey and Muslim in Greece. A determination that is fully in line with the concept of a nation-state with the concrete models of the modern Turkish and modern Greek state as nation-states.

## THE CHALLENGE OF THE KURDS ON THE CONCEPT OF THE TURKISH NATION-STATE

The Kurds are the biggest challenge for the concept and the concrete model of the modern Turkish nation state. The challenge concerns both the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Turkey, as well as the concept and concrete model of the modern Turkish nation state, something that is even more challenging.

The Kurds are probably the largest ethnic group or nation that has not constituted its own national or home state. Estimates are that they have more than 35 million worldwide. The region where it is dominantly concentrated, and which is called Kurdistan, consists of interconnected areas of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Kurdish regions are also in Lebanon, Armenia and Azerbaijan, but these regions do not make a whole with the Kurdistan region, just as there is a Kurdish diaspora in the United States and several European countries. The estimation is that in the region that is called Kurdistan there are about 27 million Kurds living. In Turkey Kurds are 20% of the population, in Iraq 15-20%, in Syria 8% and in Iran 7%. The estimation is that in Turkey, 55% of the total number of Kurds living around the world live (Bajalan 2014).


It is crystal clear that if the geostrategic and geopolitical circumstances determine the formation of a Kurdish nation state, then the territorial integrity and sovereignty of these four states, in which historical region of Kurdistan is divided, will inevitably be disrupted. In Iraq, Kurds actually have their own state in a state that, among other things, controls rich oil resources. Therefore, the Republic of Turkey is willing to seriously destruct its relations even with the United States if the relevant geostrategic and geopolitical determinants suggest the possible establishment of a Kurdish nation state. And precisely because of this in the current geostrategic and geopolitical circumstances it is not realistic to form a Kurdish state (Sasajkovski 2018).

The Kurdish challenge for the modern Turkish nation-state is in the danger of being challenged by the concept and the concrete model of the modern Turkish nation-state. The Republic of Turkey at any price has not accepted it so far, and it is not realistic to expect that it will ever accept that it is not a nation-state. That is, it is a state and a society in which national minorities exist, including Kurdish, as public and as a state factor and determinant, and not only as personal, private and domestic determination and behavior. In this place it must be emphasized that the Justice and Development Party and Erdogan, unlike the hard, true or self-styled, heirs of Ataturk's vision of a modern (pro)western Turkish nation-state, have expressed and implemented several political measures in the direction of easier and safer expression of Kurdish national identity within their personal, private and house relations (Okyay 2017). The turnaround of Turkey's policy towards the war in Syria in the most obvious way shows and confirms that for Turkey it is less evil to accept the reality of the state of Syria in its current internationally recognized borders under certain conditions and to accept the

Assad's power as fully relevant regional geopolitical factors and competitors, than to enter military and political actions on the complete destruction of the state of Syria at the cost of that destruction to create a real possibility for the constitution of the Kurdish state.

## CONCLUSION

The concept and practical models of a nation-state, including the concept and practical model of the modern Turkish nation-state, should overcome various kinds of cultural differences - ethnic, national, linguistic, in order to set the cultural basis for building an optimal level on the integration and cohesion of the state as a kind of social community or as a social body. This level of integration and cohesion is necessary in order to provide the necessary level of quality of the functionality of the state as a nation-state, that is, of the social community.

The concept and practical models of a nation-state, including the concept and practical model of the Turkish nation-state, must, through the constitutional and total legal order, as well as through appropriate policies, establish exclusivity and full domination of the national identity of the nation who constitute its state as a nation-state and determines the name of the state as a derivative of its national identity, that is, as a derivative of the national name. That is why this concept and the concrete models of the nation-state, and of course the concrete Turkish concept and model of nation-state, enter the direct and fundamental conflict with the concept and concrete models of multiethnicity, multinationality and multiculturalism, and in no way should they be factors and contents of the constitutional and total legal order of the state as a nation-state. The nation-state sets the total cultural diversity of its population exclusively within personal and private relations, that is, within family and domestic relations, and in no way supports this diversity. 

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**Editor-in-Chief:** Goran Ilik, PhD

**Managing Editor:** Mladen Karadjoski, PhD

**Available Format:** Online

**Language:** English

**eISSN:** 1857-9760

**Publisher:** Institute for Research and European Studies

**Fields:** Political Sciences, International Relations, International Law

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Date of acceptance: March 03, 2019

Date of publication: May 25, 2019

Essay

UDC 343.541

Scan the QR code:



## THE #MeToo MOVEMENT

By

Dustin Pickering<sup>1</sup>

Shortly after Trump's nefarious election to the office of President of the United States, a movement emerged following scandals surrounding Harvey Weinstein. Weinstein, Hollywood producer of *Shakespeare in Love* and *The Lord of the Rings: Fellowship of the Ring* fame, was accused of sexual abuses ranging from rape to harassment by actresses such as Gwyneth Paltrow and Salma Hayek. These sudden allegations sparked a movement known as '#MeToo' with the intended purpose of demonstrating how frequent sexual abuse happens and how little of it is reported. The movement received worldwide support as well as criticism. In France, for instance, a collective of one hundred feminists denounced the movement in the paper *Le Monde* with these words: "But it is the characteristic of Puritanism to borrow, in the name of a so-called general good, the arguments of the protection of women and their emancipation to better bind them to a status of eternal victims, poor little things under the influence of demon phalocrats, as in the good old days of witchcraft." It was then the world realized there was a rift in feminism worldwide. The French feminists insisted on a right for men to act in gallantry, to court and make fools of themselves however they wished provided they were not harming those they addressed. Free speech, in their opinion, should not be violated on the assumption of protecting the 'weaker sex'.

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The language quoted above demonstrates that these feminists seek female empowerment within the context of the modern world and the freedom it offers.

According to a 2010 report entitled *False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of Reported Cases*, “To classify a case as a false allegation, a thorough investigation must yield evidence that a crime did not occur”. This same report indicates that between 2%-10% of reported cases in the researched ten year period were false allegations. This clearly demonstrates that women are not inclined to lie about sexual misconduct toward them.

Yet false reports do occur. The #MeToo Movement developed the criteria of ‘always believe the woman’ ignoring the right of trial by jury.<sup>2</sup> What began as a movement of highlighting and examining the nature of sexual abuse moved toward a general movement of contempt for men. Flirting became suspect, the language normally exchanged between men and women during courtship was challenged (telling a woman she is ‘pretty’ somehow assaulted her or objectified her), and women even developed lists such as the ‘shitty men in publishing list’ that called out certain men in the industry for making them ‘feel creeped out’, among more serious charges.

Normally what another person feels is entirely subjective. If I am uncomfortable with someone, I can choose to avoid them but I might recognize my feelings are simply feelings, not reality. The new standard became any accusation leveled at a man concerning misconduct should be believed and taken seriously. The woman’s instincts must be held as the ultimate judge concerning a man’s character. This standard raged over the internet on social media, in public forums, and across calls from activists.

Such an attitude can only be taken as an exaggerated response to a serious issue that has run rampant throughout civilization for centuries. Women, as they become empowered economically and civilly, turn against their oppressor or benefactor (depending on your viewpoint) in a backlash of rage and spite. The rally call is, “We no longer need men! They have shoved us in the dirt and made us their pleasure objects for centuries!” Diane Ackerman in *A Natural History of Love* discusses how Roman fathers were permitted to abandon their infant daughters to the wild. She writes, “A father could decide a child’s fate at birth, depending on whether a girl or boy was born”. All the while, such men acquired possessions endlessly to prove their worth to their peers and countrymen. The history of coverture also demonstrates sexism. Coverture is the tradition of a bride assuming her husband’s last name upon marriage. It has its roots in English common law. Upon birth, a female is given her father’s name until the day of her marriage. The word ‘coverture’ means ‘covered by’ and indicates that the woman is one with her father or husband—that is, she is his property. This tradition began in the ninth century and, like the tradition in Rome, prevented women from engaging in public affairs or owning property.

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<sup>2</sup> “Me Too” was used as social media activism by civil rights activist Tarana Burke before it was picked up by Alyssa Milano.

The legal nature of coverture existed in the United States until the 1970's when women were allowed to choose whether to keep their maiden names or not.

Obviously, there is a need for a strong women's liberation movement to establish equal rights and the integrity of women's emotions and pursuits. Historically, such movements have seen limited successes.

Women are beginning to be heard, appreciated, and considered competent for work, legal decisions, and raising their own kids. The #MeToo Movement is a sore necessity in exposing the social corruption that underpins sexual abuse and misconduct. We should consider treading this space carefully as we do not want to demonize men or destroy masculinity. We can have a society where all people are free to live safely, in pursuit of their independent goals. #MeToo began with the intention of destroying the blind hubris of powerful men who are 'too big to fail' or be called out for sexual assault. We are seeing headway in this respect, but let's not allow ourselves to overindulge in mob mentalities or aggressive unfounded accusations. In the words of President Theodore Roosevelt, "Tread lightly, but carry a big stick."



#metoo